Opinion
C/A 5:20-01230-TMC-KDW
05-28-2021
Samuel T. Johnson, Plaintiff, v. Warden Stephan; Associate Warden Ramos; Ms. Jackson, and Mr. Gough, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge
Samuel T. Johnson, “Plaintiff, ” is an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”), and filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 66, filed on February 3, 2021. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) the court advised Plaintiff on February 3, 2021, of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' Motion. ECF No. 67. Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion on March 15, 2021, ECF No. 73, and Defendants replied on March 15, 2021, ECF No. 74. Additionally, Plaintiff filed a Sur Reply on April 5, 2021. Additionally, on April 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Argument. See ECF No. 77. These matters are now ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C, which provides for all pretrial proceedings in certain types of matters be referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. Because Defendants' Motion is dispositive, the undersigned enters this Report for the district judge's consideration.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff initially filed this action on March 31, 2020, and in his Complaint, he purports to assert allegations against Defendants for due process violations that occurred while he was housed at McCormick Correctional Institution (“MCI”) and Broad River Correctional Institution (“BRCI”). ECF No. 1; 8. Plaintiff maintains the incident giving rise to his causes of action occurred on or about August 27, 2019 while he was housed at MCI. Id. at 8. He represents that he was handcuffed and taken out of the F-4 Unit and was “emergency transferred” to BRCI where he remained in a segregated unit from August 27, 2019, until October 4, 2019. Id. at 5; 8. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that he was placed in the Saluda Unit (Lock-up) or “Security Detention under false allegations [and] no supporting document[ation].” Id. at 5. Plaintiff represents that he filed a grievance about the incident on October 7, 2019. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was denied his 90-day Security Detention hearing and continued to be held against his will. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff maintains that he asked Defendants Ramos, Jackson, and Gough to check the computer and his file, give him a hearing, and reevaluate the situation, but they placed him in Security Detention anyway. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges these actions amount to Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection violations. Id. Further, he maintains these actions amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment as well as gross negligence. Id.
Plaintiff explains that while he was attending an RHU (Restricted Housing Unit) classification committee board meeting that he explained to the board that he was erroneously kept in Security without ever having a hearing. Id. at 9. Further, he alleges he told the committee that he was never served with the incident report or a “Phd form.” Id. He represents that the committee “reach[ed] the verdict of placing Plaintiff on Security Detention based on [the] incident report.” Id. Plaintiff represents that he has developed a mental illness for which he takes psychotic medication, and he hears voices. Id. at 10. Plaintiff seeks a jury trial on all issues; $550,000 in actual damages; $100,000 in punitive damages; a preliminary and permanent injunction; $75,000 in compensatory damages; fees and costs; and any other relief the court deems appropriate. Id. at 10.
II. Standard of Review
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
III. Analysis
a. Failure to Exhaust
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's purported claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See ECF No. 66. After describing the grievance procedure, Defendants maintain: “Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this suit because he did not file a Step 2 grievance after receiving the denial of his Step 1 Grievance on October 25, 2019.” Id. at 6. In Response, Plaintiff represents:
[P]laintiff did in fact attempt to file a step (1) grievance concerning those issues but the grievance was sent back processed but denied due to the fact that [P]laintiff did not timely file Step (1) grievance at grievance time frame however on October 25[], 2019, [P]laintiff received his step (1) grievance and I placed my step (2) grievance in an official hands who was responsible for placing my step (2) grievance in the grievance box. The grievance coordinator never received my step (2) grievance and I couldn't hold this official accountable because he no longer works for (SCDC).ECF No. 73 at 6. Based on the representations from both parties, the undersigned recommends dismissing this action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as discussed below.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of all available administrative remedies. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.'” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739).
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is twofold. First, it gives an administrative agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). Second, “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.” Id. Any consideration of administrative remedies pursued after the commencement of the litigation would only serve to frustrate both purposes of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Id. at 90 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Defendants have the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 681 (4th Cir. 2005).
Exhaustion is an affirmative defense; an inmate is not required to plead exhaustion in his complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); see also Mattress v. Taylor, 487 F.Supp.2d 665, 668 (D.S.C. 2007) (“Instead, an inmate's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies must be viewed as an affirmative defense that should be pleaded or otherwise properly raised by the defendant.”). While “unlikely” that failure to exhaust administrative remedies will be apparent from the face of the complaint, sua sponte dismissal is appropriate if the complaint “clearly” reveals that an inmate has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Mattress, 487 F.Supp.2d at 668.
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff failed to abide by the procedural rules and deadlines of the grievance process concerning his allegations. ECF No. 66 at 4-6. Further, they outline the steps required to exhaust a grievance within the SCDC grievance processing system, and they have submitted the affidavit of Sherman Anderson, General Counsel and Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch of SCDC, as an attachment. See ECF No. 66-3. Anderson represents that inmates are required to attempt an informal resolution of an issue by using the Kiosk system or a Request to Staff Member Form prior to filing a formal grievance. Id. ¶ 6. Thereafter, the inmate may file a Step-One Grievance within five (5) working days of the alleged incident. Id. ¶ 7. After filing the Step-One Grievance, the inmate is then required to file a Step-Two Grievance within five (5) calendar days of the Step-One Grievance being returned. Id. at ¶ 11.
Concerning Plaintiff's claim here, Anderson attests that on October 7, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a Step-One Grievance, Grievance # BRCI-0915-19, concerning the classification decision, and to appeal same. Id. ¶ 16; see also ECF No. 66-3 at 7-8. This Step-One Grievance was processed and returned to Plaintiff on October 25, 2019—the Warden denied Plaintiff's request that he be reclassified. Id. Mr. Anderson attests there is no record of Plaintiff filing a Step-Two Grievance concerning this classification. Id. at ¶ 17. Notably, the Grievance response from the Warden directs Plaintiff to “plac[e] a [Step-Two Inmate Grievance] in the grievance Box at your local correctional institution within five (5) days of your receipt of this Decision.” Id. at p. 8. Though Plaintiff represents he gave his Step-Two Grievance form to an officer to place in the grievance box for him, Plaintiff cannot identify this officer and further represents this officer no longer works for SCDC. Regardless of Plaintiff's representations, it appears that Plaintiff did not comply with the grievance procedure by filing his Step-Two as directed by his own admissions to the court.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a proper Step-Two grievance form. The purpose of the grievance process is to allow SCDC to resolve issues on its own accord and without the court's involvement. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 89. Here, Plaintiff failed to follow the grievance system in place by properly submitting a Step-Two grievance form in violation of GA-01.12 of the grievance process. Furthermore, he did not receive a final decision on the merits of his grievance, which should have put him on notice that one was never filed.
Therefore, because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing this action, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's causes of action for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1024 (holding that an inmate's failure to “properly take each step within the administrative process . . . bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983.”); see also Blevins v. Loranth, No. 09-788-TLW-BM, 2010 WL 670099, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2010), (“Plaintiff needed to file and exhaust his administrative claim [] at FCI Williamsburg prior to proceeding with this lawsuit.”); Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 814 (D.S.C. 2008) (“There is no evidence that Plaintiff appealed the initial denial of his grievance relating to his cell door being locked. . .”). Nevertheless, the undersigned will proceed and address the following argument on its merits out of an abundance of caution.
b. Failure to State a Claim on the Merits
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff's due process claim fails on the merits, and they are entitled to summary judgment. ECF No. 66 at 6-7. They argue Plaintiff essentially maintains he was not convicted of the August 27, 2019 incident, was wrongfully placed in Security Detention, and the wrongful placement caused him harm. Id. at 6. In his response, Plaintiff argues that he did not commit the crimes for which he has been charged. ECF No. 73 at 3. However, he acknowledges that on August 27, 2019, he was placed in RHU because SCDC administration “felt that Plaintiff was a threat to physical safety of other inmates/or staff.” Id. at 4.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “In determining whether state officials have deprived an inmate, [] of a procedurally protected ‘liberty,' this Court traditionally has looked either (1) to the nature of the deprivation (how severe, in degree or kind) or (2) to the State's rules governing the imposition of that deprivation (whether they, in effect, give the inmate a ‘right' to avoid it).” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 493 (1995). “In order to prevail on either a procedural or substantive due process claim, inmates must first demonstrate that they were deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property' by governmental action.” Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2012) (laying out two-step process for procedural due process violations). The court must first consider whether, and to what extent, the inmate has a protectable interest under the Due Process Clause. Id. If the court determines that the inmate has asserted a protectable interest, the court must then determine whether the government failed to afford him the minimum procedural protections required by the Fourteenth Amendment in depriving him of this interest. Id.
Either the Due Process Clause or state laws afford plaintiffs protected liberty interests. Berrier v. Allen, 951 F.2d 622, 624 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (“Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.”). The Due Process Clause does not create a protected liberty interest in an inmate's particular classification. See Id. (finding the Due Process Clause does not independently create “an interest in being confined to a general population cell, rather than the more austere and restrictive administrative segregation quarters”). Moreover, while the Fourth Circuit has held that a prisoner may set forth a viable due process claim relating to a custody status decision under some circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any facts sufficient to proceed on such a claim in this case. See Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Sandin found no liberty interest protecting against a 30-day assignment to segregated confinement because it did not present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of the [inmate's sentence].”); Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 254 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Prieto, like any other inmate, can only be deprived of that to which he is entitled.”).
Additionally, South Carolina law does not afford Plaintiff a protected liberty interest in this situation. See e.g., Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 595 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[B]road empowering statutes do not themselves create the liberty interest necessary to support the inmates' claim.”); Wiles v. Ozmint, No. 0:05-2111 CMC-BM, 2006 WL 2260136, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2006) aff'd, 221 Fed.Appx. 257 (4th Cir. 2007) (“South Carolina law confers no protected liberty interest upon inmates of the South Carolina Department of Corrections from being placed in administrative segregation or any particular prison.”); Rivera v. Byars, No. 8:12-cv-02219-JMC, 2013 WL 4697177, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 30, 2013) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiff argues Defendants have violated SCDC policies or procedures by denying his attendance at meetings to review his classification, assuming without deciding this claim is true, violations of prison policies and/or procedures do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”).
In support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants have submitted several supporting documents. First, Defendants have presented an SCDC narrative; incident reports; a photo of a handmade shank; the pending charges against Plaintiff as a result of the incident, including arrest warrants for him; and RHU Classification Review of Inmate Disposition Forms. See ECF No. 66-1 at 3-32. These records indicate on August 27, 2019, at approximately 3:15 p.m., four (4) SCDC correctional officers were working at MCI, Housing Unit F-4, B Wing, where Plaintiff was housed. See ECF No. 66-1 at 3. The narrative further indicates that the officers observed Plaintiff wearing a jacket and homemade mask, holding a shank and striking the drywall causing damage to the walls. See Id. The officers then observed Plaintiff stop hitting the wall and he began to chase the officers, but the officers were able to escape into the unit office and locked the door after which Plaintiff attempted to break the office window. Id. After the incident, affidavits for probable cause were presented to the magistrate judge to issue arrest warrants against Plaintiff for kidnapping and possession of a weapon during a violent crime. Id. at 10-28. However, the county magistrate dismissed the charges when no witnesses appeared to present evidence at a preliminary hearing. Id. at 24.
Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's confinement in administrative segregation, the court cannot find that the conditions of his confinement rise to the level of an atypical and substantial hardship. Plaintiff does not allege how and what specifically make the conditions of his confinement atypical and harsh. See Incumaa v. Stirling, No. 9:12-CV-3493-DCN, 2014 WL 958679, at *10 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015), as amended (July 7, 2015); Menei v. Rubenstein, 2012 WL 4845659, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. October 11, 2012). Because the court has determined that Plaintiff does not have a protectable liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation, the procedural protections required by the Fourteenth Amendment are not implicated. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants summary judgment of Plaintiff's due process claims.
To the extent Plaintiff has raised an equal protection cause of action in his Complaint, this purported claim fails to meet Rule 8 minimum pleading requirements. See e.g., Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”); Robinson v. Moore, No. 516CV00560BHHKDW, 2016 WL 6089823, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 5:16-560-BHH, 2016 WL 6070152 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2016) (“[I]n order for Plaintiff to state a plausible equal-protection claim, he must allege that he is a member of a class that was denied a benefit available to other similarly situated individuals and that such a denial is not rationally related to legitimate state interests.”).
c. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claims. ECF No. 66 at 7-8. The Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald established the standard that the court is to follow in determining whether a defendant is protected by this immunity. That decision held that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
When evaluating a qualified immunity defense, the court must determine (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230-33 (2009). The two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis may be addressed in whatever order is appropriate given the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 236. In determining whether the right violated was clearly established, the court defines the right “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301-03 (4th Cir. 2004). “If the right was not clearly established in the specific context of the case—that is, if it was not clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged was unlawful in the situation he confronted—then the law affords immunity from suit.” Id. (citations and internal quotation omitted).
The record before the court shows that Defendants performed the discretionary functions of their respective duties in an objectively reasonable fashion. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants could not have transgressed Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Thus, the undersigned recommends Defendants be granted qualified immunity.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 66, be granted, and this action be dismissed. The court has reviewed Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend Argument, See ECF No. 77, and finds it is without merit. Therefore it is denied.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”