Opinion
(September Term, 1894.)
Justice of the Peace — Jurisdiction.
Where two actions were brought before a justice of the peace, not to enforce a contract by recovering judgment for an ascertained amount of indebtedness, but for the recovery in claim and delivery proceedings of the possession of distinct articles of property, to wit, corn of the value of $35 made upon certain lands in the first, and cotton and fodder raised thereon of the value of $15 in the second action, the court of the justice of the peace had jurisdiction, under the principle laid down in Bell v. Howerton, 111 N.C. 69, this not being a case of "splitting up" the items of indebtedness for the purpose of giving jurisdiction.
(34) ACTION, the consolidation of two suits brought by plaintiff against defendant on 8 November, 1892, before J. P. Leach, justice of the peace in Warren County, one demand having been made by the plaintiff upon the defendant for the property embraced in both suits; and upon the trial before said justice the defendant put in no defense, and the plaintiff recovered judgment in both suits for the property described in the summons in the suits. From these judgments the defendant appealed to the Superior Court of Warren County, and in the Superior Court the two actions as begun before the justice of the peace were, by consent of all parties, consolidated.
(35) From his Honor's ruling dismissing said action for want of jurisdiction in the justice of the peace the plaintiff appealed.
Thomas W. Hawkins for plaintiff.
Walter A. Montgomery for defendant.
The two actions were brought before the justice of the peace, not to enforce a contract by recovering judgment for an ascertained amount of indebtedness, but for the recovery of the possession of distinct articles of property, to wit, corn of the value of $35 made upon certain land, in the first, and cotton and fodder raised thereon, of the value of $15, in the second action. The court of the justice unquestionably had jurisdiction, under the principle laid down in Bell v. Howerton, 111 N.C. 69. This is not one of the cases where an attempt has been made to give jurisdiction by "splitting up" the items of indebtedness due on a single contract so as to bring the amount demanded in each action within the constitutional limit. The ruling of the court below sustaining the conclusion of the referee that the magistrate's court had no jurisdiction is, therefore, reversed, and the cause will stand for hearing upon the report of the referee.
Reversed.
(36)