Summary
In Johnson v. Zerivitz, 234 Md. 113, 198 A.2d 254 (1964), the appellant was a taxicab driver who had been rear-ended by a truck.
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[No. 169, September Term, 1963.]
Decided March 10, 1964.
EVIDENCE — Of Emotional Disturbance Resulting From Automobile Accident — Required Expert Medical Testimony — Cannot Be Left To The Speculation Of The Jury — Testimony Here Was Insufficient To Go To The Jury. The appellant in this case, a taxicab driver, claimed severe and disabling injuries as a result of an automobile accident. He attempted to show that if there was any exaggeration of injuries it was due to an unconscious emotional injury, which had been caused by the accident and he contended that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that there was no legally sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant sustained any emotional injury or disturbance as a result of the accident. However, it was held that the instructions on this point were correct. Causes of emotional disturbances are complicated medical questions, proof of which must be made by expert medical testimony and cannot be left to the speculation of the jury. Although several doctors testified in this case, they either were not asked, or stated they could not say, whether the exaggeration of injuries was unconsciously caused by an emotional disturbance. Only one psychiatrist testified. His conclusion was that any emotional disturbance was the direct result of both the instant accident and a prior one. This testimony was not sufficient to go to the jury, since, assuming the jury found an emotional disturbance, it would be required to speculate as to how much, if any, of this disturbance was specifically due to the accident in question and, as previously stated, such speculation has been condemned. pp. 115-117
DAMAGES — Automobile Accident — Personal Injury — Instructions To Jury Were Proper. In the instant automobile accident case the appellant contended that the trial court erred by "allowing the jury to consider the possibility that the plaintiff might not be entitled to recover any amount of damages by the use of the words `if any' in discussing damages; and further by emphasizing said words". It was held that since the appellees were contending that either the appellant had not suffered any injuries or that such injuries as he might have were caused by a prior accident, or other previous accidents, the inclusion of the words "if any" in the instructions was not error. Furthermore, even assuming that it would have been prejudicial error, under the facts of this case, for the trial judge to unduly emphasize the words "if any," a reading of the complete charge showed that these words were not in fact emphasized. p. 117
EVIDENCE — Of Causal Connection Between Alleged Leg Injury Resulting From Instant Automobile Accident And Subsequent Injury Was An Intricate And Involved Medical Question — Expert Testimony Was Insufficient — Question Was Properly Withheld From Jury Consideration. In the instant automobile accident case the appellant contended that injuries resulting from the accident caused his leg to buckle two and one-half years later while he was filling a hot water bottle and he was scalded, and thus the appellees were responsible for the scalding. The trial judge instructed the jury that no damages could be awarded as a result of the scalding, and the appellant claimed this was error. The Court held that where the alleged injury to the leg did not manifest itself until six months after the accident and the scalding did not occur until two years thereafter, the causal connection was an intricate and involved medical question which could only have been established by medical testimony. Since such testimony was lacking, the trial court was correct in refusing to allow the jury to consider the scalding as an element of the appellant's damages. pp. 117-118
APPEAL — Adequacy Of Verdict Was Not Reviewable Where No Prejudicial Error In Instructions To Jury Was Shown. Where no prejudicial error in the trial court's instructions to the jury was shown, the adequacy of the verdict was not reviewable on appeal. p. 118
H.C. Decided March 10, 1964.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (FOSTER, J.).
Action for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident by James N. Johnson, to his own use and the use of the Maryland Indemnity and Fire Insurance Exchange, against Beryl Zerivitz and others, etc. and Robert Randall. From the judgment entered on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $1,800, he appealed.
Judgment affirmed; appellant to pay the costs.
The cause was argued before BRUNE, C.J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, MARBURY and SYBERT, JJ.
Paul R. Rochlin and Irving Settleman for appellant.
M. King Hill, Jr., with whom were Smith, Somerville Case on the brief, for appellees.
On May 22 1960, after a taxicab operated by the appellant, James N. Johnson, had stopped to discharge a passenger, it was struck in the rear by a truck driven by the appellee, Robert Randall, an employee of the other appellees, Beryl Zerivitz and others trading as Pariser Bakery. The sole question before the jury was the nature and extent of the appellant's injuries resulting from the accident, liability having been admitted by all appellees.
The appellant claimed severe and disabling injuries, although he admitted on cross-examination that the accident produced no cut, mark, bruise or anything that could be seen on his body. The appellees took the position that the appellant was not injured as a result of the accident on May 22 1960; that he was consciously malingering and exaggerating his injuries; and that the injuries complained of had actually resulted from previous accidents, particularly from a similar accident two and one-half months before, on March 5 1960. The appellant attempted to show that any exaggeration of injuries was due to an unconscious emotional injury, which had been caused by the accident of May 22 1960. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellant in the amount of $1,800. After a motion for a new trial was denied the appellant filed this appeal.
The appellant's complaint is that the verdict was grossly inadequate, in view of the injuries allegedly sustained, and he blames certain of the court's instructions for that result. He first maintains that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that there was no legally sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant sustained any emotional injury or disturbance as a result of the accident of May 22 1960. Our review of the testimony convinces us that the trial court's instruction on this point was correct.
In Wilhelm v. State Traffic Comm., 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715 (1962), it was held that the causes of emotional disturbances are complicated medical questions, proof of which must be made by expert medical testimony. Cf. Craig v. Chenoweth, 232 Md. 397, 194 A.2d 78 (1963). In Wilhelm, Judge Prescott exhaustively reviewed the authorities on the point and said for the Court (at p. 101 of 230 Md.):
"There can be little doubt, we think, that a question involving the causes of emotional disturbances in a person sufficient to evoke, subconsciously, grossly exaggerated symptoms is an intricate and complex one, peculiarly appropriate for science to answer. To allow a jury of laymen, unskilled in medical science, to attempt to answer such a question would permit the rankest kind of guesswork, speculation and conjecture."
Several doctors in the field of neurosurgery, orthopedic surgery, and traumatic and internal medicine, who had treated the appellant, testified that his symptoms and responses were exaggerated, but they either were not asked, or stated that they could not say, whether this was intentional and malingering or whether the exaggeration was unconsciously caused by an emotional disturbance. As one doctor stated, in refusing to express an opinion as to what caused the exaggeration: "whether there is indeed a functional overlay [emotional disturbance] present, [or] whether it is malingering, hysterical, or some other process, lies in the field of psychiatry." Only one psychiatrist testified. When asked, in a hypothetical question, his conclusion as to whether there was a causal connection between the accident of May 22 1960 and the appellant's condition (assuming an emotional disturbance), he stated that in his opinion the condition was "a direct result of the automobile accidents" (referring to both the accident of March 5 1960 and that of May 22 1960). This testimony was not sufficient to allow the question of emotional disturbance to go to the jury, since, assuming the jury found an emotional disturbance, it would be required to speculate as to how much, if any, of this disturbance was specifically due to the accident in question. Such speculation was condemned in the Wilhelm and Craig cases, supra, and hence the instruction on this phase of the case was justified.
The second issue raised by the appellant is that the trial court erred by "allowing the jury to consider the possibility that the plaintiff might not be entitled to recover any amount of damages by the use of the words `if any' in discussing damages; and further by emphasizing said words". This issue requires little discussion. Since the appellees were contending that either the appellant had not suffered any injuries or that such injuries as he might have were caused by the prior accident of March 5 1960 or other previous accidents mentioned in the testimony, the inclusion of the words "if any" in the instructions to the jury was not error. Furthermore, even assuming that it would have been prejudicial error, under the facts of this case, for the trial judge to unduly emphasize the words "if any", a reading of the complete charge shows that these words were not in fact emphasized.
The appellant's next contention is likewise without merit. In December 1962 — more than two and one-half years after the accident in question — he was scalded when his leg "gave way" while he was filling a hot water bottle. He claimed that his injuries in the accident of May 22 1960 caused his leg to buckle in December 1962, and thus the appellees were responsible for the scalding. The trial judge instructed the jury that no damages could be awarded as a result of the scalding, and the appellant contends that this was error. We cannot agree. There was no testimony sufficient to prove that the scalding in December 1962 was caused by the accident in question. The appellant made no complaint of any injury to his leg until December 1960 — six months after the accident which appellant now claims caused the injury to his leg. Under these circumstances expert medical testimony was again needed to establish a causal connection, but again, no such testimony was offered. In Wilhelm v. State Traffic Comm., supra, we held that when the symptoms complained of did not develop until several months after the accident and there was no medical testimony to show a connection between the symptoms complained of and the accident, the trial court was correct in refusing to submit the question of causal connection to the jury. The rationale of the Wilhelm case is controlling here, where the alleged injury to the leg did not manifest itself until six months after the accident and the scalding did not occur until two years thereafter. Under these circumstances, the causal connection between any injury to the appellant's leg and the accident in question was an intricate and involved medical question which could only have been established by medical testimony. Lacking such testimony, the trial court was correct in refusing to allow the jury to consider the scalding of December 1962 as an element of the appellant's damages.
The appellant urges, finally, that this Court should reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial because the jury's verdict was grossly inadequate. However, since no prejudicial error in the court's instructions has been shown, the adequacy of the verdict is not reviewable on appeal. Leizear v. Butler, 226 Md. 171, 172 A.2d 518 (1961), and cases cited. See also State v. Gray, 227 Md. 318, 323, 176 A.2d 867 (1962).
Judgment affirmed; appellant to pay the costs.