Opinion
No. 10-06-00174-CV
Opinion delivered and filed November 21, 2007.
Appeal from the 82nd District Court Falls County, Texas, Trial Court No. 35,180.
Affirmed.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Stephen and Linda Johnson, individually and as guardians of Keashia McLinn, a minor ("the Johnsons") appeal from an order denying their motion to reinstate their suit against Robert Thigpen and Thigpen Cattle Company ("Thigpen."). The trial court had dismissed the suit for want of prosecution. In two points of error, the Johnsons complain that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the suit because (1) the original suit was improperly dismissed and (2) the motion to reinstate should have been granted. We will affirm the decision of the trial court.
Background
After being involved in a collision when some of Thigpen's cattle wandered onto the road, the Johnsons filed suit against Thigpen for failure to maintain fences on his property. Thigpen filed a motion for summary judgment, which was overruled, and the trial court requested that the parties proceed to mediation as soon as the necessary depositions were complete. After the case was inactive for a period of sixteen months, the trial court sent a notice to the parties stating that the case had been set on the dismissal docket for February 14, 2006. It notified both parties that their "presence was not required," but that a motion to retain could be filed. The Johnsons filed a motion to retain, and on February 10, 2006, it was granted.
Thigpen's attorney, unaware of the motion to retain, arrived at the dismissal hearing on February 14. At the hearing, the court notified Thigpen's attorney that a motion to retain had been granted, but he contested it. He argued before the court that he had attempted to set up depositions and select a mediator but never received any response from the Johnsons. On these facts, the trial court withdrew its order granting the motion to retain and dismissed the case for want of prosecution. Upon receipt of the trial court's order dismissing the case, the Johnsons filed a motion to reinstate, which the trial court denied. The Johnsons now appeal.
Dismissal for Want of Prosecution
The Johnsons' first issue asserts that the trial court erred when it dismissed their case for want of prosecution. We review a dismissal for want of prosecution under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex. 1984); In re Marriage of Seals, 83 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.). We employ the same standard in reviewing the denial of a motion to reinstate. Franklin v. Sherman Indep. School Dist., 53 S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts "without reference to any guiding rules or principles," or, stated another way, when the trial court acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 109 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985)).
A trial court's power to dismiss a suit for want of prosecution originates from two sources: (1) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a and (2) the trial court's inherent authority. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a; Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999); Steward v. Colonial Cas. Ins. Co., 143 S.W.3d 161, 163-64 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet.); Binner v. Limestone County, 129 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied). A trial court may dismiss a suit under Rule 165a when (1) a party fails to appear for a trial or hearing or (2) when a suit is not disposed of within the time standards given by the Supreme Court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(1), (2); Steward, 143 S.W.3d at 163-64. Independent of the rules of civil procedure, a trial court may also dismiss a suit under the inherent authority given to it by common law. Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 630; Steward, 143 S.W.3d at 163-64.
Rule 165a provides that a judge may dismiss a case for want of prosecution when any party seeking affirmative relief fails to appear for any hearing or trial of which the party had notice or when the case is not disposed of within the time standards promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court under its Administrative Rules unless, at a dismissal hearing about which the parties are provided adequate notice, good cause is shown for the case to be maintained on the docket. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(1), (2).
The trial court may consider the entire history of the case, including: 1) the length of time the case was on file; 2) the extent of activity in the case; 3) whether a trial setting was requested; and 4) the existence of reasonable excuse for the delay. King v. Holland, 884 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); City of Houston v. Malone, 828 S.W.2d 567, 568 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
The Johnsons claim that the motion to retain should not have been denied for several reasons. First, the dismissal notice made no reference to Rule 165a or the authority it used to dismiss the case, which they allege is erroneous under Villareal. Thigpen counters that even if the trial court's order fails to specify the reason for its dismissal of a case, the dismissal must be upheld as long as the record supports some proper ground for dismissal. Shook v. Gilmore and Tatge Mfg. Co., 951 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.App.-Waco 1997, pet. denied); City of Houston v. Thomas, 838 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
The Johnsons did not request findings of fact or conclusions of law, and the trial court did not specify the standard of dismissal used. Therefore, we must affirm on the basis of any legal theory supported by the record. Vickery v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 252 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (citing Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990)).
We disagree with the Johnsons. We have held that "a dismissal notice containing no reference to Rule 165a or the court's inherent authority [is] sufficient to put an appellant on notice that the court could dismiss under Rule 165a(1), Rule 165a(2), or its inherent authority." Steward, 143 S.W.3d at 164 (citing Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 712). Because the law does not require a dismissal notice to reference Rule 165a or the court's authority to dismiss, the notice sent to the Johnsons was adequate. Id.
Finally, the Johnsons argue that it was error for the court to notify them that their presence was not required at the dismissal hearing but then to allow opposing counsel to act ex parte and argue against the motion to retain. We construe the Johnsons' argument to mean that it was error for the court to reconsider its order granting the motion to retain. However, any error was cured by the trial courts' hearing on the motion to reinstate.
We have held that conducting a motion to reinstate hearing cures any potential problems created by dismissing a case for want of prosecution. See Dueitt v. Arrowhead Lakes Property Owners, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 733 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied). We have agreed with several other courts of appeals that the filing of a motion to reinstate and participation in the hearing on the motion to reinstate (as in this case) cures any due process concerns that may result. Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 713; Steward, 143 S.W.3d at 165. Therefore, even if dismissal was improper, it was cured by the hearing on the motion to reinstate. Accordingly, we overrule the Johnsons' first issue.
Motion to Reinstate
In their second issue, the Johnsons argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to reinstate. Specifically, the Johnsons assert that after their motion to retain was granted, the trial court failed to set a trial date before dismissing the case. See Seals, 83 S.W.3d at 875 (holding that a trial court has an independent duty to set a case for trial once a motion to retain is granted). They further contend that under Seals, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to dismiss a case based on failure to comply with Rule 165a if a motion to retain has been granted and a trial date has not been set. Id.
The Johnsons' reliance on Seals is misplaced for two reasons. First, the trial court initially granted the Johnsons' motion to retain on February 10, 2006. The dismissal hearing was held on February 14, 2006. Failing to set a trial date in a four-day window does not reach the error found in Seals, in which a trial date was not set for fifteen months and caused the case to be inactive beyond the Texas Supreme Court's eighteen month guideline. Second, it was not the court's fault that no action was taken in this case. Since the summary judgment hearing, more than 18 months had elapsed, and the Johnsons had failed to comply with the court's request to engage in discovery and mediation. These facts alone provide support for the trial court's dismissal for want of prosecution under the abuse of discretion standard.
The Johnson's failure to participate in discovery and mediation gave ample reason for the suit to be dismissed. The Johnsons did nothing to move the case toward a resolution for over eighteen months. And from the evidence before it, the trial court was free to disbelieve that various medical ailments prevented both Linda Johnson and her counsel from actively participating in this case. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion on the record before us, and we overrule the Johnsons' second issue.
Conclusion
Because the trial court could properly dismiss the Johnson's case for failure of diligent prosecution or for failure to comply with the Rule 165a(2) time standards or under its inherent authority, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reinstate the case under Rule 165a(3). Having overruled Johnson's two issues, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.