Opinion
No. 3-04-CV-0419-M.
June 22, 2004
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Michael W. Johnson, appearing pro se, has filed an application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated herein, the application should be denied.
I.
Petitioner is serving a three-year sentence for injury to a disabled person. While incarcerated at the Sanders Estes Unit of the TDCJ-ID, petitioner was convicted of engaging in a physical altercation with another inmate, a Level 2, Code 21 disciplinary infraction. Punishment was assessed at 10 days recreation restriction. Petitioner challenged the results of his disciplinary hearing through the prison grievance process. His grievance was denied. Petitioner then filed this action in federal court.
Petitioner originally brought this case as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because petitioner seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate or a speedier release from custody, the court has construed his complaint as an application for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ORDER, 4/8/04, citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).
II.
In his sole ground for relief, petitioner contends that his disciplinary conviction "has irreparably harmed" his eligibility for release to mandatory supervision.A.
The due process rights of prisoners are generally limited to freedom of restraint which "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Restrictions which merely alter the conditions of confinement do not implicate due process. See id., 115 S.Ct. at 2301 (segregated confinement); Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000) (commissary and cell restrictions); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). Although a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time if he is eligible for release to mandatory supervision, petitioner did not forfeit any good time credit as a result of his disciplinary conviction. The only punishment assessed was 10 days recreation restriction. Thus, there is no liberty interest protected by the due process clause. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958; Madison, 104 F.3d at 768.B.
Moreover, even if petitioner were able to establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest, he still would not be entitled to federal habeas relief. The minimum requirements of due process are: (1) written notice of the alleged disciplinary violation at least 24 hours prior to a hearing; (2) the ability to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (3) a written statement of the hearing officer as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for any disciplinary action taken. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-79, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). In this case, petitioner received notice of his disciplinary infraction on February 3, 2003. (Resp. Ans., Exh. B at 1). A hearing was held on February 6, 2003, at which time petitioner was given the opportunity to present his defense. ( Id.). At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner was found guilty of fighting with another inmate. The hearing officer issued a written report detailing the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken. ( Id.). Although petitioner may disagree with this decision, he has failed to establish a due process violation.
To the extent petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the hearing decision, this claim also fails. Federal habeas review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a disciplinary conviction is extremely limited. Due process requires only "some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing." Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2775, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). The offense report alone, which states that petitioner participated in an assault of another inmmate, constitutes all the evidence necessary to establish a disciplinary infraction. See Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 2001) (incident report is "some evidence" of guilt); Christoph v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 21750705 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 24, 2003) (same).