Opinion
No. HHD-CV-08-4036988S
June 12, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
STATEMENT OF CASE
The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, sovereign immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeared pro se.
This court is aware of the difficulties faced by pro se parties and is solicitous of their rights. "Although we have construed the rules of practice liberally for pro se litigants, as long as that does not interfere with the rights of other parties, we cannot ignore the statutes and rules of practice." (Citation omitted.) Bella Vista Condominium Ass'n., Inc. v. Byars, 102 Conn.App. 245, fn.7, 925 A.2d 365 (2007).
In her complaint filed on April 28, 2008, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff is licensed by the Department of Public Health (department) to practice as a registered nurse in the State of Connecticut. Her license was unlawfully suspended in November 2006. As a result, the plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm including the auctioning of her home and unemployment. The plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as well as damages.
In their motion to dismiss, the defendants, Connecticut State Board of Examiners for Nursing, Matthew Antonetti and Jennifer Filippone, state the following. Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 19a-14, 20-92, 20-93 and 20-94, the department is the state agency responsible for licensing registered nurses, and for investigating and prosecuting actions for improper conduct and standard of care violations. The Connecticut State Board of Examiners for Nursing (board) is the state agency responsible for adjudicating cases brought by the department against registered nurses and is statutorily authorized to take disciplinary action against any nurse found to have engaged in improper conduct pursuant to General Statutes §§ 20-88, 20-90(b), 20-99, 19a-10, 19a-14(b) and 19a-17. The defendants Antonetti and Filippone are employees of the department. On or about October 18, 2006, the department issued a statement of charges against the plaintiff claiming that she provided false and/or materially deceptive information to the department on her application for licensure as a registered nurse. A summary suspension of the plaintiff's registered nurse license was ordered on October 18, 2006. The administrative licensure action was heard by the board on September 19, 2007 and March 19, 2008, and is currently pending before the board for a final decision. The board has ninety days from the close of the hearing to issue a final decision. General Statutes § 4-180. The ninety-day period has not expired as of the date of the motion hearing. On March 20, 2008, the plaintiff was notified that the board had unanimously voted to vacate the October 18, 2006 summary suspension.
On June 2, 2008, the court heard argument on the defendants' motion to dismiss and the defendants' motion to seal confidential documents containing the plaintiff's social security numbers. The motion to seal was granted at the hearing.
II DISCUSSION A Motion to Dismiss
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). "Any claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived; and whenever it is found after suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judicial authority shall dismiss the action." Practice Book § 10-33. "[A] motion to dismiss is not designed to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint in terms of whether it states a cause of action." Pratt v. Old Saybrook, 225 Conn. 177, 185, 621 A.2d 1322 (1993). "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005).
"When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, supra, 278 Conn. 211. "Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiff's] claim . . ." (Citation omitted.) D'Agostino v. Housing Authority, 95 Conn.App. 834, 837, 898 A.2d 228, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 905, 907 A.2d 88 (2006).
(1) Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
The defendants contend that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. "It is a settled principle of administrative law that if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter . . . We have frequently held that where a statute has established a procedure to redress a particular wrong a person must follow the specified remedy and may not institute a proceeding that might have been permissible in the absence of such a statutory procedure . . . [B]ecause the exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the plaintiff['s] claim . . .
`The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law . . . The doctrine provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted . . . Where a statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by [legislative] intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consistent with the statutory scheme . . . Consequently, [t]he requirement of exhaustion may arise from explicit statutory language or from an administrative scheme providing for agency relief . . .
"A primary purpose of the doctrine is to foster an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review, offering a reviewing court the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions. It relieves courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions that, entrusted to an agency, may receive a satisfactory administrative disposition and avoid the need for judicial review . . . Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to [the legislature's] delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that [the legislature] has charged them to administer . . . Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities.
"The [exhaustion] doctrine is applied in a number of different situations and is, like most judicial doctrines, subject to numerous exceptions . . . [W]e have recognized such exceptions only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes . . . such as when recourse to the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate . . . Because of the policy behind the exhaustion doctrine, we construe these exceptions narrowly." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stepney v. Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558, 563-65, 821 A.2d 725 (2003).
In Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 248 Conn. 87, 88, 726 A.2d 1154 (1998), the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's action based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies doctrine. There, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from taking any further action on an attorney grievance complaint. Id.
The court must determine whether the plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court "must examine the complaint to determine whether [the plaintiff was] required to exhaust an administrative remedy before the Superior Court could entertain this action. Whether prior recourse to the agency will be required will depend on the injury alleged and the administrative remedy available." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn.App. 769, 771-72, 647 A.2d 751 (1994).
The plaintiff claims injury based on the board's action regarding her registered nurse license. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies doctrine clearly applies in this case. The department has the statutory authority to regulate registered nurses. The board has the statutory authority to adjudicate actions relating to registered nurse licenses. The plaintiff's case was heard by the board on September 19, 2007 and March 19, 2008. The ninety-day period for the board to issue a final decision has not yet expired. General Statutes § 4-180. Pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., the plaintiff has the right to appeal a final decision rendered by a state agency. More specifically, the plaintiff may appeal to the Superior Court an adverse determination rendered against her license by the board. General Statutes § 19a-12. In addition, she may request a stay of the agency decision from the agency itself or from the Superior Court. General Statutes § 4-183(f). The plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief at this time. The plaintiff must await the board's final decision before exercising her rights under the UAPA, including proceeding to Superior Court for review.
The court must also consider whether any exception to the exhaustion doctrine applies. After the March 19, 2008 hearing, the board vacated the October 18, 2006 summary suspension of the plaintiff's registered nurse license. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be argued that recourse to the administrative procedure would necessarily have been futile or inadequate.
This case must be dismissed because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided for by law and, therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
III CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the above-stated reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. Since the case is dismissed based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies doctrine, the Court does not need to consider the remaining grounds for the motion.
See Fisher Skylights, Inc. v. Mashantucket Pequot Indian Tribe, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. CV 104741 (July 11, 1994, Leuba, J.) ( 1994 Ct.Sup. 7252) ("Furthermore, because the motion to dismiss must be granted on this ground, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining grounds for the motion."); Owens, Renz Lee Company v. Carbone, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven Housing Session, Docket No. SPNH 40986 November 25, 1994, Jones, J.) ("The dismissal renders a ruling on the remaining [grounds] unnecessary.") Chayoon v. Sherlock, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. CV 128101 (April 23, 2004, Martin, J.), aff'd, 89 Conn.App. 821, 877 A.2d 4, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 913, 888 A.2d 83 (2005) ("Accordingly, the [defendant's] motion to dismiss is granted and the court need not address the [defendant's] alternate arguments.")
SO ORDERED,