Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-71803-DT
September 24, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Henry Johnson, Jr., ("Plaintiff), is presently confined at the Carson City Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan. On or about May 1, 2003, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint against the five named defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants, through the Michigan Attorney General's Office, have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead or prove that he exhausted administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses the complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies.
At the time that the instant complaint was filed, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility in Standish, Michigan.
I. The Complaint
The complaint names the Michigan Department of Corrections [the M.D.O.C.], William Overtoil, the director of the M.D.O.C., Warden Thomas M. Birkett, Deputy Warden Barbara Meagher, and Resident Unit Manager Darlene George, as defendants. The complaint alleges violations of the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq., and the Michigan Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff specifically alleges that because of a hearing impairment, he was placed in a prison with a higher security classification than the level two security level that was assigned to him by the M.D.O.C. Plaintiff also claims that due to a Special Prisoner Offender Notification (SPON) which was wrongfully added to his file, he was prevented from going to the Cotton Facility, one of the two level two facilities which can accommodate persons with hearing impairments. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
In the body of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he filed three grievances. Plaintiff also attached an Affidavit of Grievance Exhaustion, dated April 30, 2003, in which he further alleges that he exhausted his grievances. Plaintiff also attached to his complaint a letter to Defendant Overtoil, dated August 11, 2002, in which he mentions the claim. Plaintiff has also attached his Step n and Step III grievances to the complaint. In none of these exhibits, however, is any defendant mentioned by name.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.
II. Discussion
When a court reviews a motion to dismiss filed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court "must construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor and accept as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences therein." Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994). Because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion rests upon the pleadings rather than upon the evidence, it is not the court's function, in ruling upon the motion, to weigh the evidence or to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Riley v. Ameritech Corp., Inc., 147 F. Supp.2d 762, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). A federal district court should, therefore, deny a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Id. ( quoting Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d at 1064). However, although this standard is liberal, "it requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions." Id. at 766 ( citing to In Re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F. Supp.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993). Instead, the complaint must contain either direct or indirect allegations in regards to all of the material elements to sustain a recovery by the plaintiff under some viable legal theory. DeLorean, 991 F.2d at 1240; Riley v. Ameritech Corp., Inc., 147 F. Supp.2d at 766.
The Court initially notes that the Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, is properly brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), because it seeks a finding that the complaint is deficient on its face, without reference to matters outside of the complaint which would require the Court to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." This exhaustion requirement applies to cases which were filed on or after April 26, 1996. White v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff's complaint was filed on or about May 1, 2003, and the PLRA would, therefore, apply.
A prisoner who seeks monetary damages must complete the prison administrative process, even where that process may not offer the prisoner the specific remedy that he or she seeks. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 (2001). The PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner lawsuits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and regardless of whether the suit alleges excessive force or some other wrong. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). A prisoner may not amend his § 1983 complaint to cure a failure to plead the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 487 (6th Cir. 2002). Therefore, a prisoner's pro se § 1983 action is properly dismissed without prejudice in the absence of any indication in the complaint that the prisoner has properly exhausted his or her state administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d at 1104.
In order to effectuate the language contained in § 1997e(a), a prisoner must plead his or her claims with specificity and show that they have been exhausted by attaching a copy of the applicable dispositions to the complaint, or in the absence of any documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome. Knuckles-El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff has failed to establish with specificity that he exhausted his administrative remedies, because there is no indication that Plaintiff named any of the defendants in any of the grievances filed.
This was the court's holding in Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that because prison officials were aware of the underlying facts involving their claim, they did not need to identify every defendant. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, noting that the claim against this defendant was "a separate claim, against a separate individual, premised on a separate and independent legal theory." Id. at 505. Because this defendant was not mentioned in the plaintiffs' grievances, prison officials did not have any reason to pursue any of the plaintiffs' claims or to take disciplinary action against this particular defendant. Id. The Sixth Circuit indicated that the requirement that a prisoner file a grievance against the person or persons whom he or she seeks § 1983 relief against "does not impose a heightened requirement upon would-be § 1983 plaintiffs" but only assured "that the prison administrative system has a chance to deal with the claims against prison personnel before those complaints reach federal court." Id.
Plaintiff here has failed to allege or prove that he named any of the defendants in any of his grievances. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a copy of his Step I grievance, nor does he indicate that he identified any of the defendants in this Step I grievance. "For a court to find that a prisoner has administratively exhausted a claim against an individual defendant, a prisoner must have alleged mistreatment or misconduct on the part of the defendant at Step I of the grievance process." Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff's failure to name the defendants in his Step I grievance alone would preclude a finding of exhaustion. Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d at 576, fns. 4 5 (claim of retaliation which was initially raised by prisoner in Step n of the grievance process was not administratively exhausted). Moreover, there is no indication that Plaintiff named any of the defendants at Steps II or III of the grievance process. A prisoner must pursue all levels of the prison's administrative procedure before he or she can file a complaint in federal court. Smeltzer v. Hook, 235 F. Supp.2d 736, 740 (W.D. Mich. 2002). Without any evidence from Plaintiff that he identified any of the defendants in any administrative proceedings or that he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to each of these defendants, Plaintiff would be unable to establish with particularity that he had exhausted his available administrative remedies against these defendants in order to maintain this complaint against the named defendants. See Gibbs v. Bolden, 151 F. Supp.2d 854, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Summary dismissal is proper, because Plaintiff has alleged only in a conclusory fashion, without sufficient documentary support, that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. See Ziegler v. Michigan, 59 Fed. Appx. 622, 624 (6th Cir. 2003).
Although not dispositive of the motion to dismiss, the Court notes that some of Plaintiff's claims might have been mooted by his transfer to the Carson City Correctional Facility, which Plaintiff indicates in his complaint is a level 2 facility that is capable of handling hearing impaired prisoners like himself.
V. ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).