Opinion
No. 2:11-cv-2881 TLN DAD P
07-24-2015
LUIS REYNALDO JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. D. CLAYS, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action on a First Amendment retaliation claim against defendants Baker and Speer. Pending before the court are several of plaintiff's motions, which the court will address in turn.
First, plaintiff has filed a motion styled "Motion to Subjoin Nonjoinder Defendant" in which he requests that the court add Lieutenant E. Hobbs to this action as a defendant and order service of plaintiff's amended complaint on him. Plaintiff contends that information he received during discovery demonstrates that Hobbs is a "collusive codefendant." As noted above, plaintiff is proceeding on a retaliation claim against defendants Baker and Speer. Specifically, plaintiff has alleged that defendants Baker and Speer searched his cell and seized his property because he had filed an administrative grievance against one of their fellow officers and because he acts as a jail house lawyer and has assisted fellow inmates in filing lawsuits against prison staff. Plaintiff contends that, according to defendant Baker's responses to plaintiff's interrogatories, Lieutenant Hobbs directed defendants Baker and Speer to search plaintiff's cell.
Typically, the court would not permit plaintiff to join a party without filing an amended complaint for this court to evaluate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Because the time to file pretrial motions in this action under the court's scheduling order, such as a motion to amend, has now expired the court will in the interest of justice consider plaintiff's pending "joinder" motions.
The court will deny plaintiff's motion to join Lieutenant Hobbs in this action at this time because plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim against him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder); Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (court may on motion or on its own add or drop a party on just terms). Insofar as plaintiff now wishes to claim that Lieutenant Hobbs retaliated against him, the Ninth Circuit has made clear:
Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). In his pending motion, plaintiff has not alleged a causal link between Lieutenant Hobbs and plaintiff's claimed First Amendment deprivation. Specifically, plaintiff has not indicated that Lt. Hobbs knew of any of plaintiff's alleged protected conduct (e.g., that plaintiff had filed an administrative grievance against defendants' fellow officer). See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (a retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, "after this, therefore because of this."). In this regard, in contrast to his allegations against defendants Baker and Speer, plaintiff has not adequately alleged that Lieutenant Hobbs' conduct was motivated by, or because of, plaintiff's engagement in protected activities. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Moreover, insofar as plaintiff believes Lieutenant Hobbs is liable as a supervisor, as this court previously advised plaintiff, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Accordingly, the undersigned will deny plaintiff's motion to join Lieutenant Hobbs in this action.
Plaintiff has also filed a similar motion in which he requests that the court order service of his amended complaint on Officer D. Clays. As an initial matter, at screening, this court determined that plaintiff's amended complaint failed to state a cognizable claim against Officer Clays and issued findings and recommendations to dismiss Clays as a defendant. (Doc. No. 25) In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that Officer Clays confiscated his television and wrote-up false claims and allegations that the television was altered. The court informed plaintiff that unauthorized, intentional deprivations of property do not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because meaningful postdeprivation remedies are available in California. (Id.) The assigned District Judge adopted the undersigned's findings and recommendations in full and dismissed Clays from this action. (Doc. No. 27) In his pending motion, plaintiff claims that, based on certain information revealed in defendants' pending motion for summary judgment, the court should re-evaluate its screening order because Officer Clays' conduct was authorized for purposes of a due process claim.
The undersigned will deny plaintiff's motion to join Officer Clays in this action because plaintiff has not identified any new information in defendants' motion for summary judgment that demonstrates, as he contends, that Clays is a "collusive co-defendant." Defendants' references to Officer Clays in their motion for summary judgment primarily reiterate plaintiff's allegations in his amended complaint and do not constitute new information about Officer Clays' alleged misconduct. (Doc. No. 110) Moreover, that defendants argue in their motion for summary judgment that they had a valid penological interest to search plaintiff's cell based in part on plaintiff's altered television (seized during Officer Clays' search) does not constitute a concession that Officer's Clays' search was authorized for purposes of a due process claim. (Id.) To be clear, the court finds once more that plaintiff's allegations that Officer Clays confiscated his television based on false claims and allegations fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Accordingly, given the court's prior dismissal of Officer Clays and plaintiff's lack of showing in the pending motion, this court will deny plaintiff's motion to join Officer Clays in this action.
Next, plaintiff has filed a document styled "Plaintiff's Evidence of Informal Request to Defendants' to Avoid Court Ordered Compeller", which this court and defendants in an abundance of caution have liberally construed as a motion to compel discovery. In his motion, plaintiff appears to complain that defendant Baker did not adequately respond to his request for production number 7, which sought documents related to defendant Baker's prior taking of prisoner property. Plaintiff also appears to complain that defendant Baker did not adequately respond to his request for production number 9, which sought documents showing what internal costs would be expended to defend against plaintiff's lawsuit.
The court will deny plaintiff's motion to compel. First, the court finds that plaintiff's request for production number 7 is overly-broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In this regard, plaintiff's discovery request is wholly unlimited in scope with respect to time. Moreover, plaintiff's request is not adequately limited in subject-matter scope. Prior inmate complaints about defendant Baker taking personal property could establish a possible pattern or practice with respect to the defendant's confiscating of inmate property. However, plaintiff has not shown how any and all prior complaints about defendant Baker taking inmate property are relevant to his sole claim against defendant Baker for retaliation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) ("[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense...."); see also Brown v. Williams, No. 1:09-cv-00792 LJO GBC (PC) (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2012) (denying motion to compel all inmate complaints against defendant); Edwards v. Carey, No. Civ S-05-1353 LKK DAD (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2006) (denying motion to compel any and all complaints and grievances filed against defendants related to family visitation).
The court also finds that plaintiff's request for production number 9 regarding the costs of this case is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Again, plaintiff has not shown how the information he seeks is relevant to his sole claim against defendant Baker for retaliation.
As defense counsel contends, if defendants prevail at trial and were to file a motion for an award of attorneys' fees, that motion would be based on the number of hours reasonably and actually expended in defense of the case, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Until that time, the potential costs of this litigation are irrelevant. --------
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court will deny plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Baker to provide further responses to plaintiff's discovery requests.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion to allow for garnishment proceedings in the event that he prevails in this action and a motion seeking a judgment based on defendants purportedly breaking the "dirty hands doctrine." Neither motion has merit. As to plaintiff's motion for garnishment proceedings, plaintiff is advised that Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs execution of a money judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). This court has not entered judgment in this case, so plaintiff's motion at this juncture is premature. As to plaintiff's motion based on the unclean hands doctrine, plaintiff misunderstands the doctrine. "The unclean hands doctrine derives from the equitable maxim that 'he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.'" Ellenburg v. Brockway, 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985). The unclean hands doctrine is an affirmative defense; any inquiry into unclean hands would be with respect to whether plaintiff dirtied his hands in acquiring the right he has asserted. Id. Accordingly, the court will deny both of these motions as well.
Finally, plaintiff has not filed a substantive opposition to defendants' pending motion for summary judgment and instead has opposed it as premature in light of his pending motions to join additional defendants. Plaintiff has also filed a motion to strike defendants' reply to his opposition. Plaintiff is advised that defendants properly filed their motion for summary judgment and reply in accordance with the court's discovery and scheduling order and Local Rule 230(l). In addition, now that this court has ruled on all of plaintiff's pending motions, the court will direct plaintiff to file any substantive opposition to defendants' motion within twenty-one days. The court cautions plaintiff that any failure on his part to file an opposition to that pending motion in compliance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion to join E. Hobbs to this action (Doc. No. 99) is denied;
2. Plaintiff's motion to join D. Clays to this action (Doc. No. 116) is denied;
3. Plaintiff's motion to compel (Doc. No. 100) is denied;
4. Plaintiff's motion to allow for garnishment proceedings (Doc. No. 105) is denied;
5. Plaintiff's motion based on the unclean hands doctrine (Doc. No. 106) is denied;
6. Within twenty-one days of the date of this order, plaintiff shall file an opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment. Failure to file an opposition in compliance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. Defendants may file any reply in accordance with Local Rule 230(l); and
7. Plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' reply (Doc. No. 115) is denied. Dated: July 24, 2015
/s/_________
DALE A. DROZD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DAD:9
john2881.subj