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Johnston v. Blanchard

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department
Dec 20, 1949
276 AD 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949)

Opinion


276 A.D. 839 93 N.Y.S.2d 338 JOHNSTON v. BLANCHARD. Supreme Court of New York, First Department December 20, 1949

         Roy W. Johnston brought action against George K. Blanchard to recover for injuries sustained when struck by a golf ball which had been hit by defendant.

         A judgment was entered in the Supreme Court, New York County, Benedict D. Dineen, J., for the plaintiff on the verdict of a jury, and the defendant appealed.

         The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the judgment without opinion.

         In action for injuries sustained by golfer when he was struck by a ball of companion who did not call " fore" before playing his shot, evidence sustained verdict for golfer who was injured.

          Archie B. Morrison, New York City, of counsel (John D. Lynn and Robert A. Dwyer, New York City, with him on the brief; Daniel Miner, New York City, attorney), for appellant.

          Robert Hoffman, New York City (Samuel S. Kolman, New York City, with him on the brief), for respondent.

          Before GLENNON, J. P., and DORE, COHN, VAN VOORHIS and SHIENTAG, JJ.

         PER CURIAM.

          Judgment affirmed with costs.

         Order filed.

         VAN VOORHIS and SHIENTAG, JJ., dissent and vote to reverse and dismiss the complaint.

         VAN VOORHIS, Justice (dissenting).

          Plaintiff testified that, playing in a threesome, he went to look for defendant's golf ball which had been lost in the rough, but that it was found when plaintiff was between 50 and 100 feet away from defendant. Then plaintiff went to look for the ball of the third player, nearer to the next green, which was found also. Plaintiff knew that under the etiquette of the game defendant had the next play, his ball being farthest from the next hole. It thus appears from plaintiff's own testimony that he knew where defendant was, knew that the latter was likely to swing, and plaintiff testified that he actually saw defendant swing. The only advantage in defendant's shouting ‘ fore’ would have been to have enabled plaintiff to have retired to a place of safety. Giving warning could have made no difference in the case of this accident, since plaintiff was already in possession of the information which would have been conveyed to him if defendant had called the word ‘ fore’ before playing his shot. Plaintiff, knowing the circumstances, voluntarily took a position nearer to the next hole, about 30 degrees outside of a direct line between defendant and the next hole. He knew that defendant was going to play, knew that he was upon the opposite side of the tree through the branches of which the ball came, and took a chance that defendant would shoot straighter than he did. Plaintiff assumed the risk that he might be hit. A plaintiff should not be permitted to recover who has assumed a risk inherent in a sport in which he is a participant, Rocchio v. Frers, 248 A.D. 786, 290 N.Y.S. 432; Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa.Super. 471, 157 A. 10; Stober v. Embry, 243 Ky. 117, 47 S.W.2d 921. In Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, Inc., 245 A.D. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505, and Kaufman v. Madison Square Garden Corporation, 246 A.D. 593, 284 N.Y.S. 808, complaints were dismissed on the law where spectators had been struck by hockey pucks. The opinion in the Ingersoll case, supra, cites as analogous several cases in other states where spectators were struck by baseballs, where the complaints were dismissed on the law. Other cases where similar disposition was made, and in which plaintiffs were held to have assumed the risks involved in amusements, are Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173, and Lumsden v. L. A. Thompson Scenic Ry. Co., 130 A.D. 209, 114 N.Y.S. 421. In Stober v. Embry, supra, a golf ball case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals said, 243 Ky. at page 121, 47 S.W.2d at page 922:‘ It is a sound principle, frequently applied, that warning is never required to be given to persons aware of potentially dangerous movements about to be made.'

         In Benjamin v. Nernberg, supra, the Pennsylvania Superior Court said, 102 Pa.Super. at page 476, 157 A., at page 11:‘ It is common knowledge, at least among players, that many bad shots must result although every stroke is delivered with the best possible intention and without any negligence whatever. * * * This risk all golf players must accept.'

         The judgment appealed from should be reversed, with costs, and the complaint dismissed.

Summaries of

Johnston v. Blanchard

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department
Dec 20, 1949
276 AD 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949)
Case details for

Johnston v. Blanchard

Case Details

Full title:JOHNSTON v. BLANCHARD.

Court:Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department

Date published: Dec 20, 1949

Citations

276 AD 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949)
93 N.Y.S.2d 338

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