Opinion
24-CV-0689 (LTS)
06-10-2024
DAYSHAUN JONES, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER CAILLEC, Certified Financial Officer, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action asserting a breach of contract claim. By order dated February 28, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dayshaun Jones sues Christophe Le Caillec, Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of American Express Company, for breach of contract. Plaintiff filed this action on January 20, 2024, by order to show cause requesting preliminary injunctive relief. (ECF Nos. 1, 4-5.) By order dated March 1, 2024, the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and denied as moot Plaintiff's request for a hearing on his request. (ECF No. 8.) On March 8, 2024, without direction from the Court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff alleges the same facts and seeks the same relief as in his original complaint.
The following allegations are taken from Plaintiff's amended complaint and attachments.Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement dated January 16, 2024. On January 19, 2024, Defendant received a notarized letter of default on the agreement. Plaintiff asserts that he performed the terms of the agreement and gave valuable consideration, but that Defendant did not perform his obligations as per the agreement. Plaintiff therefore asserts that Defendant breached the agreement, and he brings this action seeking to have the Court order Defendant to specifically “perform his obligations to give equal consideration on behalf of the agreement.” (ECF No. 9 at 12.)
The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
As an attachment to his amended complaint, Plaintiff includes a letter addressed to Defendant and mailed to 200 Vesey Street in Manhattan, the site of American Express's world headquarters. In the letter, Plaintiff, who writes the letter as an agent on behalf of himself, purports to “[a]ccept all titles, rights, interest, and EQUITY on behalf of the Principal,” and directs Defendant “to transfer principal[']s balance to principal[']s account . . . each and every month for set[-]off.” Jones further wrote that “[i]f no answer is received I will assume instructions have been acknowledged and applied.” It appears that Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff's letter, and Plaintiff's requests were not granted.
A review of the Public Access to Court Records (“PACER”) database reveals that in 2023, Plaintiff filed three similar actions-against Jeffrey Campbell (Defendant's predecessor at American Express), Jon Farney (then-CFO of State Farm), and Matthew Ellis (former CFO of Verizon), respectively-in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. Two of those cases were dismissed by the court; Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the third. See Jones v. Farney, No. 23-CV-00563 (BKS) (DJS) (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff's second amended complaint with prejudice); Jones v. Ellis, No. 23-CV-00656 (GLS) (DJS) (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff's amended complaint); Jones v. Campbell, No. 23-CV-00732 (LEK) (CFH) (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2023) (acknowledging Plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal and closing the action).
DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.'” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative ....”).
1. Federal Question Jurisdiction
To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff's claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 118889 (2d Cir. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts demonstrating a viable federal claim. His allegations of breach of contract arise under state law. The facts alleged also do not suggest that American Express's failure to respond to Plaintiff's letter would implicate any federal laws or regulations governing banking institutions or credit lenders. The Court therefore does not have federal question jurisdiction of Plaintiff's claim.
2. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction
The federal court does not have jurisdiction of Plaintiff's state-law, breach-of-contract claim unless he can show diversity of citizenship. To establish diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep't of Corr. V. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff resides in New York, it contains no allegations concerning Defendant's state of residence; the Court is therefore without a basis to determine whether diversity of citizenship exists. Additionally, because Plaintiff does not allege an amount in controversy, he has not alleged to a “reasonable probability” that the statutory minimum is satisfied. Colavito, 438 F.3d at 221.
Because, as explained above, Plaintiff does not allege a valid federal claim, this court can exercise jurisdiction of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim against Defendant only if it possesses diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Because the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to find that the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are met, however, the Court does not have such jurisdiction of the claim.
The Court offers no opinion as to the viability of any state law claim Plaintiff may wish to pursue in state court against Defendant.
B. Leave to Replead
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Although the Court finds that it is unlikely that Plaintiff can allege additional facts to state a valid federal claim, in light of his pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead to allege facts to state a valid federal claim or show that the Court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of his breach-of-contract claim.
Plaintiff must reallege his claim against Defendant, indicate whether Defendant resides in a state other than New York, and whether his damages exceed $75,000. If Plaintiff has an address for Defendant, he must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the second amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the second amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should allege facts showing that the Court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of his breach of contract claim against Defendant.
Because Plaintiff's second amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the amended complaint must be repeated in the second amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 30 days of the date of this order, caption the document as a “Second Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 24-CV-0689 (LTS). A Second Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this case.
The Clerk of Court is instructed to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.