Opinion
23-CV-481 JLS (AHG)
07-29-2024
JAMES JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, Commissioner, Social Security Administration; ERIC V. BENHAM, Administrate Law Judge; LAURA MIDDLETON, Administrative Appeals Judge; MS. KAWANO (full name and title to be ascertained); and DOES 4 to 100, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S (1) EX PARTE MOTION TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT MISHANDLING ISSUES AND (2) EX PARTE MOTION TO RULE ON PRIOR MOTION (ECF NOS. 59 & 60)
Hon. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge
Presently before the Court are Plaintiff James Johnson's Ex Parte Motion to Investigate and Report Mishandling Issues (“Investigation Mot.,” ECF No. 60) and Ex Parte Motion to Rule on Prior Motion, the latter of which the Court will refer to as the Disqualification Motion (“Disqual. Mot.,” ECF No. 59) for reasons that will become clear below. Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff's submissions, the record, and the law, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART both Motions.
BACKGROUND
The Court incorporates the description of this action's background contained in its May 6, 2024 Order (“Second Screening Order,” ECF No. 51) and sets forth below only those details relevant to the instant Motions.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action against the Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on March 16, 2023. See ECF No. 1. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a myriad of motions, including an Ex Parte Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym and File Certain Documents Under Seal (“Mot. to Seal,” ECF No. 6) and an Ex Parte Motion for Additional Time Extension to Amend Complaint (“Extension Mot.,” ECF No. 22). See generally ECF No. 32 (“First Screening Order”) (addressing the foregoing motions, along with eight others). In the Motion to Seal, Plaintiff sought, inter alia, (1) leave to proceed under a pseudonym; (2) “[t]o file [his] ‘Declaration of True Identities,'” “Exhibit 58, ‘Medical Records List of Providers 7-29-16,'” and “Exhibit 252, ‘Victims Criminal Complaint,'” under “permanent seal”; and (3) an order directing the Clerk to apply S.D. Cal. General Order No. 514-C (“General Order 514-C”). Mot. to Seal at 18-19. In the Extension Motion, Plaintiff sought leave to file an addendum to his First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF Nos. 23, 25).
See S.D. Cal. Gen. Order No. 514-C, available at https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/assets/ pdf/rules/GO514-C.pdf.
In this Order, pin citations to Plaintiff's filings refer to the blue CM/ECF page numbers electronically stamped across the top margin of each page.
Plaintiff's FAC was docketed as ECF No. 23. Plaintiff later sought to append a “Section E” to the FAC, and the submission of Section E was entered as ECF No. 25. The Court later accepted both filings and considered them together as a single pleading. See First Screening Order at 13-14. In this Order, mentions of the FAC refer collectively to ECF Nos. 23 and 25.
After this case was transferred to the undersigned due to commonalities between this matter and a previously filed case, see ECF No. 31, the Court ruled on Plaintiff's initial motions. As relevant here, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Seal. Specifically, the Court, among other actions, directed the Clerk to (1) file the three documents Plaintiff identified (including the Declaration of True Identities) under seal; and (2) restrict access to the docket and filings of this case in accordance with General Order 514-C. First Screening Order at 20. The Court also granted Plaintiff's request to proceed as “James Johnson.” Id. at 20-21. Meanwhile, having accepted the FAC, the Court denied the Extension Motion as moot. Id. at 13-14.
See Johnson v. Saul, 20-CV-747 JLS (AHG).
In the midst of the above flurry of filings, Plaintiff also submitted a Correction Notice and Declaration of Prior Noticing in Support of All Previous Motions Made Ex Parte (“Correction Notice,” ECF No. 21). The Correction Notice consisted of several distinct-and yet sometimes duplicative-documents, including objections, motions, and notices of updated information. See generally Correction Notice. In the Disqualification Motion, Plaintiff explains that he intended these documents-which were submitted on the same day-to be docketed separately. See Disqual. Mot. at 3-4. Among the amalgamated papers is an Ex Parte Motion for Injunctive Relief Regarding Conflict of Interest Representation, which-based on the nature of the relief sought, see infra-the Court liberally construes as a request to disqualify Defendant's attorneys. Correction Notice at 41-57.
For clarity's sake, the Court will continue to cite to pages of the Correction Notice when referring to the content incorporated into the Disqualification Motion.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's Investigation Motion primarily relates to matters stemming from the Motion to Seal and the Extension Motion, while his Disqualification Motion ties back to the request he made in the Correction Notice. The Court will address each Motion in turn.
I. Investigation Motion
The Investigation Motion raises wide-ranging concerns regarding Plaintiff's privacy and the public dissemination of various documents filed in this case. Broadly, these concerns fall into three categories (1) alleged public dissemination of his Declaration of True Identities; (2) alleged improper implementation of General Order 514-C; and (3) actions supposedly taken-or not taken-by the Clerk and this Court. See generally Investigation Mot. The Court will tackle these categories one at a time.
A. Plaintiff's Declaration of True Identifies
Plaintiff, pointing to the Extension Motion, claims his Declaration of True Identities remains accessible to the public, even though the Court granted his request to file it under seal. See id. at 8.
The truth is more complicated than Plaintiff acknowledges. Pursuant to the First Screening Order, Plaintiff's Declaration of True Identities (ECF No. 7), Exhibit 58 (ECF No. 7-1), and Exhibit 252 (ECF No. 7-2) (collectively, the “Sealed Documents”) were filed under seal. However, copies of all three documents were submitted again, this time as a single exhibit to the Extension Motion. See generally ECF No. 22-1. This facsimile of the Sealed Documents was not filed under seal.
That such a situation arose here is not surprising. The Court understands that pro se litigants like Plaintiff bear a heavy burden and thus liberally construes their filings. See Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Courts in this circuit have an obligation to give a liberal construction to the filings of pro se litigants ....”). That said, a review of the Docket shows Plaintiff has a penchant-one well beyond what the Court typically observes in cases involving pro se parties-for filing lengthy, fragmented, and often duplicative pleadings, motions, and other miscellaneous papers. Such conduct wastes judicial resources, clutters the Docket, makes it more likely that documents will get lost in the shuffle, and impedes the Court's ability to find and address the issues Plaintiff wishes to raise.
See, e.g., United States v. Molen, No. 2:10-CV-02591 MCE, 2011 WL 1810449, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2011) (“The multiplicity of defendants' . . . duplicative filings is a burden on the court and the plaintiff, and impedes the progress of this action.”); Yonai v. Walker, No. CIV S-08-0192-WBS KJM P, 2008 WL 356957, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008) (“[Petitioner's] duplicative filings may hamper resolution of his claims as it forces the court to determine what is currently pending.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL 1766959 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2008); AAA by next friend Abdul-Alim v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:20-CV-0195-JAD-BNW, 2020 WL 4904630, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2020) (explaining “numerous duplicative . . . filings” create a bloated docket and tax the court's time and resources).
Still, in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will GRANT the Investigation Motion to the extent Plaintiff seeks to seal the copies of the Sealed Documents found in ECF No. 22-1 for the reasons stated in its First Screening Order.
Plaintiff also asks the Court to “remove all documents found on the docket that should have been sealed . . . (e.g., documents complained about by Plaintiff or documents in which the headings or labels use the word ‘seal').” Investigation Mot. at 11. To the extent Plaintiff is referring to unspecified documents beyond the Declaration of True Identities, Exhibit 58, and Exhibit 252, his request is DENIED. “[R]equests to seal particular filings” or “to remove them wholly from the public record” must “relate to specific documents.” Jane Roes 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 77 F.Supp.3d 990, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The Court cannot and will not sift through the thousands of pages Plaintiff has filed in a likely futile effort to identify sensitive documents. Nor has the Court had the opportunity to evaluate whether any such documents may be sealed.
B. Implementation of General Order 514-C
Next, Plaintiff claims the Clerk and/or the Court has failed to restrict access to this case in accordance with the privacy policy articulated in General Order 514-C. See Investigation Mot. at 8-9. Principally, Plaintiff expresses discomfort with the fact that the Second Screening Order can be viewed through such sources as “Google Scholar, CaseText[,] and Justia,” among others. See id. at 16. On that point, Plaintiff asks the Court to (1) confirm that General Order 514-C has been applied correctly and (2) attempt to have the Second Screening Order scrubbed from the internet. See id. at 8, 11.
Plaintiff misunderstands the nature of General Order 514-C. As the Court has previously explained,
For Social Security cases, such as the instant case, the Southern District of California limited public access in General Order No. 514-C, which includes the following: “Social Security cases shall be excluded from electronic public access except for access by judiciary employees, the United States Attorney or its representatives and the litigants in those cases.”
First Screening Order at 8 (citation omitted). General Order 514-C dovetails with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c), under which only “the parties and their attorneys may have remote electronic access to any part of the case file” in social security appeals. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(c)(1). Other individuals can only access the full record electronically “at the courthouse.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(c)(2). As an exception, however, Rule 5.2(c) provides that anyone “may have remote electronic access” to “an opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition of the court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
In other words, neither Rule 5.2(c) nor General Order 514-C restricts the public's access to orders issued by this Court, including the Second Screening Order. See Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting a district's local rules must “comport with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); J.P. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-CV-00947-VKD, 2023 WL 7026928, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2023) (acknowledging “opinions by the Court are more widely available than other filings” in a social security case and citing Rule 5.2(c)). And Plaintiff does not explain why any aspect of the Second Screening Order is worthy of sealing. United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring compelling justification to file court's decision under seal given “the fundamental importance of issuing public decisions” (quoting Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 2001))).
Plaintiff's request to restrict public access to the Second Screening Order is therefore DENIED. As for his related concerns, the Court has reviewed the Docket and is satisfied that General Order 514-C has been correctly applied.
C. Request for an Investigation
Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to order an official investigation into “any and all mishandl[ed] aspects of this case, including its documents and filings,” with a “focus on all forms of breaching” (e.g., “failure[s] to seal documents”). Investigation Mot. at 11. Plaintiff also suggests that the Court should look into whether someone might have disadvantaged Plaintiff by intentionally delaying the docketing of one of the Court's prior orders. See id. at 9.
This request is DENIED. Having thoroughly investigated the concerns raised in the instant Motion, as detailed above, the Court sees no reason for further action at this time. If Plaintiff means to imply that Court staff may have conspired against him, he presents no evidence to that effect.
DISQUALIFICATION MOTION
In the remaining Motion, Plaintiff seeks a ruling on the disqualification request he made in the Correction Notice. See Disqual. Mot. at 7-8; Correction Notice at 41-57. As described above, said request was not properly filed as a distinct motion for the Court to address. Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court GRANTS the Disqualification Motion so far as it asks the Court to address the merits of Plaintiff's disqualification argument. The Court will thus deem the Disqualification Motion to have incorporated the points made in pages 41 to 57 of the Correction Notice.
Plaintiff asks the Court to “bar[] all United States Attorneys under the control of, or employment with, or in connection to, the U.S. Department of Justice [(“DOJ”)] from representing the Defendants in this case.” Id. at 52. Plaintiff explains that he “filed formal criminal charges against the Commissioner” and “other personnel at the [SSA] with the U.S. Attorney's office.” Id. at 43. And, Plaintiff argues, it would be inappropriate for a U.S. Attorney's office to investigate his criminal complaint and defend the Commissioner in this civil matter at the same time. See id.
Simply put, Plaintiff requests breathtakingly broad relief that no court could ever grant. Given the “‘special solicitude' owed to Executive branch prerogatives under the separation of powers,” disqualifying an entire U.S. Attorney's office constitutes an “extreme remedy” that is “only appropriate in the most extraordinary of circumstances.” United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 564, 570, 573 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982)). Indeed, the bar is so high that, so far as the Court is aware, no litigant has ever cleared it. And Plaintiff's ask is even more extreme, as he seeks to disqualify all U.S. Attorneys' offices. So, assuming such relief might ever be justified (which the Court doubts), Plaintiff's general argument regarding the DOJ's involvement in both civil and criminal matters necessarily falls short.
See United States v. Rodella, 59 F.Supp.3d 1331, 1348 n.3 (D.N.M. 2014) (“Disqualification of an entire office is . . . unprecedented.”); Williams, 68 F.4th at 572 (“[E]very circuit court that has reviewed an officewide disqualification has reversed.”); United States v. Bolden, 353 F.3d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e can only rarelyif ever-imagine a scenario in which a district court could properly disqualify an entire United States Attorney's office.” (emphasis added)).
Nor will the Court take the less-radical-but-still-serious step of disqualifying a specific government attorney. In “limited circumstances,” a court may disqualify a federal attorney. Bolden, 353 F.3d 870 at 878. But “court[s] should hesitate to impose” such a “drastic measure . . . except where necessary.” United States v. Moreno, No. 3:20-CR-29 WBS DLB, 2020 WL 6685520, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 12, 2020) (quoting Bolden, 353 F.3d at 878-79)). To that end, “[t]he basis for disqualifying an Assistant United States Attorney must be ‘very strong.'” Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Christian Stanley, Inc., No. CV 11-7147-GHK (MANx), 2012 WL 13012479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012) (quoting Galindo v. United States, CV No. 11-00601 DAE-KSC, CR No. 04-00053 DAE, 2012 WL 668938, at *2 (D. Haw. Feb. 28, 2012)). Here, Plaintiff presents no evidence of a conflict that might necessitate the disqualification of the specific attorneys that have appeared in this case.
Nor can Plaintiff conjure such a conflict by gesturing vaguely toward 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101, see Correction Notice at 44-45, which “broadly require[s] federal employees to act with integrity, abide by ethical standards, and avoid creating an appearance of impropriety,” United States v. Tavberidze, No. 23-CR-585 (JSR), 2024 WL 3009460, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2024).
Plaintiff's disqualification request is therefore DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Given the above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Investigation Motion (ECF No. 60) and Disqualification Motion (ECF No. 59) as follows.
1) As to the Investigation Motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request to seal the duplicate copy of his Declaration of True Identities and thus DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to FILE UNDER SEAL ECF No. 22-1 pending further Order of the Court. The Investigation Motion is otherwise DENIED.
2) The Court GRANTS the Disqualification Motion only to the extent it seeks to incorporate the substance of pages 41 through 57 of the Correction Notice (ECF No. 21) for the Court's consideration. Plaintiff's disqualification request is DENIED on its merits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.