Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-0191 c/w 01-1560 Section "C" (1)
December 10, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant's, the Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College's ("the Board") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, dismissing the claims of Gail Cooper, Debra Celestine, Lorraine Keller-Jenkins, Cynthia Henley, Patricia Chapman, Thais Walker and Lynette Walker (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Also pending is the Board's Motion to Strike Exhibit G attached to the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Cynthia Henley, Patricia Chapman, Debra Celestine, Thais Walker, Lorraine Keller-Jennings and Lynette Walker (collectively, "Grouped-Plaintiffs") and Exhibit I attached to the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Gail Cooper ("Cooper"). For the following reasons Defendant's Motion to Strike Exhibit G attached to the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Cynthia Henley, Patricia Chapman, Debra Celestine, Thais Walker, Lorraine Keller-Jennings and Lynette Walker is DENIED and Defendant's Motion to Strike Exhibit I attached to the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Gail Cooper is GRANTED. Further, for the following reasons Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims by Plaintiffs is GRANTED.
On May 10, 2002, all plaintiffs, except Gail Cooper, filed a joint motion withdrawing their attorney and substituting a new attorney. (01-1560-Rec. Doc. No. 39). In order to avoid confusion, reference to record documents is prefaced by the appropriate civil action number wherein the record was filed.
Also stricken are the "Employee Notice" documents included in the supplemental memorandum (01-191-Rec. Doc. No. 49) of the Grouped-Plaintiffs. See discussion, infra.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are all African-American women who work in the Finance Department at Louisiana State University Medical Center ("LSUMC"). In March of 1999, LSUMC authorized the hiring of Jacqueline Donellon and Rose Klein, each a white female, to restricted appointments in the position of Accounting Supervisor 1 (GS 16). Neither Donellon or Klein were employed in the state civil service at the time. Apparently, LSUMC learned that neither woman qualified for the position of Accounting Supervisor 1, and they were reassigned to the restricted appointments of Administrative Manager 3 (GS 17)
A restricted appointment is a temporary position not to exceed six months in a calendar year. See 01-191-Rec Doc. 37, Ex. A, State Civil Service Commission Rule 8.10.
Plaintiffs allege they were equally or more qualified for promotion than either Donellon or Klein. Further, Plaintiffs allege they were denied the opportunity to apply for these two allegedly unposted promotional opportunities based on their race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and La. R.S. 23:301 et seq.
II. MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBITS
A. Authenticity and Timeliness
As a threshold matter the Court will address the argument raised by Defendant concerning the authenticity of the documents at issue and their untimely submission. Defendants are correct that the Court ordered "[a]ll relevant motions, oppositions, and replies" be submitted by October 15, 2002. Plaintiffs satisfied this deadline with the timely submission of their Oppositions on September 20th and 23th, 2002, respectively. These timely Oppositions contained unauthenticated versions of the documents at issue in Defendant's Motion to Strike. Such unsworn documents are not appropriate evidence for consideration on summary judgment. See Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distributor, Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987), citing Oglesby v. Terminal Transport Co., 543 F.2d 1111, 1112 (5th Cir. 1976).
01-191-Rec. Doc. 42.
01-191-Rec. Docs. 37 38.
On October 15, 2002, Cooper supplemented her Opposition with a Certification received from the EEOC for the "Conciliation Agreement." On October 17, 2002, the Grouped-Plaintiffs supplemented their Opposition with an authenticated copy of Exhibit G and similar documents pertaining to the EEOC charge filed by the other named Plaintiffs. Because the Court is satisfied that all parties to this suit are well aware of the accuracy and authenticity of these documents any objection to the "untimely" supplement of certified copies for timely submitted unsworn copies is rejected.
01-191-Rec. Doc. 44.
According to Plaintiffs the EEOC is temporarily unable to locate the file containing similar documents for plaintiff, Lorraine Keller-Jennings.
The "Conciliation Agreement" was signed be a representative of Defendant on September 29, 2002, and Plaintiffs maintain that a copy of the "Determination" was mailed by the EEOC to Defendant.
B. Exhibit G
Exhibit G is a "Determination," dated July 26, 2000, of the merits of Cynthia Henley's (as Charging Party, and representative for other class members) charge of employment discrimination by New Orleans District Office of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). It states in relevant part:
The Charging Party and the other class members were not considered for these promotional positions through the Respondent' s manipulation of the Civil Service Policy by establishing restricted appointments. This allowed the Respondent to fill these positions by word-of-mouth recruitment without publicizing vacancies and to establish positions in which to place Whites regardless of qualifications. The Respondent's selection of Whites in positions which are at higher GS-levels and higher rates of pay has the purpose or effect of denying promotional opportunities to the Charging Party and other class members because of their race in violation of the statute.
01-191-Rec. Doc. 37, Ex. G.
Such factual findings by the EEOC are admissible in subsequent civil proceedings. "EEOC determinations and findings of fact, although not binding on the trier of fact, are admissible as evidence in civil proceedings as probative of a claim of employment discrimination at issue in the civil proceedings." Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 894 (5th Cir. 1998), quoting McClure v. Mexia Ind. Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1985). Such investigative reports or factual findings may be admitted into evidence under the hearsay exception for reports of a public agency. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(c); see also, Jimenez v. Paw-Paws Camper City, Inc., No. 00-1756, 2001 WL 1445027 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2001) (Wilkinson, Mag.).
The EEOC determination of reasonable cause that Defendant manipulated Civil Service Policy, thereby denying to Plaintiffs promotional opportunities because of their race is relevant to issues posed by Plaintiffs' Title VII suit. Therefore, any exclusion of the "Determination" at trial would be appropriate only if the Court decided that "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Fed.R.Evid. 403. Here, on summary judgment, there is no danger of unfair prejudice. See McClure, 750 F.2d at 400 (noting that in non-jury trials the danger of admitting such evidence is almost nil); but see, Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1992) (clarifying dicta in McClure suggesting EEOC investigative reports to be highly probative per se and reasserting that district court is not without discretion "to exclude such reports if their probative value is substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect"). Because the Court concludes that the probative value of the "Determination" at issue is not substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect, Exhibit G is properly admitted for summary judgment purposes. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Strike Exhibit G is denied.
The Court does not consider whether the probative value of Exhibit G is substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect upon the jury at trial.
C. Exhibit I
Exhibit I is a "Conciliation Agreement," dated September 9, 2000. Unlike Exhibit G, it does not simply state investigatory and factual findings. Rather, it is a proposed settlement by the EEOC, generally submitted to the parties in an attempt to preclude litigation. Such documents are expressly barred from consideration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which provides in pertinent part:
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned.
( Id.) (emphasis added). Even use by the parties to the agency proceeding of EEOC conciliation material in subsequent litigation is prohibited. Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 842 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1988), citing Branch v. Philips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 880-81 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). Further, because such documents contain "advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated," Branch, 638 F.2d at 881, they are protected from disclosure by the common law "deliberative process" and/or the "official information privilege." Jimenez, 2001 WL 1445027, at *1, citing generally, Branch. Accordingly, Exhibit I is stricken from the record.
Grouped-Plaintiffs include various iterations of the "Conciliation Agreement" in their supplemental memorandum as they pertain to each individual plaintiff. ( See Rec. Doc. No. 49, Ex. A). All such iterations are hereby stricken.
D. Other Documents from the EEOC File
Also, included in the Grouped-Plaintiffs' supplemental memorandum are other documents, namely several iterations of an "Employee Notice" that appears to be part of the informal process of conciliation. As discussed above, these documents, clearly derivative of the conciliation process, are expressly excluded by § 2000e-5(b)
See 01-191-Rec. Doc. 49, Ex. A.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be] `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] `material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrom v. First National Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).
B. DISCUSSION
Under Title VII and Louisiana State law, Plaintiffs must establish that "but for" race they would have been treated differently. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Plummer v. Marriot Corp., 654 So.2d 843, 848 (La.App. 4th Cir, 1995), citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) Thus, Plaintiffs' claims require a showing of intentional discrimination. See Plummer, 654 So.2d at 848.
A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A prima facie case of discrimination consists of a plaintiff showing that (1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she applied for the position in question; (3) she was qualified for the position; (4) she was not selected for the position; and (5) after the employer declined to hire her, the position either remained open or was filled by someone outside the protected class. See Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994).
Because Louisiana courts have routinely looked to federal jurisprudence to determine whether a claim of discrimination has been asserted, the Court includes and applies its analysis of Title VII to Plaintiffs' state law discrimination claims. See, generally, Plummer, 654 So.2d 843.
Additionally, where the plaintiff claims discrimination in promotion to an unposted position, "she must establish that the company had some reason or duty to consider her for the post." Jones v. Flagship Intern., 793 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1986), citing Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir. 1984).
If established, the plaintiff's prima facie case raises an inference of intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. The defendant then must rebut that presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the defendant articulates such a reason, the focus then shifts to the ultimate question: whether the plaintiff can prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. See id.
The plaintiff may attempt to overcome the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason by providing evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is merely pretextual. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
The plaintiff, therefore, "retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the case." Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207). A plaintiff can meet her burden of demonstrating pretext and thereby establish a jury issue to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law "if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [the plaintiff's protected status] was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains." Vadie v. Mississippi State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 374, n. 23 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that this analysis first formulated in Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996), survives the Supreme Court's abrogation of Rhodes in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). A prima facie case and sufficient evidence of pretext would permit a court or jury to find unlawful discrimination, without additional independent evidence of discrimination, though such a showing will not always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-49, 120 S.Ct. at 2106-2109, 147 L.Ed.2d 105. See also Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying McDonnell Douglas-St. Mary's burden-shifting analysis to ADEA claims).
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a prima facie case as to their Title VII claims. Although they are all members of a protected class, African-American, they did not seek nor were they qualified for either position of Accountant Supervisor 1 or Administrative Manger 3. Moreover, LSUMC had no reason or duty to consider any of these women for either position because none of them met the objective promotion criteria for either position. See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, 246 F.3d 458, 469 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiff must demonstrate that she meets objective promotion criteria at prima facie stage), citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2001); Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs do not allege that they applied for either position. Rather, the dispute in this case involves whether Plaintiffs were qualified for either position and if so, whether LSUMC have some reason or duty to consider them for the unposted positions.
In her sworn affidavit, Kaye Hamilton, a Human Resources Program Consultant Supervisor with the Louisiana Department of Civil Services stated that none of the Plaintiffs was qualified for either position. The minimum qualification required for Accountant Supervisor 1 is "a baccalaureate degree with twenty-four semester hours in accounting plus three years professional level experience in accounting or financial auditing." The minimum qualifications required for Administrative Manager 3 is "a baccalaureate degree with twenty-four semester hours in accounting plus two years professional level experience in administrative services, accounting, auditing, purchasing, or staff development." For both positions certain substitutions for the specified qualifications are permitted.
01-1560-Rec. Doc. 46, Ex. A, p. 3.
Id., Ex. C.
Id., Ex. B.
See id., Exs. A-C.
None of the Plaintiffs met the general minimum qualifications or the substitute qualifications for either position. As a result, their names did not appear on the List of Certificate of Eligibles requested from the Civil Service for the position of Accountant Supervisor 1. Because they were not listed on the Certificate of Eligibles, "the hiring agency could not consider them for the position." Thus, LSUMC had no reason or duty to consider Plaintiffs for the position.
See id., Exs. A D-I.
Id., Exs. A K-M.
Id., Ex. A.
The Grouped-Plaintiffs fail to allege that they met the objective promotional criteria. Instead, Plaintiffs' argument merely contends that the hirees, Donellon and Klein were themselves unqualified for the positions at issue. Defendant's expert, Kaye Hamilton reviewed the personnel files of both hirees and determined that neither Donellon nor Klein possessed the minimum qualifications for the position of Accountant Supervisor 1. Hamilton stated that she had insufficient information to determine whether Donellon or Klein met the minimum qualifications for Administrative Manager 3, however, based on the information in their personnel files, she was unable to state that they were qualified.
See Deposition of Kaye Hamilton, 01-191-Rec. Doc. 37, Ex. C, 68:25-69:19 and 77:6-16)
See id., 73:2-75:4 and 77:17-80:8.
At the prima facie stage of inquiry, the qualifications, or lack thereof of the hirees, is not pertinent. In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, Plaintiffs must make a showing that they were qualified for the position. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; and Davis, 14 F.3d at 1087. The Grouped-Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this threshold burden.
Gail Cooper contends that she can satisfy the objective promotion criteria for both Accountant Supervisor 1 and Administrative Manager 3. To support her argument she relies on the deposition testimony of Kaye Hamilton, who stated that as of June 1999 Cooper satisfied the objective criteria for the Accountant Supervisor 1 and Administrative Manager 3 positions. However, this assessment by Hamilton was based on additional information provided to her at the deposition, which was not included in Cooper's State Pre-Employment Application at the time of the events complained of in the Complaint. Further, Hamilton testified that it was the applicant's responsibility to update her application with additional information that would assist in securing a promotion. Therefore, in March of 1999, when Donnelon and Klein were hired, Cooper appeared unqualified based on the status of her Pre-Employment Application.
See id., 105:3-9 and 105:12-106:3.
Id., 117:14-25; see, also, 01-1560-Rec. Doc. 46, Ex. D.
Id., 118:1-20.
01-1560-Rec. Doc. 46, Ex. D.
Accordingly, Gail Cooper has failed to demonstrate that at the time of the incidents alleged in the Complaint that she met the objective promotional criteria necessary to establish a prima facie case.
Additionally, the Grouped-Plaintiffs allege that the use of restricted appointments permits LSUMC to manipulate the civil service rules to place white applicants possessing similar or lesser qualifications in favored positions of employment. In support of this argument, Grouped-Plaintiffs rely on the factual findings of the "Determination" by the EEOC. ( See Part IB, supra; and 01-1560-Rec. Doc. No. 37, Ex. G). As stated in Part IB, the Court may consider this document when considering summary judgment, however, its contents are "not binding on the trier of fact," rather it is simply "probative of a claim of employment discrimination." Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 894.
First, the standard of proof applied in the EEOC "Determination" was one of "reasonable cause to believe that violations have occurred." This is a lesser standard than that required here on summary judgment. Thus, the EEOC finding that reasonable cause exists that LSUMC used restricted appointments to manipulate civil service policy does not by itself raise a genuine issue of material fact. It is simply a conclusion reached by the Commission that based on the allegations presented the possibility of intentional discrimination was a reasonable conclusion. It is not a determination that intentional discrimination occurred.
01-191-Rec. Doc. 37, Ex. G.
Second and more importantly, at the prima facie stage of the inquiry this argument is misplaced. Although this argument may be cogent to counter as pretextual an explanation proffered by the Defendant to rebut a prima facie case once made, it is not relevant to establish the prima facie case itself. The Grouped-Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case, therefore, the argument that Defendant is manipulating restricted appointments to intentionally discriminate is not ripe at this stage of the analysis.
Also, Gail Cooper contends that Rule 9.8 of the Department of Civil Service Rules and Policy No. 8005 of the Department of Health and Human Resources, Office of Charity Hospital at New Orleans establish both a reason and a duty on the part of LSUMC to consider her for the unposted position.
Rule 9.8 provides in relevant part: "Because the restricted appointment is easy to use, it is also easy to misuse." (01-191-Rec. Doc. 37, Ex. E).
Policy No. 8005 provides in relevant part: "The person appointed [to a restricted appointment] must meet the minimum qualifications required for the class in which the appointment is made." ( Id., Ex. F).
In support of this argument, Cooper relies on the fact that in 1997 she had been detailed into an Accountant 2 position and that Policy No. 8005 states that restricted appointments should be made "only when all reasonable efforts to fill the position or meet the staffing needs of the unit have been exhausted." Such efforts expressly include filling the position with a " qualified person through probationary appointment, job appointment, non-competitive re-employment, or detailed to special duty."
Detailing means that the employee can be placed in a vacant position on a trial basis while crediting the employee with qualifying experience for that position. Detailing can result in possible promotion. See id., Ex. C, 92:8-18 Deposition of Kaye Hamilton.
Id., Ex. F.
Id., (emphasis added).
Although "detailing" personnel into positions for promotion purposes is one of several options apparently available under Policy No. 8005, it still requires that the individual be qualified for the position. As discussed above, at the time of the incident alleged in the Complaint, Gail Cooper did not appear qualified for either position. Therefore, even if Policy No. 8005 did establish a reason or duty to consider unit personnel before resorting to restricted appointments, LSUMC had no reason or duty to consider unqualified personnel such as Cooper.
In as much as the process of "detailing" may permit unqualified but able personnel to gain qualifying experience for promotion, such a procedure inherently involves subjective promotional criteria and cannot be relied on to support a plaintiff's burden at the prima facie stage. To find that Policy No. 8005 establishes a duty to consider and assess whether all objectively unqualified personnel were subjectively able to fulfill the requirements of an available position for "detailing" purposes each and every time a position became available would be an unreasonable interpretation of the policy.
Cooper's reliance on Blow v. City of San Antonio, Texas, 236 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2001) is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of McDonnell Douglas and established a prima facie case. The issue on appeal concerned whether the City's proffered nondiscriminatory reason was legitimate or pretextual. Blow, 236 F.3d at 297. The Fifth Circuit found that the City's explanation was insufficient to prevail on summary judgment. Here, in contrast, Cooper has failed to establish a prima facie case. Cooper's argument fails for similar reasons that the Grouped Plaintiffs' argument of deliberate manipulation fails; it is not appropriate at this initial stage of inquiry. Accordingly, Gail Cooper have failed to establish that her employer, LSUMC had a duty to consider her for the unposted positions at issue. See Jones, 793 F.2d at 724.
IV. CONCLUSION
C. Motion to Strike
Upon review of the motions, memoranda and attached exhibits, and the applicable law the Court concludes that all iterations of the EEOC "Determination" are appropriately submitted for summary judgment purposes and all iterations of the "Conciliation Agreement" and "Employee Notice" are excluded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's, the Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College's Motion to Strike Exhibit G attached to the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Cynthia Henley, Patricia Chapman, Debra Celestine, Thais Walker, Lorraine Keller-Jennings and Lynette Walker is hereby DENIED, and the Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College's Motion to Strike Exhibit I attached to the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Gail Cooper is hereby GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the all iterations of the "Conciliation Agreement" and the "Employee Notice" attached to the Grouped-Plaintiffs supplemental memorandum (Rec. Doc. 49, Ex. A) are hereby stricken as well.
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of maternal fact. It is undisputed that at the time of the incident alleged in the Complaint all Plaintiffs were either unqualified or appeared unqualified based on the status of their Pre-Employment Applications for the promotions at issue. Because they were not qualified for promotion, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in promotion under state and federal law based on race. Further, because they were not qualified, the Defendant had no reason or duty to consider them for promotion.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's, the Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College's Motion Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, dismissing all claims by Plaintiffs, Gail Cooper, Debra Celestine, Lorraine Keller-Jenkins, Cynthia Henley, Patricia Chapman, Thais Walker and Lynette Walker.