Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CV-8508
October 14, 2003
MEMORANDUM
Sondra Johnson ("Plaintiff or "Johnson") appeared before the Honorable Gene D. Cohen ("Judge Cohen") on August 20, 2001, having brought a pro se civil action for defamation, fraud, and slander in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Jacques Ferber, Inc., a Philadelphia furrier that allegedly lost Plaintiffs fur coat. As alleged by Johnson in her Amended Complaint before this Court, Judge Cohen deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law when he belligerently and unfairly denied her requests for a continuance and when he later falsified court transcripts, allegedly in order to remove those portions that would incriminate him.
Presently before the Court is Judge Cohen's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Default Judgment. Judge Cohen contends that, as the presiding judge in Plaintiffs civil action, he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit. For the reasons which follow, Defendant's Motion will be granted.
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint additionally names Jacques Ferber, Inc.; its representative, Kenneth C. Ferber; Court Reporter Catherine A. Lonergan; and the Office of the Prothonotary as additional defendants. While those other defendants also have filed Motions to Dismiss, this Memorandum only pertains to those claims against Judge Cohen.
I. Jurisdiction and Legal Standard
As Johnson alleges violations of her constitutional rights as guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Having construed Plaintiffs complaint liberally, this Court concludes that Johnson further alleges a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which reads, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). "The purpose of Section 1983 is to provide a civil cause of action to protect persons against the misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible because the defendant was cloaked with the authority of the state." Douris v. Dougherty, 192 F. Supp.2d 358, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court must accept as true all well — pleaded allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted only when it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved by the plaintiff. Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988).
A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to no less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
II. Analysis
A. Factual Background — Plaintiffs Allegations
Approximately seven years ago, Jacques Ferber, Inc., a Philadelphia furrier, misplaced a fur coat that it had been holding in storage for one of its customers, Plaintiff Johnson. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) After unsuccessful negotiations and settlement talks, Johnson initiated suit against the furrier in order to secure compensation. (Id. ¶ 6.) Judging from the allegations within Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, this lawsuit and the accompanying arbitration hearings had been marked by severe enmity. (Id. ¶ 9.) Thereafter, on February 9, 2000, Plaintiff filed a pro se civil action against the furrier for defamation, fraud, and slander in Pennsylvania State Court. (Id. ¶ 15.) On the morning of August 20, 2001, a Monday, Johnson and the furrier appeared before Judge Cohen. (Id. ¶ 18.)
As Plaintiff only had received the furrier's answer to her amended complaint that previous Saturday afternoon, Johnson requested a continuance during which she could review the furrier's answer and respond appropriately. (Id.) Judge Cohen firmly established that the parties would resolve their dispute that day in his courtroom. (Tr. at 6, 7-8, 10.) According to Plaintiff, Judge Cohen "belligerently and vehemently" denied her requests for a continuance. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff "pleaded three times that she was being placed at a [sic] unfair disadvantage, but Judge Gene D. Cohen, screamed in a disdainful tone of voice[,] `I DO NOT CARE ABOUT YOUR UNFAIR DISADVANTAGE.'" (Id.) (emphasis in original). Judge Cohen allegedly "verbally berated and oppressed [Plaintiff] into a state of exerucreating [sic] anxity [sic] and server [sic] duress." (Id.) That day, Plaintiff withdrew her claim without prejudice.
According to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Johnson withdrew her complaint because it had become painfully obvious that she could not receive fair, objective treatment from His Honor. "[I]t was glarenly [sic] evident that from the personal bias, prejudice and ill will of Judge Cohen, that he was not going to allow [Johnson] the opportunity to present a defense [sic] on her behalf nor to present evidence for default judgment. . . ." (Id. ¶ 18.) Having decided to initiate litigation against Judge Cohen, Plaintiff requested the corresponding trial transcripts and was surprised to learn that the version depicted therein did not comport with her recollection. Feeling that her rights to due process and equal protection under the law, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, had been violated and unjustly disregarded by Judge Cohen, Plaintiff brought the instant action against him, alleging judicial impropriety.
B. Judicial Immunity
Judge Cohen argues that Plaintiffs claim against him should be dismissed because, as a judge, he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. It is well-established that a judge sued pursuant to § 1983 is absolutely immune from liability provided: (1) the judge has jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (2) the judge had been performing a judicial act. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). Provided that these conditions have been satisfied, a judge cannot be deprived of absolute immunity from suit even where it is alleged that the judge has acted in error, with malice, in excess of his authority, or in conspiracy with others. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 So. Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). Therefore, Plaintiffs accusations that Judge Cohen "displayed a personal bias, ill will prejudice and partiallity [sic] for the defendant" are irrelevant (Am. Compl. ¶ 48), "as judicial immunity is not forfeited by allegations of `malice or corruption of motive.'" Gallas v. Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotingForrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)).
In her Opposing Motion, Plaintiff appears to agree that Judge Cohen is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from her suit and now rephrases her sought relief: "Plaintiff admits in part to defendants [sic] Motion to Dismiss surrounding Judge Cohens [sic] Judicial Immunity . . . but plaintiff seeks not monetary [sic] damages from Judge Cohen, but only seeks Judge Cohen's [sic] as a party to give testimony in plaintiffs present cause of action." (Pl.'s Mot. Opp'n Def's Mot. to Dismiss, ¶ 1.)
Generally, judges are immune from suits that seek monetary relief.Ryan v. Lower Merion Township, 205 F. Supp.2d434, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citations omitted). But, for whatever purpose Plaintiff might now seek Judge Cohen's continued inclusion in this lawsuit, this Court simply cannot grant Johnson's wishes, however benign, should doing so deprive Judge Cohen of his absolute judicial immunity. See, e.g., Gueson v. Feldman, No. 00-1117, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24210, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2001) (stating that accused, but immune, judges should be excluded from discovery since discovery presupposes and ultimately evolves into trial) (citation omitted).
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In order to decide that Judge Cohen possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court first must determine that he did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction; judges are liable for those acts performed in the clear absence of jurisdiction, whereas judges who act merely in excess of jurisdiction remain entitled to judicial immunity. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n. 6). As Judge Cohen alleges in his Motion to Dismiss, which Plaintiff does not refute, he had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter. Judges on the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, on which Judge Cohen sits, have broad judicial powers that encompass "unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law." PA. CONST, art. V, § 5, cl. b; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 931 (2003) ("[T]he Court of Common Pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings. . . ."). Judge Cohen would have had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs civil action against the Philadelphia furrier whom she charged with defamation, fraud, and slander.
2. Judicial Act
Plaintiff claims that two particular actions performed by Judge Cohen violated her constitutional protections: the denial of her continuance requests and the redaction of the official courtroom transcript. Two factors determine whether to define a judge's challenged action as a "judicial" act: "first, whether the function is one that is normally performed by a judge, and, second, whether the parties expected to have dealings with the judge in his judicial capacity." Assocs. in Obstetrics Gynecology v. Upper Merion Township, No. 03-2313, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17468 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2003) (Baylson, J.). This Court concludes that these actions isolated by Plaintiff are routinely and normally performed by judges, and were undertaken in conformance with the parties' expectations of a judge's official judicial capacity.
Other courts have defined the grant or denial of a litigant's request for a continuance as a "judicial" act, and have exempted such actions from § 1983 claims on grounds of judicial immunity. See, e.g., Pokrandt v. Shields, 773 F. Supp. 758, 764-65 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that the denial of continuance motions, like the denial of any motion, constitutes a judicial act for immunity purposes); Keener v. Feudale, No. 89-2694, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6361 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 1989) (denying § 1983 relief where a plaintiff alleged that the repeated granting of his opponent's motions for continuances constituted a denial of due process). Even where judges have been accused of falsifying court transcripts, as Judge Cohen has been accused here, those actions have been defined as "judicial acts" properly entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Travis v. Miller, 226 F. Supp.2d 663 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Plaintiff and the furrier appeared before Judge Cohen for the purpose of litigating Johnson's civil action for defamation, fraud, and slander. There is no reason to doubt that Judge Cohen was acting in his judicial capacity. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Furthermore, because Figueroa was brought before Judge Blackburn for the purpose of being arraigned, he was before her and dealing with her in her judicial capacity.").
III. Conclusion
Because this Court concludes that Judge Cohen both had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation and had been performing traditional "judicial" acts when he allegedly harmed Plaintiff, this Court holds that Judge Cohen is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit. Therefore, this Court must grant Judge Cohen's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Default Judgment.
An appropriate order follows.