Opinion
No. 3992.
March 19, 1931.
Appeal from Grayson County Court; A. S. Noble, Judge.
Garnishment proceeding by the Chapman Milling Company against T. L. Johnson. From the judgment, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
The appellee milling company, having a judgment for $303.94 against one W. Z. Bensley, had a writ of garnishment issued and served on appellant Johnson, who, answering the writ, alleged he was not indebted to Beasley and had none of Beasley's effects in his possession. Answering further, "as a matter of explanation," Johnson alleged that Beasley, who was engaged in the mercantile business, made a voluntary assignment to him (Johnson) as trustee for the benefit of his (Beasley's) creditors "who would consent to accept their proportionate share of the estate"; that he (Johnson) took charge of the property so assigned to him, and thereafter, "acting under said assignment (quoting), sold said property for the gross sum of $936.12, which was the best price he could obtain for said property"; that the indebtedness of Beasley amounted, approximately, to the sum of $11,000; and that "parties holding claims against him (Beasley) aggregating approximately $10,000.00 had filed same with him (Johnson)" and that he as trustee had accepted same. The trial was to the court without a jury, The appeal is from a judgment for $313.84 in favor of the milling company against Johnson, garnishee, and allowing his attorney a fee of $30, to be taxed as costs of the suit.
Warren, Lasseter Warren, of Tyler, for appellant.
Webb Webb, of Sherman, for appellee.
The facts of this case are not materially different from those of Patty-Joiner Eubank Co. v. Cummins (Tex.Civ.App.) 59 S.W. 297, Id., 93 Tex. 598, 57 S.W. 566, decided by Texas courts, and International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 173 Ark. 316, 292 S.W. 996, decided by Arkansas courts, where it was held, in effect, that an assignment under a state statute by an insolvent debtor of his property for the benefit of his creditors who accepted thereunder was valid, "except as against proceedings seasonably taken under the National Bankruptcy Act." In the Pinkus Case a writ of error was granted by the United States Supreme Court ( 278 U.S. 261, 49 S.Ct. 108, 110, 73 L.Ed. 318), which reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court, holding that in enacting the Bankruptcy Act (11 USCA § 1 et seq.) "Congress [quoting] did not intend to give insolvent debtors seeking discharge, or their creditors seeking to collect claims, choice between the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Act and that specified in state insolvency laws." "States," the court added, "may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations."
It may be, as argued by appellant, that the Texas Assignment Law (title 12, R.S. 1925) is not an "insolvent law" in the sense the Arkansas statute was, but it cannot be doubted, we think, that the effect of holding it to have been operative in the insolvent debtor's (Beasley's) favor would have been to have given him "choice between the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Act and that specified" in the Texas statute, a thing the federal Supreme Court said should not be done; and, further, would be to "complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations," which that court held a state could not do.
As we view the matter, giving effect, as he was bound to, to the ruling in the Pinkus Case, the trial court could not have held otherwise than he did, and this court, also bound as it is to respect that ruling, cannot do otherwise than affirm the judgment.