Opinion
FSTCV166029255S
01-12-2018
Matthew JOHNSON v. WEBTAB, INC.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
POVODATOR, J.
Background
This is a lawsuit involving a Connecticut plaintiff and two West Coast defendants, an individual and a business in which the individual had a managerial/controlling role, with one of the issues being whether the individual and business were located in California or Washington (state) for purposes of service. Both defendants have filed motions to dismiss, relying upon an affidavit from defendant Johnson. The plaintiff has filed objections to both motions, filing an affidavit only with respect to the corporate defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court heard argument on both motions on June 19, 2017.
The lawsuit centers on an indebtedness described as a note, whereby the plaintiff lent the corporate defendant $1.5 million, of which only $500,000 has been repaid. The claim against the corporate defendant is based on the note and various provisions relating to protecting the plaintiff’s interests; the claims against the individual defendant are based on his status as the principal of the corporate defendant and a reference in the operative document to an agreement of the defendant personally- but the only signatures on the document are those of the plaintiff and the individual defendant signing on behalf of the corporate defendant. By way of amended complaint filed in 2017, the plaintiffs added claims of tortious conduct by the individual defendant.
Specifically, the corporate defendant alleges that Connecticut longarm jurisdiction cannot be asserted over it, based on the conduct described in the complaint, as augmented by the affidavit submitted in support of the motion to dismiss. The claim is based on the lack of sufficiency of conduct under the relevant longarm statute, and further based on a constitutional due process minimum-contacts analysis. As a second basis for moving to dismiss, the defendant contends that it was not properly served under the provisions of the longarm statute.
The individual defendant also claims that there is/was a lack of minimum contacts and a lack of a basis for asserting longarm jurisdiction. He also claims that he was not served properly. He also claims that he did not sign any operative document in a personal capacity- but that appears to be a matter going to the merits rather than jurisdiction. Notably, in his affidavit and brief, he does not address the claim- asserted in the amended complaint- that he engaged in tortious conduct outside of Connecticut that caused injury within Connecticut (i.e., to plaintiff), which the plaintiff has claimed to be a basis for long-arm jurisdiction.
The plaintiff contests the motions to dismiss. As to the corporate defendant, he claims that there was sufficient contact for both statutory and constitutional purposes, and that service was made in compliance with the statutory requirements. As to the individual defendant, aside from challenging the merits of the defendant’s contentions, he relies on Practice Book § § 10-30 and 10-32, as the defendant filed an appearance more than 30 days prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss, such that there has been a waiver of the right to contest personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiff submitted an affidavit, but the affidavit goes to the issues of proper service and the existence of certain facts relating to the claimed tortious conduct of the individual defendant; it does not address the longarm jurisdictional aspects of defendant Webtab’s arguments, both as to statutory and constitutional impediments to assertion of jurisdiction.
Legal Standards
" A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction ... [O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo ... When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ... The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone." Petrucelli v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co., 146 Conn.App. 631, 639-40 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks, omitted.)
However:
" [I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... other types of undisputed evidence ... and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ... If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits ... or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings ... If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations ... or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question ... the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein ... " Finally, where a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts. [W]hen issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction ... due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses." (Internal quotation marks, parentheses and citations, omitted.) Cuozzo v. Town of Orange, 315 Conn. 606, 615-16, 109 A.3d 903, 908-09 (2015).
Discussion
I. Defendant Johnson
The individual defendant, Steven Johnson, filed a self-representation appearance on November 2, 2016, and his motion to dismiss, currently pending, was filed on April 11, 2017. In addition to various pleadings filed in that interval, the court conducted three status conferences, at least in part continuing the process to allow the defendant an opportunity to obtain counsel for himself and the corporate defendant. (An appearance was filed on behalf of the corporate defendant on February 15, 2017.) Thus, more than 5 months elapsed between the filing of an initial appearance and the filing of the motion to dismiss. Practice Book § § 10-30 and 10-32 make it clear that the failure to file a motion to dismiss within 30 days of the filing of an appearance constitutes a waiver of all waivable jurisdictional defects, and the issues presented in defendant Johnson’s motion all relate to personal jurisdiction and therefore are waivable.
In the defendant’s submission in support of the motion to dismiss, no mention was made of the presumptive waiver; the plaintiff clearly indicated his intention to rely on that waiver, in addition to arguing the merits.
The court recognizes that appellate authorities repeatedly direct trial courts to be solicitous of self-represented parties, but at the same time cautioning trial courts not to do so in a manner that adversely impacts the rights of other (represented) parties.
Connecticut courts are solicitous of self-represented parties when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties. Our courts allow self-represented parties some latitude, but that latitude is constrained by our rules of practice; the purpose of which is to provide a just determination of every proceeding. Argentinis v. Fortuna, 134 Conn.App. 538, 539 (2012) (citations and internal quotation marks, omitted).
Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law ... Self-represented parties are not afforded a lesser standard of compliance, and [a]lthough we are solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants ... [s]uch a litigant is bound by the same rules ... and procedure as those qualified to practice law. Rutka v. City of Meriden, 145 Conn.App. 202, 218 (2013) (ellipses as in cited case; internal quotation marks, omitted).
The defendant has not cited any authority for the proposition that the 30-day time period in which to file a motion to dismiss is subject to any exceptions, particularly related to a self-represented party. The intent of the rules is to ensure that any personal jurisdictional issues are raised in a timely manner, with " timely" defined in terms of a 30-day period (absent a requested extension of time). In this case, the situation is not even close; five months is well in excess of the allowed 30-day period in which to file a motion to challenge personal jurisdiction.
The result may appear somewhat harsh, but the court must recognize the need to be cognizant of the rights of others, with the directive that the limit on being solicitous is that it " does not interfere with the rights of other parties." The rules adopted almost 40 years ago eliminated special appearances- intended to allow an appearance for purposes of contesting jurisdiction- and instead adopted a time-based approach, giving parties 30 days to address jurisdiction after filing an appearance (again, absent a motion for extension of time directed to filing a motion to dismiss).
The court appreciates that a " typical" self-represented party may not appreciate the possible existence of a constitutional minimum contacts issue (International Shoe and its progeny). In contrast, the summons recites a Washington address for the defendant and the return of service recites service based on that address; if there were an issue as to the defendant’s (or defendants’) address for purposes of service, that was (should have been) apparent on the record, and could have been raised, in some fashion, in a more timely manner- but wasn’t.
The court notes that if waiver were disregarded, some issues might be subject to resolution on the current record, while others might not be amenable to resolution without further proceedings. The court cannot address the merits of any issue that might require an evidentiary hearing. Most notably in this regard, the plaintiff served the defendant at an address in Washington state; in an affidavit filed by the defendant, he asserts that he lives in San Francisco, and the court probably would need an evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute as to proper address (if for no other purpose than to determine when the San Francisco address became operative, assuming that the defendant moved from Seattle to San Francisco).
The current record would appear to allow a resolution of the claim that the alleged conduct of defendant Johnson is insufficient to form a basis for jurisdiction under General Statutes § 52-59b. The defendant attempts to refute the sufficiency of the allegations under the contract prong of the statute, but does not address the amended complaint which asserts an additional basis for jurisdiction predicated on tortious conduct outside the state causing injury to someone within the state. Not only has the plaintiff alleged such a factual basis in the amended complaint but also, in response to the motions pending, submitted documentary evidence tending to support some of those contentions. Absent any affidavit or other factual submission to the contrary, and absent any effort to identify deficiencies in the tort-based claim of jurisdiction, the court is left with interpreting the pleadings and submissions of the plaintiff in this regard in a manner most favorable to supporting jurisdiction. That issue, then, based on the record before the court, would not be a basis for granting the motion to dismiss.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss as filed by the individual defendant must be denied.
II. Defendant Webtab
The situation with respect to the corporate defendant is different. There are multiple issues identified in the motion to dismiss, and the court will address the service issue first, because it is the most straightforward.
The plaintiff claims to have served the defendant at the address on file with the Washington (state) Secretary of State, which is an address in Seattle. The defendant has filed an affidavit (# 121.00) indicating that that is not the address of its principal office- that since May 15, 2016, its principal office has been in San Francisco. The statute, presumably to avoid precisely the type of situation here (recent unknown change of address), does not require service at the factual location of an office but rather allows for service at the address on file with a central repository of corporate information, if the actual current address is not known. The plaintiff’s affidavit affirms not only that the address at which service was made was the address on file at the time of service, but also that it remained the address on file as of the date of the execution of the affidavit prepared in response to the motion to dismiss. Therefore, the plaintiff has complied with the requirements of General Statutes § 33-929(g). (The defendant has not suggested that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the correct address but chose to have service made at the address on file, which might be argued constituted improper service.) The motion to dismiss is denied, in this respect.
The major argument advanced by the defendant is a blend of due process minimum contacts and the factual insufficiency of a claim of contractual activities for purposes of longarm jurisdiction (General Statutes § 33-929(f)). The defendant claims that it did not engage in any conduct in Connecticut, thereby negating both a premise for longarm jurisdiction as well as negating anything approaching a constitutionally-required level of minimum contacts.
The plaintiff’s response is that the defendant had reached out to the plaintiff, already affiliated with the defendant as a minor equity holder, seeking needed financing. The defendant is claimed to have known that the plaintiff resided in Connecticut; the plaintiff executed that document in Connecticut; the plaintiff wired $1.5 million from Connecticut to the defendant located on the West Coast; and a $500,000 partial repayment was made back into Connecticut. Those are the facts that are claimed to establish both long-term and constitutional jurisdiction.
With respect to statutory longarm jurisdiction, the plaintiff states: " Connecticut’s long-arm statute states in part that ‘[e]very foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state ... on any action arising (1) out of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state, ’ " and the contention is that the plaintiff having signed the operative document in Connecticut makes this a contract " made in this state or to be performed in this state."
[I]t is well established that a contract is considered made when and where the last thing is done which is necessary to create an effective agreement. Centennial Helicopters, Inc. v. Sterling Corp., 2005 WL 3508575, *2 (Conn.Sup.Ct. Nov. 22, 2005) (quoting Alfred M. Best Co., Inc. v. Goldstein, 124 Conn. 597, 602 (1938)); see also Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 2016 WL 5415399, *3 (Conn.Sup.Ct. Aug. 24, 2016).
That may well suffice for purposes of the longarm statute, but there remains the issue of due process and minimum contacts under International Shoe and its progeny. The U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the analysis required for constitutional purposes cannot be based on mechanical or formulaic tests.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945).
At the outset, we note a continued division among lower courts respecting whether and to what extent a contract can constitute a " contact" for purposes of due process analysis. If the question is whether an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it cannot. The Court long ago rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on " mechanical" tests, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, at 319, or on " conceptualistic ... theories of the place of contracting or of performance, " Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. at 316. Instead, we have emphasized the need for a " highly realistic" approach that recognizes that a " contract" is ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future consequences which themselves are the real object of the business transaction. Id. at 316-17. It is these factors- prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing- that must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 53 U.S.L.W. 4541 (1985).
The analysis requires purposeful and substantial conduct by the defendant, in the forum state.
" The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." This " purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of " random, " " fortuitous, " or " attenuated" contacts ... or of the " unilateral activity of another party or a third person" ...
... As the United States Supreme Court has explained, however, in order for personal jurisdiction to lie, the defendant must create the significant connection with the forum state [J]urisdiction is proper ... where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a " substantial connection" with the forum State. (Internal quotation marks and citations, omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 529-31 (2007).
As something of a corollary to the requirement of purposeful forum contact, the fact that conduct may have a foreseeable impact in a forum state does not give rise to jurisdiction if the conduct itself occurred outside the jurisdiction, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12, 82 U.S.L.W. 4097 (2014) (" [A] plaintiff’s contacts with the forum State cannot be decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are violated ..." (Internal quotation marks and citation, omitted.) 134 S.Ct. 1119).
The plaintiff relies on the rule that a contract is deemed created in the state in which the last step occurred, but that appears to be the epitome of a mechanical rule that cannot be deemed determinative in a minimum contacts analysis. Can the defendant be said to have availed itself of the privilege of doing business, potentially seeking the benefits or protection of Connecticut courts with regard to this transaction? Although not a true forum selection provision, the document specifies that California law governs (except in limited circumstances where Delaware law governs)- and California is the claimed residence of the corporate defendant’s principal as well as the physical location of the corporate defendant’s offices.
Based on the parties’ submissions and the court’s own research, there appears to be surprisingly sparse authority relating to situations analogous to the present one- a simple interstate loan transaction involving a business in one state and an individual creditor in another. The jurisdictional facts are sparse- there is no evidence of extended negotiations, and although plaintiff has claimed the contrary, the affidavit (evidence) presented to the court negates the presence of either defendant in Connecticut for that purpose. The plaintiff relies on an agreed loan, subsequent wiring of money from Connecticut to the West Coast, and an initial/single payment of $500,000 into Connecticut, all in connection with a West-Coast-based business venture.
The plaintiff asserts that he fully performed his contractual obligations in Connecticut, and in some circumstances, that has been found to be sufficient. See, e.g., Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 146 Conn.App. 341 (2013), where the plaintiff was expected to perform all contractual duties within Connecticut for an out-of-state election campaign (and was required to obtain approval before performing services outside Connecticut). That agreement required performance of substantial services in Connecticut, by an entity based in Connecticut.
In Avant Capital Partners, LLC v. Basis Investment Group, LLC, J.D. Stamford, FSTCV136017113S (January 23, 2014), the court focused on a single transaction between the parties, but the focus was activity in Connecticut:
The court finds that this was a single purposeful transaction that Basis, a New York business, did with Avant, a business with its only offices in Connecticut after January 1, 2010. The transaction had two purposes: to introduce Basis to Strathmore leading to closing a mortgage loan and Basis protecting Avant for its mortgage broker’s fees. The plaintiff has satisfied the long-arm statute, Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a)(1).
With respect to whether there were sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy constitutional requirements, the court in Avant discussed Cuddy extensively, concluding that " [t]he court finds that these contacts by Basis were purposeful and directed to accomplish a recognized business purpose. They were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts."
The plaintiff attempts to distinguish cases cited by the defendant, but in at least one instance does so inaccurately. In footnote 2, the plaintiff states:
The cases cited by Webtab in support of the Motion are inapposite and clearly distinguishable from the relevant facts present in this case. See, e.g., Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 120 (2007) (jurisdiction lacking because complaint arose out of defendant’s preparation of New York tax returns and therefore did not arise out of any contacts with Connecticut) ...
The Ryan case makes it clear that the defendant also prepared Connecticut tax returns, and indeed the preparation of Connecticut returns was a significant factor as argued by that plaintiff. Thus, at page 119 of the decision, the court explicitly addresses that claim: " With respect to the issue of whether the preparation of Connecticut income tax returns in New York by a New York accountant properly may be deemed to constitute transacting business in this state for purposes [of the long arm statute] ..." Later, at pages 120-21, the court stated: " Although it is true, of course, that the plaintiff resides in Connecticut and that [the defendant] prepared the plaintiff’s Connecticut income tax returns, we agree ... that those facts alone are insufficient" to constitute transacting business within the meaning of the longarm statute.
The court has found additional trial court decisions that address this type of issue. Seemingly similar in context/facts:
In the present case, the plaintiff has not filed any counteraffidavits or other evidence to rebut the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations. The plaintiff relies on the allegation that the plaintiff signed the note in Connecticut and lived in Connecticut when she received the funds under the note. There are no facts concerning whether the note was used to conduct business in Connecticut, obtain property in Connecticut, or whether the defendant consented to Connecticut jurisdiction, which are factors that the court should consider. See Savin v. Ranier, 898 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1990) (defendant obtaining financing for New York business from Connecticut resident with note payable in Connecticut does not amount to defendant transacting business in Connecticut); Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Castelli, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-95-0465911-S (April 25, 1995, Handy, J.) (holding that signing promissory note in Connecticut not sufficient to extend jurisdiction under long-arm statute); People’s Bank v. Zadora, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 059972 (September 22, 1992, Pickett, J.) (7 Conn.L.Rptr. 408) (holding that signing a contract in Connecticut, without more, does not satisfy minimum contacts); R.O.I. Development Corp. v. Weiss, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 391594 (December 21, 1992, Dunn, J.) (8 Conn.L.Rptr. 122) (holding that a single contract signed in Connecticut does not necessarily satisfy minimum contacts).
This appears to be a typographical error, and would only make sense if intended as a reference to the defendant. The court has reviewed the underlying court file to confirm this; the objection to the motion to dismiss, for example, recites that the contract was signed in Connecticut and claims an absence of any proof that the defendant did, in fact, live in Georgia, as had been claimed; the complaint recites that the defendant lived in Connecticut.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.
In Mitchell v. Patterson, No. 4001501, 2005 WL 1671528 (Conn.Super.Ct. June 21, 2005) , the court discussed the need for purposeful and relatively substantial involvement of the forum state, reiterating the proposition that the state in which a contract may have been last signed by the plaintiff, and perhaps coupled with some payments in the forum state, are insufficient to pass muster under the long-arm statute and/or International Shoe and its progeny. See, especially, footnote 6 which, in turn, extensively quoted Coan v. Bell Atlantic Systems Leasing, Inc., 813 F.Supp. 929 (D.Conn. 1990).
Coan, in turn, relied in large measure on Savin v. Ranier, 898 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1990), where the court discussed the inadequacy of the defendant’s contact with Connecticut: " Ranier’s only purposeful contact with Connecticut was in obtaining financing for his share of the New York business from a Connecticut resident." This was followed by the observation that additional events made for a closer call, but not enough to warrant recognition of jurisdiction: " Even though these additional contacts regarding payments on the note constituted transacting business with a Connecticut resident, they did not amount to Ranier’s transacting business in Connecticut." Id. at 307. This discussion was in the context of determining the reach of the long-arm statute, but the court went further, concluding that even if the long-arm statute was facially subject to application, due process considerations would have made jurisdiction improper:
Finally, we note that even if there were statutory authority for jurisdiction in this case, exercise of jurisdiction over Ranier would raise due process concerns. Designating Connecticut as the place for payment on the note was not an act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Rather, the place of payment was an unbargained-for convenience for the benefit of the plaintiff. Compare Wirth v. Prenyl, S.A., 29 A.D.2d 373, 375, 288 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1st Dep’t 1968) (holding that benefit of New York laws not bargained for where choice of New York as place of payment was to accommodate payee), with Sterling Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. v. Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 510 F.2d 870, 873-74 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding exercise of jurisdiction where maintenance of New York bank account was not merely for accommodation of lender but important part of bargain).
Moreover, simply receiving financing from a Connecticut resident is tantamount to an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party, which alone ... [cannot] automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum. Because neither the business of the syndicate nor of the note had a substantial connection with Connecticut, we find that Ranier’s contacts with Connecticut were too " attenuated" to serve as the basis for the district courts exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. (Internal quotation marks and citations, omitted.) Id. at 307.
These cases are to be distinguished from First Commerce of America, Inc. v. Potoker, No. CV 93-0531747 S, 1994 WL 506616 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept. 7, 1994) , where there was a clearly Connecticut-centered transaction, including a Connecticut lender and a Connecticut borrower, with the defendant as a guarantor and investor and manager of the Connecticut entity- and had been a resident at the time of the transaction.
Here, the plaintiff cannot point to any meaningful or purposeful conduct of defendant Webtab in or involving Connecticut. It is fortuitous that the plaintiff lives in Connecticut such that the payment originated in, and repayments would be directed to, Connecticut.
The court is compelled to conclude that there were inadequate indicia of purposeful Connecticut-based conduct by the defendant Webtab for the court to conclude that jurisdiction may properly be asserted in a Connecticut court in connection with this transaction, on this record.
Conclusion
The court often tries to " save paper" by not going into great detail as to the standards for a motion, but in this instance, it was necessary to do so, especially with respect to the hierarchy of facts/evidence to be considered in connection with a motion to dismiss. Some jurisdictional facts that are alleged in the operative complaint are unchallenged, and therefore must be accepted for purposes of these motions. Other jurisdictional facts are set forth in affidavits, and to the extent that the affidavits are not challenged by other competent evidence, those jurisdictional facts must be accepted for purposes of these motions. Finally, there is at least one jurisdictional issue for which there appears to be inadequate facts on the record, such that if the court were to try to resolve that issue (service at a Washington address rather than California address), an evidentiary hearing would be required- but for reasons unrelated to the merits of that claim, it is not necessary to conduct such an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant Johnson has waived his right to contest personal jurisdiction. Appellate directives to trial courts, requiring that trial courts be solicitous of self-represented parties, do not go so far as to allow substantial prejudice to an adverse party, particularly when the issue is not whether an issue has been " properly" raised and pursued, but whether the issue has been raised at all, within a mandatory time limit. Further, as briefly discussed, the defendant has not challenged the availability of statutory and constitutional long-term jurisdiction predicated on the tortious conduct alleged in the amended complaint. For the reasons stated, the court cannot address the issue of proper service on the current record, and in light of the denial of the motion in a global sense (waiver), sees no point in ordering an evidentiary hearing for that purpose.
Defendant Webtab filed a timely (relative to the filing of an appearance on its behalf) motion raising similar issues, and the results are different. The court is satisfied that the issue of proper service must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. However, the issue of long-arm jurisdiction, as established by the record before the court, is another matter. There was no purposeful conduct of the defendant relating to Connecticut; it was fortuitous that the plaintiff resided in Connecticut such that money would be sent from and to Connecticut. Even if sufficient to satisfy statutory long-arm requirements, the cases discussed above indicate that this minimal involvement of Connecticut does not suffice to satisfy due process minimum contacts requirements.
Although distinguishable in many respects, the analysis in Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 923 A.2d 638 (2007) is suggestive. An insurer who did not regularly conduct business in Connecticut (and was not registered/authorized to do so) was not deemed to have conducted business in Connecticut sufficient to allow a claim of personal jurisdiction over it, as a result of efforts to adjust a claim made by a Connecticut resident against the defendant’s insured. It engaged in some Connecticut-related activities, but had not purposefully engaged in such conduct of its own volition- it had to address a claim being made under an insured’s policy, with the claimant fortuitously located in Connecticut. The mere fact that an investor or lender lived in Connecticut does not create a sufficient nexus with Connecticut so as to allow personal jurisdiction over the West Coast corporate borrower, consistent with a minimum contacts analysis.
For all these reasons, then, the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Steven Johnson (# 125.00) is denied; the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Webtab (# 120.00) is granted.