Summary
In Johnson Safety, the court could not determine "what structure comprises the 'pivot-limiting portion,'" and concluded that "the claim recites a function without a corresponding structure."
Summary of this case from Zimmer Surgical, Inc. v. Stryker Corp.Opinion
Case No. 5:14-cv-02591-ODW(DTB)
11-16-2016
JOHNSON SAFETY, INC., Plaintiff, v. VOXX INTERNATIONAL CORPORATOIN; VOXX ELECTRONICS CORPORATION; and INVISION AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS INC., Defendants.
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
U.S. PATENT NO. 6,871,356
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,267,402
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,448,679
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,379,125
U.S. PATENT NO. 5,775,762
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,050,124
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,245,274
U.S. PATENT NO. 6,678,892
U.S. PATENT NO. 7,839,355
I. INTRODUCTION
This case involves several patents, owned and/or licensed by either Plaintiff Johnson Safety, Inc. ("Johnson") or Defendants Voxx International Corporation, Voxx Electronics Corporation, and Invision Automotive Systems, Inc. (collectively, "Voxx"). (Compl. ¶¶ 7—23, ECF No. 1; Countercompl. ¶¶ 17—36, ECF No. 42.) Both Johnson and Voxx are in the consumer vehicle electronics market. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 17—23; Countercompl. ¶¶ 1, 17—36.) The patents at issue cover video systems for vehicles, which are embedded in the front seat headrests or hang from the ceiling. (See id.) The parties dispute fifteen terms (five within Johnson's patents, and ten within Voxx's patents) that they have agreed are "significant," and they list an additional eight "less significant" disputed terms. (Joint Claim Chart ("JCC"), ECF No. 74). For purposes of claim construction, and in accord with this Court's Patent Standing Order (ECF No. 54), the Court will construct only the terms labeled "significant" in the JCC.
All of the patents at issue cover vehicle electronics, specifically video systems and monitors affixed to a car ceiling or headrest. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7—23; Countercompl. ¶¶ 17—36.) The types of electronics products that the patents cover can be broken down into three categories: Headrest Patents, Overhead Patents, and Portable/Non-Specified System Patents.
• The Headrest Patents include: Johnson's Patent Nos. 6,871,356 ("the '356 patent"), 7,267,402 ("the '402 patent"), and 7,448,679 ("the '679 patent"), and Voxx's Patent Nos. 7,245,274 ("the '274 patent") and 7,839,355 ("the '355 patent");In the interest of brevity, and due to the number of claims to be constructed, each patent's background is detailed within the analysis section below.
• The Overhead Patents include: Johnson's Patent No. 7,379,125 ("the '125 patent") and Voxx's Patent No. 5,775,762 ("the '762 patent"); and
• The Portable/Non-Specified System Patents include: Voxx's Patent Nos. 7,050,124 ("the '124 patent") and 6,678,892 ("the '892 patent").
In short, both parties (Defendants, collectively, and Johnson) allege that the other is selling products that infringe on its patents. (See Compl. ¶¶ 30—125; Countercompl. ¶¶ 38—196.) On October 28, 2016, the Court held a claim construction hearing on the disputed terms that the parties have deemed significant. For the reasons discussed below, the Court adopts the described constructions outlined herein.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Claim construction is an interpretive issue "exclusively within the province of the court," and it begins with an analysis of the claim language itself. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
A. Claim Construction Generally
Claims are to be interpreted from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). That "person of ordinary skill" is deemed to read the claim term in two contexts: the context of the claim in which the term appears and the context of the entire patent. Id. Accordingly, claims must be read in light of the specification, which is "always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis." Id. at 1315 (internal quotations omitted).
However, the general rule is that limitations from the specification must not be imported into the claims. Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "[T]he line between construing terms and importing limitations can be discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the court's focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim terms." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
The "ordinary and customary meaning" of the words of a disputed claim is at the heart of claim construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13 (internal quotations and citations omitted). But in two situations, the "ordinary and customary" meaning of the terms is superseded: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as its own lexicographer; or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
"To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must 'clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term' other than its plain and ordinary meaning." Id. Disavowal occurs "[w]here the specification makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature." Id. at 1366. "[T]hat feature is [then] deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question." Id.
B. Special Rules Regarding 35 U.S.C. § 122¶6
Means-plus-function claims are a particular class of claims, and they are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6. Section 112¶6 provides that the scope of a claim expressing a means or step for accomplishing something covers the structure, material, or acts (and equivalents thereof) in the claim language that correspond with the means in the patent's specification. If § 112¶6 does apply, then the claim is limited to the embodiments in the specification and equivalents thereof. See Philips, 415 F.3d at 1303.
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether § 112¶6 actually applies to the claim at issue; it applies only to claims that describe a function without defining the structure with which to carry out the function. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006). If the word "means" appears in a claim element in association with a function, a rebuttable presumption arises that §112¶6 applies. Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). If the claim term lacks the word "means," the term will be construed under § 112¶6 only if the "challenger demonstrates that the claim fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function." Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In other words, if the claim does not include the word "means," then the challenger wishing to construe under § 112¶6 must show that the structure described in the claim is too indefinite. See id. The overall inquiry is whether the claim term, in the context of the broader claim language, suggests a class of specific structures. Id. If it does, then the term should not be construed under § 112¶6. Id.
The second step, once it is determined that § 112¶6 applies, is interpretation. See JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The first facet of interpretation is that the court must identify the function of the claim term. Id. After identifying the claimed function, the court must then identify the corresponding structure by looking at the specification. Callicrate, 427 F.3d at 1369. All structures in the specification corresponding to the claimed function are relevant; it is an error to limit the structure to just the preferred embodiment. Id. If the specification does not provide corresponding structure for the claimed function, then the claim is invalid as indefinite. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.
In addition to the structures, materials, or acts of the embodiments described in the patent's specification, the patentee is also entitled to "equivalents thereof" as of the time the patent was issued. See Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985). However, the "equivalents" issue arises in the context of the infringement determination; thus, whether something constitutes an equivalent is a question of fact for the jury. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Below, the Court constructs each of the "significant" terms in the order they appear in the JCC. A. The '356 Patent
The '356 Patent discloses headrest mounted video systems with two major components: a housing and a display that folds into and out of the housing. (See generally the '356 Patent, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. A, ECF No. 73). The folding function of the screen allows the viewer to adjust the tilt of the screen. (Id.) The location of the hinge allowing this tilt is the subject of the disputed claim term.
The disputed terms, along with each party's proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim term in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 6,871,356, Claims 1 and 5:Claim 1: ". . . the first video monitor comprising: a housing comprising a first hingeportion adjacent an upper edge thereof and defining a storage cavity having a floor .. . ."Claim 5: ". . . the first video monitor comprising: a housing comprising a first hingeportion adjacent an upper edge thereof, the viewing screen facing the passengercompartment . . . ." | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| "upper edge" | Plain and ordinarymeaning, or if constructionis necessary, "upwardedge" | "the highest surface of an object,a top surface" |
In relevant part, the specification provides that the video monitor and housing (affixed to the back of a headrest on a vehicle seat) contain two hinges which cooperate to allow the screen structure to pivot. (The '356 Patent, Col. 14:47—49.) These two hinges are, according to the specification, "[p]referably . . . located near an upper edge of the screen structure and housing," which causes that upper edge of the screen structure to remain mostly stationary, while a lower edge is capable of protruding substantially from the front face of the housing, providing a better viewing angle for the user. (Id.)
Notably, a few months after the '356 Patent was issued to Johnson, Voxx filed a request for inter partes reexamination of the patent with the USPTO. (Inter Partes Reexamination Certificate, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. A.) Each claim of the '356 Patent was ultimately confirmed patentable; no amendments to the claim language were made. (Id.)
The difference in the parties' constructions of "upper edge" boils down to a disagreement over whether the term is definite and superlative ("the highest") or indefinite and comparative ("an upper"). Johnson states that no construction is necessary for this term; a Court and jury will easily understand its meaning. (Pl. Opening Br. 7.) If construction is necessary, then Johnson's alternate position is that the word "upward" should be used as a "readily understandable synonym" of "upper." (Id.) Johnson argues that this term must remain indefinite and comparative, allowing the hinge located adjacent "an upper edge" to, in theory, be located in a variety of different locations in different embodiments of the patent, so long as the location were adjacent an upper/upward edge (not necessarily the upper/uppermost edge). (See id. at 9.) In contrast, Voxx wishes to limit the claim term to its definite, superlative version: "the highest surface of an object, the top surface." (Def. Responsive Br. 2-3.) Voxx's justification for introducing this limitation when the language of the claim itself is "an upper edge" is that Figures 8A and 9A accompanying the specification (duplicated below) illustrate the upper edge as the highest or top surface of the housing. (Id.)
Image materials not available for display.
FIG. 8A
Image materials not available for display.
FIG. 9A (The '356 Patent, Figs. 8A, 9A.)
In addition, Voxx argues that the term "upward" is ambiguous, noting that it could be construed to allow the hinge to be placed at the upward side of the bottom edge of the housing. (Def. Responsive Br. at 2.) Voxx states that during prosecution, Johnson disavowed the claim to the extent it allowed the hinge to be placed at the bottom edge of the housing, in order to overcome rejections based on prior art. (Id. at 2-3.)
Based on the general rule that claim construction should give preference to the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms, Johnson's construction should be upheld. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Johnson's construction preserves the indefinite, comparative nature of the claim language ("an upper edge") rather than distorting it into, in essence, "the uppermost edge." Especially dispositive in the Court's decision is the claim language's use of the word "an," which connotes the possibility that the hinge could be located on one of multiple "upper edges." (See the '356 Patent, Col. 17:36-40.) In addition, as Johnson points out, Figure 9A from the '356 Patent in fact uses the term "upper edge" to refer to a surface that is not the highest surface of the housing. (See Pl. Opening Br. 8.) Item 482 is described as "an upper edge" and also "a top edge," but the "J"-shaped arrow accompanying that number clearly points to an edge within the housing that is near the top, but not the highest surface. (See the '356 Patent, Fig. 9A.) As such, Voxx is incorrect in arguing that the specification supports its construction of "an upper edge." The Court adopts Johnson's construction for the term "upper edge."
B. The '402 Patent
The '402 Patent differs from other Headrest Patents in part because of the manner in which the video system screen is adjustable and can be opened all the way forward, like a latch. (See the '402 Patent, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. B.) The asserted claim outlines a method for replacing the headrest mounted video system.
The disputed terms, along with each party's proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim terms in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 7,267,402, Claim 10:"A method of replacing a mobile entertainment system, said method comprising . . .removing said first monitor from said headrest; providing a second monitorcomprising: a second housing . . . and a second screen structure . . . ." | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| "second housing" | Plain and ordinarymeaning, or if constructionis necessary, then the term"second" in conjunctionwith the independentclaim's paragraphstructure, associates thisproposed term with the"second monitor" | "a housing including like featuresrelative to the first housing" |
| "second screenstructure" | Plain and ordinarymeaning, or if constructionis necessary, then the term"second" in conjunctionwith the independentclaim's paragraphstructure, associates thisproposed term with the"second monitor" | "a screen structure including likefeatures relative to the first screenstructure" |
The relevant portion of this patent includes two aspects of the replacement method: steps for removing the current headrest-mounted video system, and steps for installing a replacement system. (Id.) In all, there are five steps involving the replacement of a first monitor with a second monitor. (Id.) The steps are fairly straightforward, and the actual method for replacement is not in issue. The parties' disagreement centers around the type of monitor the consumer should use in replacing the system. (See Def. Responsive Br. 5-6; Pl. Opening Br. 13-16.) In context, the claim provides that the first housing and screen structure should be replaced with a second housing and screen structure. (The '402 Patent, Col. 8:41-55.)
Johnson's argument is that the Court should apply the plain and ordinary meaning, with fewest limitations imported, to both claim terms. (Pl. Opening Br. 15.) According to Johnson, this means that the terms must be construed simply to signify that the replacement housing and screen structure comprise a second, physically different structure from the first. (Id.) On the other hand, Voxx contends that the terms must be construed to mean that the second screen structure and housing must have identical features to the first/original housing. (Def. Responsive Br. 5.) Voxx argues that this added limitation is necessary so that the claim is not construed so broadly as to cover "upgrading" to a totally different type of screen structure or housing. (Id.) Voxx's reasoning is that only one screen structure and one housing is disclosed in the '402 Patent, so the claim does not support Johnson's broad construction. (Id.)
Voxx's argument appears to contradict one of the basic rules of Phillips: that the claims of a patent are not necessarily limited to the embodiment or specification of that patent, even if the claim language describes only a single embodiment. 415 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted). While the specification discloses one type of screen structure and housing, the claim should not be limited to the specification, and it is not difficult to imagine numerous other iterations of a screen structure and housing that could be used to replace the original system while remaining within the scope of the patent. As such, Voxx's attempt to limit the claim terms is not a valid one. Further, Voxx's assertion that the second screen structure and housing could comprise a completely different "upgrade" when compared with the original screen structure and housing is unsupported by logic and by physical limitations of the headrest. (See Def. Responsive Br. 5.) For example, the original monitor could not be replaced with a wildly different, thirty-inch screen structure and housing, because it simply would not fit on the headrest. However, the replacement screen structure may differ somewhat from the original, and the limitations of the specification should not be imported into claim construction. For these reasons, the Court adopts Johnson's construction for the terms "second housing" and "second screen structure."
C. The '679 Patent
The '679 Patent is also a Headrest Patent. (See generally the '679 Patent, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. C.) It was issued on November 11, 2008, and Johnson is the assignee. (Id.) The relevant portion of Claim 1 is directed to a pivoter that stops the screen in the headrest video unit from opening fully. For example, in one embodiment, a bracket is used to achieve this effect. Figure 5B is copied below to illustrate.
Image materials not available for display.
FIG. 5B
The disputed term in context of the broader claim language at issue in the '679 Patent, along with each party's proposed construction, is as follows (disputed claim term in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 7,448,679, Claim 1 (Johnson's Patent):"A mobile video system comprising: a headrest; a screen structure having a frontface, a rear face opposite the front face, and a first hinge portion; a pivot-limitingportion; and a housing . . . ." | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| "pivot-limitingportion" | No construction necessary.To the extent constructionis necessary, "pivot limiter,distinct from the housingand the first and secondhinge portions, that limitsthe outward rotation of thescreen structure" | This term is governed by 35U.S.C. § 112¶6."a bracket [structure] that limitsthe rotation of the screen to lessthan perpendicular relative to theclosed position of the screenstructure [function.]" |
The pivot-limiting portion exists to increase the safety functions of the product. (See id. Col 1:47-54.) The device restrains the video screen from being opened fully in such a way that it could be perpendicular to the housing. (Id. at Col. 8:61-9:11.) In addition, if force is applied to the front of the screen while it is tilted slightly outward (as far as the pivot-limiting portion will allow), the pivot-limiting portion will not resist the force and the screen will close fully. (Id. at Col. 1:47-54.) Both of these aspects of the product protect a person whose head may be thrown forward in a crash and hit the front of the screen. (See id.)
The parties disagree about whether this term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6. (See Pl. Opening Br. 19-21; Def. Responsive Br. 7-10.) If it is, then the scope of the term must be limited to that set forth in the specification. See Philips, 415 F.3d at 1303. But if § 112¶6 does not apply, as Johnson argues, then the term should not be limited to the specification. (See Pl. Opening Br. 19-21.)
Johnson points out that Voxx failed to identify this term as being governed by § 112¶6 in its (1) invalidity contentions; (2) disclosure of terms for construction; and (3) exchange of preliminary claim constructions and extrinsic evidence. (See id. at 19-20.) The Court's Patent Local Rules require disclosure of terms that a party intends to argue are governed by § 112¶6 in each of those three filings, and Voxx did not disclose this term in any of them. (See Patent L.R. 3-3(c); 4-1(a); 3-6.)
However, Voxx did identify the term as falling under § 112¶6 prior to the claim construction hearing, and the Patent Local Rules do not identify non-application of § 112¶6 as the penalty for failing to timely identify a term as being governed by such. (See Def. Responsive Br. 7; Patent L.R. 3-3(c); 4-1(a); 3-6.) For these reasons, the Court declines to decide this term on Voxx's failure to timely identify the application of § 112¶6, and instead reaches the merits of constructing the term.
The wording of the claim does not sufficiently define the structure that acts as a "pivot-limiting portion." (See the '679 Patent, Col. 8:55 - 9:11.) Because the claim term lacks the word "means," § 112¶6 should apply if the claim describes a function without sufficiently reciting corresponding structure. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349. Here, the claim states that a pivot-limiting portion is part of the claimed invention and describes the way that device limits rotation of the screen structure relative to the housing. (Id.) However, this leaves open the question of what structure comprises the pivot-limiting portion. (See id.) As such, the claim recites a function without corresponding structure, and § 112¶6 applies. In order to find the corresponding structure, the Court draws from the specification and determines that the structure is a bracket. (See id. Col. 7:63-66.) As a result, the appropriate construction must reflect what is recited in the specification. The Court therefore adopts Voxx's construction of "pivot-limiting portion."
D. The '125 Patent
This Overhead Patent, owned by Johnson, was issued on May 27, 2008. (See generally the '125 Patent, Col. 2:25—34; 3:4—6; 4:49—53, Pl. Opening Br., Ex. D.) Like some of the other patented products, the screen of this system can pivot to provide a preferred angle for the viewer. (See id.) The angle of this pivoting, and the screen structure's angular relationship to the roof of the vehicle, is the subject of the dispute for this claim term.
The disputed term in context of the broader claim language at issue in the '125 Patent, along with each party's proposed construction, is as follows (disputed claim term in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 7,379,125, Claims 1-6; 8-11 (Johnson's Patent):"An assembly mountable to an interior surface of a roof of a vehicle, the assemblycomprising: a housing . . . and a video display . . . substantially parallel with aninterior surface of a roof . . . ." | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| "substantiallyparallel with aninterior surface ofa roof" | "substantially parallel withthe ceiling of a vehiclecabin" | "essentially parallel with aninterior surface of a roof" |
The parties have already agreed on the meaning of "interior surface of a roof of a vehicle cabin"; their agreed construction is "ceiling of a vehicle cabin." (See Pl. Opening Br. 23-24.) Johnson and Voxx disagree about the extent to which the screen structure can pivot backwards, measured by whether the screen is parallel with the ceiling of the vehicle cabin. (See id. at 22-25; Def. Responsive Br. 4.) Figure 9 from the patent, copied below, illustrates the backwards-extended position of the screen structure.
Image materials not available for display.
FIG.9
Johnson seeks to maintain the original "substantially" phrasing in the construction. (See Pl. Opening Br. 23-25.) Johnson offers Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 2280 (1986) as extrinsic evidence for the meaning of "substantially"; Webster's defines it as "being that specified to a large degree or in the main." (Id. at 24.) Johnson also argues that the plain meaning of "substantially" in the relevant context (overhead monitors mounted in vehicles) is something that jurors would have everyday experience with, given the ubiquity of such monitors. (Id.) Johnson substitutes "ceiling of a vehicle cabin" for "roof" in its construction; this reflects the agreed construction for this term, noted above. (See Pl. Opening Br. 23-24.)
Voxx's argument is that Johnson need not import the phrase "ceiling of a vehicle cabin" into its construction, suggesting that it will "only act to confuse the jury." Further, Voxx defends its insertion of "essentially" for "substantially" by stating that the latter is the commonly understood meaning of the former. (Def. Responsive Br. 4.)
Voxx's argument that "ceiling of a vehicle cabin" should not be imported to replace "roof" in the construction focuses on an immaterial factor, as this phrasing has already been agreed upon between the parties as a construction. (See Pl. Opening Br. 23.) Moreover, Voxx's defense of its replacing "substantially" with "essentially" is weak. Voxx has merely replaced one adverb with another; there is nothing to suggest that a jury would understand the meaning of "essentially" any more than it would "substantially," and Voxx has produced no evidence to suggest that "essentially" actually represents the commonly-understood meaning of "substantially." That being said, the lack of clarity that either "essentially" or "substantially" provide is not reason to adopt Johnson's construction; the claim calls for a more precise construction. As such, the Court adopts the following construction for the term "substantially parallel with an interior surface of a roof": "having an angular relationship between 170 degrees and 180 degrees, inclusive, with the ceiling of a vehicle cabin." This construction provides for an arc of ten degrees difference in the relationship of the display to the roof when the display is fully extended.
E. The '762 Patent
The '762 Patent is an Overhead Patent and belongs to Voxx. (See generally the '762 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. B., ECF No. 76) It was issued on July 7, 1998. (Id.) The console of this patent includes a leading end, a trailing end, and an optional central section. (Id. Col 2:2-6.) The monitor, video source, and wiring for this entertainment system are all located within a console; however, the specification does not limit the console to a specific size or shape. (See id.)
The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the '762 Patent, along with each party's proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim terms in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 5,775,762, Claim 1:"An overhead console . . . comprising: an elongated console housing . . . acompartment for storing a source of video signals formed in the trailing end ofthe console housing, and conductive means associated with the compartment forconnecting the television monitor to the compartment to provide readyattachment of the source of video signals to the television monitor andtransmission of video signals between the source of video signals and thetelevision monitor." | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| "elongated consolehousing" | "A console housing longerthan it is wide, [wherein | "a console housing that isextended or lengthened to include |
| length is determined by thelongitudinal axis ofsymmetry of a vehicle andwidth is determined by theaxis of the monitorwidth]," otherwiseindefinite | a television monitor and acompartment capable of storing acourse of video signals" | |
| "a compartmentfor storing a sourceof video signalsformed in thetrailing end of theconsole housing" | "a separate and partitionedspace formed entirelywithin the trailing end ofthe console housing" | Voxx asserts that this claim termshould be given its plain andordinary meaning (noconstruction needed). |
| "conductive meansassociated with thecompartment forconnecting thetelevision monitorto the compartmentto provide readyattachment of thesource of videosignals to thetelevision monitorand transmissionof video signalsbetween the sourceof video signals | This term is governed by35 U.S.C. § 112¶6.Function:Connecting the televisionmonitor to thecompartment to provideready attachment of thesource of video signals tothe television monitor andtransmission of videosignals between the sourceof video signals and thetelevision monitor | This term is governed by 35U.S.C. § 112¶6.Function:Connecting the television monitorto the compartment to provideready attachment of the source ofvideo signals to the televisionmonitor and transmission ofvideo signals between the sourceof video signals and the televisionmonitorStructures: |
| and the televisionmonitor" | Structures:Insulated electrical wires,and this term is not entitledto any equivalents under35 U.S.C. § 112¶6 | Electrical wires or equivalentsthereof |
There are several sources of disagreement on the terms in the '762 Patent. The parties submit competing proposed constructions regarding the shape and size of the console containing the monitor, video source, and wiring. (See Def. Opening Br. 10-15 (ECF No. 75); Pl. Responsive Br. 2-10.) There are three disputed terms for the '762 Patent, and each is addressed in turn below.
1. "Elongated console housing"
Johnson argues that the first disputed term, "elongated console housing," must be construed as meaning "longer than it is wide." (Pl. Responsive Br. 2.) Johnson offers extrinsic dictionary evidence to support this definition. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 737 (1981) defines "elongated" as "having a form notably long in comparison to its width," and The Concise Oxford Dictionary 439 (9th ed 1995) defines it as "long in relation to its width." Further, Johnson argues that the patent figures and specification support Johnson's construction (Figure 3 from the '762 patent is copied below):
Image materials not available for display.
Voxx wishes to avoid a limitation on this claim term, and it points to the specification's statement that "the console may take on a variety of shapes without departing from the spirit of the present invention." (See the '762 Patent, Col. 3:18-20.) Voxx defines "elongated" as "big enough to include the system's key components and it could be elongated in multiple orientations." (Def. Opening Br. 12.) According to Voxx and as outlined in the specification, the central section of the console is optional; other possible embodiments could include a more compact console. (See id. at 13.)
Neither party's proposed construction appears to correctly define the term "elongated console housing." Based on the commonly-understood meaning of the word "elongated," and bolstered by the dictionary definitions provided, Johnson is correct in asserting that "elongated" means "longer than it is wide." (See Pl. Responsive Br. 2-10.) To that extent, its proposed construction will control. Voxx's use of the words "extended"/"lengthened" to define "elongated" is an attempt to broaden the scope of the term in a way that does not comport with the meaning of the original phrasing, "elongated." (See Def. Opening Br. 10-15.) However, Johnson's definition of the way length and width are determined ("by the longitudinal axis of symmetry of a vehicle and . . . by the axis of the monitor width," respectively), imports an unnecessary limitation into the construction. "Elongated console housing" does not dictate the orientation of the console, but it does require that the console be longer than it is wide. Further, while the Background of the Invention and Description of the Prior Art section of the '762 Patent states that these types of overhead consoles are generally "mounted coincident with the longitudinal axis of symmetry of the vehicle," nothing in the actual claim language commands this. (See the '762 Patent, Col. 1:14-17.) Therefore, the Court adopts the construction "a console housing longer than it is wide" for the term "elongated console housing."
2. "A compartment for storing a source of video signals formed in the trailing end of the console housing"
The specific word at the center of this disputed term is "compartment." Johnson wishes to define "compartment" as a separate space that is divided (partitioned) from the encapsulating space. (Pl. Responsive Br. 4.) Johnson offers some dictionary definitions of "compartment" to support this, including "a space within a larger space, separated from the rest by partitions" from The Oxford English Dictionary 593 (2d ed 1989). (See Pl. Responsive Br. 4.)
Voxx, on the other hand, argues that no construction is needed for this term. (Def. Opening Br. 10-11.) It asserts that "compartment" is a commonly understood term and that no additional definition is needed. (Id.) Voxx's main issue with Johnson's proposed construction is that it unnecessarily restricts the claim by using the language "a separate and partitioned space formed entirely within" in its proposed construction. (Id.) Voxx cites Phillips in supporting its argument that the claim scope should not be limited to the embodiment of the invention. (Id.); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
Though Voxx is correct, to a degree, that "compartment" is a commonly understood term, Johnson's proposed construction adds the necessary structure and gloss to a claim term that otherwise could be overbroad. As Phillips establishes, a claim term should be read and constructed in the context of the claim in which it appears and in the context of the entire patent. 415 F.3d at 1315. Here, the word "compartment" is followed closely by "formed in the trailing end of the console housing." (The '762 Patent, Col. 5:43-50.) Johnson's proposed construction clarifies the meaning of "compartment" by using the dictionary definition "a separate and partitioned space." (Pl. Responsive Br. 4-5.) Based on the definition of "compartment" as "a separate and partitioned space," it follows that the separate and partitioned space is formed apart from other areas within the encapsulating space. Thus, Johnson's proposed construction language of "formed entirely within the trailing end of the console housing" is appropriate.
As such, the Court adopts Johnson's construction for this term.
3. "Conductive means associated with . . . the television monitor."
The parties agree that 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6 governs this disputed claim term, but they disagree on whether that means that the term "insulated electrical wires" is entitled to equivalents under § 112¶6. Here, use of the word "means" in the claim language triggers § 112¶6's applicability, and the corresponding structure can be found in the specification. (The '762 Patent, Col. 5:43-50); see Callicrate, Inc., 427 F.3d at 1368. The parties agree on which portion of the claim term represents the function. (See Def. Opening Br. 13.) The function that this term describes, for purposes of § 112¶6, is "connecting the television monitor to the compartment to provide ready attachment of the source of video signals to the television monitor and transmission of video signals between the source of video signals and the television monitor." (Id.) The dispute centers on the corresponding structures, which Johnson asserts are "insulated electrical wires, and this term is not entitled to any equivalents under 35 U.S.C. § 112¶6." (Def. Opening Br. 13.) Voxx contends that the corresponding structures are "electrical wires or equivalents thereof." (Id.)
The Court finds that the scope of this means-plus-function claim term includes equivalents of electrical wires. The fact that Voxx added a limitation in the course of patent prosecution does not estop it from applying the doctrine of equivalents. (See Response to Office Action, Dec. 1997, 9, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. H.) Voxx is correct in citing Engingeered Products Co. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., as an example of a case where a court rejected an estoppel argument similar to Johnson's. 313 F.Supp.2d 951 (N.D. Iowa 2004). Engineered Products holds that estoppel in the context of patent equivalents does not apply to means-plus-function claims. Id. at 981-82. The Supreme Court case Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., underlies the relevant rule in Engineered Products. See 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (standing for the rule that where amendments to a patent application narrow the claims, the prosecution history estops the patentee from later claiming the rejected equivalents, but leaving open certain types of amendments as not triggering estoppel). Without the estoppel argument, Johnson has no valid claim that Voxx should not be entitled to equivalents for "insulated electrical wires." The general § 112¶6 rule is that the covered structure includes what is laid out in the specification, plus equivalents. Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 974. Therefore, the Court adopts Voxx's construction for this term.
F. The '124 Patent
The '124 Patent is a portable video/entertainment system. (See generally the '124 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. J.) Voxx is the assignee for this patent. (Id.) It was issued on May 23, 2006. (Id.) The basic configuration of the patented product is a portable DVD-stereo that can be used in the home or mounted with straps between car seats (and removed as needed). (Id.)
The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the '124 Patent, along with each party's proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim terms in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 7,050,124, Claims 38 and 51:Claim 38: "A video system mounted to a seat in a vehicle comprising . . . at least onedisplay is mountable to the assembly housing at a location between the first andsecond panels."Claim 51: "A portable video system comprising . . ." | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| "a locationbetween the firstand second panels" | "A location along thecommon physical bordershared by the first andsecond panels" | Voxx asserts that this claim termshould be given its plain andordinary meaning: "One skilledin the art would readilyunderstand the meaning of alocation between the first and |
| second panels." | ||
| "portable" | "easily transferable by auser between vehicles andother settings" | Voxx asserts that this term ismerely a portion of the preambleand should not be construed as aclaim limitation. Therefore, Voxxcontends that no construction isnecessary. |
The technology here is fairly straightforward; the dispute regarding the terms lies in the distinction between two simple phrases. First, the parties disagree about whether "a location between the first and second panels" means that the location must be along the common physical border shared by the two panels, or whether it can be construed more broadly. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 11-13; Def. Opening Br. 18.) Second, the parties argue over whether "portable," a word in the preamble of the patent, should constitute a limitation. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 13-14; Def. Opening Br. 18-19.)
1. "A location between the first and second panels"
The Court is unpersuaded by Johnson's argument that the "location" in this claim term refers to a place along the common physical border between the first and second panels. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 11.) While it is true that the claim language describes the two panels as being "adjacent" to one another, this does not necessarily mean that the two panels share a common physical border. (See the '124 Patent, Col. 11:39.) In fact, the claim language suggests the opposite interpretation. The claim states that "at least one display is mountable to the assembly housing at a location between the first and second panels," which suggests that there is a space between the two panels in which to mount a display. (See id. Col. 11:40-42.) For this reason, the court adopts Voxx's construction of the term "a location between the first and second panels."
2. "Portable"
The conflict here revolves around whether "portable," which is part of the preamble of the claim, should act as a limitation. Pacing Technologies, LLC v. Garmin International, Inc., provides clarity here; it stands for the rule that preamble language can limit the scope of a claim when limitations in the body of the claim rely upon the preamble and draw support from it. 778 F.3d 1021, 1023-24 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Put another way, if the preamble language describes what a claimed invention is or does (rather than a purpose or intended use), it can act as a limitation. See id. The Court finds that the relevant preamble language in this instance does just that. Indeed, this patent is different from the others presently being constructed because it is meant to be removable from a car when not in use; the Background of the Invention section of this patent specifically describes the anti-theft benefits of this feature. (See 'the 124 Patent, Col. 1:28.) As such, Voxx should not now be allowed to assert that "portable" is only one intended use; this does not describe the overall purpose of the invention. (See Def. Opening Br. 19.) The Court adopts Johnson's construction of this term.
G. The '274 Patent
The '274 Patent is a Headrest Patent. (See generally the '274 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. L.) Voxx is the assignee, and the patent was issued on July 17, 2007. (Id.)
The disputed term in context of the broader claim language at issue in the '274 Patent, along with each party's proposed construction, is as follows (disputed claim term in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 7,245,274, Claim 11 (Voxx's Patent):"A video system comprising: a base portion . . . wherein the base portionaccommodates a media player . . . ." | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| "accommodates" | "the base portion, and notthe display, incorporates amedia player" | "provides sufficient space for" |
In broader context, this claim term is about which portion of the invention houses the media player that allows the product to function. (See id.) Johnson's position on this term is that some of the figures included within the patent represent a configuration that is not in the spirit of the invention. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 16-17.) Specifically, Johnson notes that Figures 3A-3C show a media player within the door/display that is hinged or attached to the base (rather than being situated within the base itself). (See id.) Johnson argues that the correct construction of this term is such that it requires an allocation of sufficient space within the base portion (and not the display/door) to incorporate a media player. (Id.)
This is an attempt to limit the term "accommodates" in a way that is already limited elsewhere in the claim language. Johnson's proposed construction makes explicit that there must be sufficient space left in the base, not the display/door, to incorporate the media player. (Id.) The original claim language already provides that "the base portion accommodates a media player." (The '274 Patent, Col. 6:43.) As such, it is an unnecessary redundancy to construe "accommodates" to include only the base portion. The Court therefore adopts Voxx's construction of the term "accommodates."
H. The '892 Patent
The '892 Patent is unique among the patents at issue here in that it can be installed in a variety of locations within a vehicle's interior. (See generally the '892 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. M.) It was issued on January 13, 2004, and Voxx is the assignee for this patent. (Id.)
The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the '892 Patent, along with each party's proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim terms in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 6,678,892, Claims 1, 25, 26:Claim 1: ". . . at least one wireless transmitter operatively coupled to said audiobus, adapted to wirelessly and simultaneously transmit a plurality of audioprograms from each of the plurality of input devices to a plurality of wirelessheadphones."[The terms are substantially the same in Claims 25 and 26; differences shownbelow] | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| Three similarphrases combinedfor efficiencypurposes:"at least onewirelesstransmitter . . .,adapted towirelessly andsimultaneouslytransmit a pluralityof audio programsfrom each of theplurality of inputdevices to aplurality of | "at least one wirelesstransmitter, each of whichis operatively coupled toaid said audio bus, andeach of which is adaptedto wirelessly andsimultaneously . . ." (claim1) | Voxx asserts that this claim termshould be given its plain andordinary meaning: "One skilledin the art would readilyunderstand the meaning of [theseterms]." |
| wirelessheadphones"(claim 1)"a wirelesstransmitter . . .,adapted towirelessly andsimultaneouslytransmit a pluralityof audio programsfrom at least someof the plurality ofinput devices to aplurality ofwirelessheadphone sets"(claim 25)"a wirelesstransmitter . . .,adapted towirelessly andsimultaneouslytransmit the audiosignals from the atleast two inputdevices to at least | "a wireless transmitter,each of which isoperatively coupled to saidaudio bus, and each ofwhich is adapted towirelessly andsimultaneously . . ." (claim25)"a wireless transmitter,each of which isoperatively coupled to saidaudio bus, and each ofwhich is adapted towirelessly andsimultaneously . . ." (claim26) |
|---|
| two wirelessheadphone sets, sothat each wirelessheadphone setreceives an audiosignal from adifferent one of theat least two inputdevices" (claim26) | ||
| "bus" | "one or more electricalconductors carryingsimilar types of signals" | "one or more wires or othersignal transmission means" |
The '892 Patent discloses a video system for a vehicle that allows a user to select among many audio and visual inputs. (See id. Col. 4:42.) The product uses wireless transmitters to allow two people in a car to listen to different audio and video programs at the same time. (Id. Col. 3:63-4:2.) Two different embodiments exist for this patent: in one, a single wireless transmitter transmits two audio programs simultaneously via Code-Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") technology. (Id. Col. 12:1-4.) In the other, two wireless transmitters each transmit a different audio program on different frequencies. (Id. Col. 8: 46-47.) The parties dispute the construction of four terms in this claim, three of which are very similar and thus are treated as one (the "Wireless Transmitter" terms).
1. The Wireless Transmitter Terms
These three terms (from claims 1, 25, and 26) provide that certain embodiments of the claimed invention include a means for wirelessly and simultaneously transmitting audio signals from at least two input devices to at least two wireless headphone sets. (See id. Col. 10:41-45; 12:32-36, 43-48.) Johnson attempts to limit the scope of this term by proposing a construction that would mean each of the one or more wireless transmitters in the claimed invention must be capable of wirelessly and simultaneously transmitting audio signals in such a way. (Pl. Responsive Br. 18-20.) Voxx asserts that this term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Def. Opening Br. 21.)
Based on the language of the claims and the specification, each wireless transmitter should not necessarily have to be adapted to wirelessly and simultaneously transmit multiple audio programs at once. Johnson's attempt to limit the claim scope by construing the term to mean that each transmitter must include this capability would be placing a limitation on the term that is not supported by the plain language of the claim. Claim 20 already requires that at least one wireless transmitter be adapted to transmit multiple audio programs using CDMA technology. (The '892 Patent, Col. 12:1-4.) Whether the other transmitters (should they be included in an iteration of the product) make use of this technology does not appear to be required by the claim. As such, the Court adopts Voxx's construction of this term.
2. "Bus"
The dispute over "bus" revolves around whether the bus must be comprised of electrical wire(s) that carry similar types of signals. Johnson argues that without this specificity, "bus" would simply mean "any possible way to transmit a signal," which could include things like Sonar and take the claim scope far outside the spirit of the invention. (Pl. Responsive Br. 20.) Voxx's position is that the term "bus" could be embodied by multiple different means of signal transmission, not just wires. (Def. Opening Br. 22.) The language of the specification is instructive here. It states in relevant part, "While the buses . . . are simply aggregations of wires carrying similar types of signals, other types of buses may be employed. For example, one or more wires or other signal transmission means may be used . . . ." (The '892 Patent, Col. 9: 62-64.) This language suggests that the means of transmission within a bus must carry similar types of signals, but that the means do not have to take the form of wires. And while limitations from the specification should not be imported into the construction of a claim term, here, the specification adds breadth rather than a limitation to construction. See Comark Commc'ns, Inc., 156 F.3d at 1186-87. In light of the claim language and specification, the Court decides to adopt its own construction of the term, which is a combination of the parties' proposed constructions. The Court adopts the construction, "one or more wires or other signal transmission means carrying similar types of signals."
I. The '355 Patent
Finally, the '355 Patent is another of the Headrest Patents; it was issued on November 23, 2010. (See generally the '355 Patent, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. P.) Voxx is the assignee for this patent. (Id.)
The disputed terms in context of the broader claim language at issue in the '355 Patent, along with each party's proposed construction, are as follows (disputed claim terms in bold):
| U.S. Patent No. 7,839,355, Claims 1, 14, 26, 38:"A display device for a vehicle having a seat, comprising: an assembly housing . . .at least one wireless transmitter adapted to wirelessly transmit the audio signals . . .and the face portion rests outside of the hole on an outside surface of the seat . . .." | ||
|---|---|---|
| Disputed ClaimTerm | Johnson's Construction | Voxx's Construction |
| "assemblyhousing" | "a housing constituting oneintegral body with adisplay" | Voxx asserts that this claim termshould be given its plain andordinary meaning: "One skilledin the art would readilyunderstand the meaning ofassembly housing." |
| "the face portionrests outside of thehole on an outsidesurface of the seat" | The sides and recessedportion of a hole are notpart of the outside surfaceof the seat. | Voxx asserts that this claim termshould be given its plain andordinary meaning: "One skilledin the art would readilyunderstand the meaning of [theterm] when read in the context ofthe specification and drawings ofthe '355 Patent." |
This patent discloses a video system for a seatback wherein the "rear portion" of the video system rests in a hole in the seatback/headrest, and the front of the device rests on top of the surface of the seatback/headrest. (Id.) The parties disagree on whether the assembly housing disclosed in this patent must constitute one solid, integrated body. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 24-25; Def. Opening Br. 23.) In addition, there is a dispute over what it means for the device to rest on a surface of a seat that is outside of a hole. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 21-23; Def. Opening Br. 22-23.)
1. Assembly Housing
In order for this claim term to be validly limited to "a housing constituting one integral body with a display," one of the Thorner scenarios would need to apply. 669 F.3d at 1365 (holding that meanings other than the "ordinary and customary" will supersede when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as its own lexicographer or when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution). The Court is unpersuaded by Johnson's attempt to show that disavowal occurred through Voxx's linking of the claim term to a specific embodiment. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 25; Response to Office Action, Aug. 2009,11, Pl. Responsive Br., Ex. R.) In reality, Voxx only referenced the specific embodiment with a "see, e.g.," citation, implying that other embodiments could exist within the claim scope. (See id.) Without any other valid reason for limiting this claim term, the Court adopts Voxx's construction.
2. "The face portion rests outside of the hole on an outside surface of the seat"
The "hole" referred to in this term, in the context of the overall patent, is a recessed portion of the seatback which houses the device. (See the '355 Patent, Col. 9:3-10.) The dispute over this term is whether the display's positioning must be such that the screen is flush with the surface of the seat, or whether it can be slightly recessed into a surface of the seat. (See Pl. Responsive Br. 21-23; Def. Opening Br. 22-23.) The specification provides the following description of this positioning: "When mounted in a vehicle seat, the rear portion is positioned in the vehicle seat so that the face portion sits substantially flush with the surface of the seat." (The '355 Patent, Col. 9:3-5.) Johnson, however, wishes to limit this claim term to "the sides and recessed portion of a hole are not part of the outside surface of a seat." (Pl. Responsive Br. 21.)
Similarly to Johnson's proposed construction for "accommodates" in the '274 Patent, this proposed construction attempts to add a limitation that the claim language itself already establishes. The claim language's plain and ordinary meaning makes clear what Johnson's construction attempts to define: that "outside" does not mean "within," or even slightly within, with respect to the hole/recessed portion. (See the '355 Patent, 10: 23-33.) In addition, Johnson's construction is not worded in a way that could stand in for the existing claim language and make grammatical sense. Such a construction would likely serve to confuse jurors. For these reasons, the Court adopts Voxx's construction of this term.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby adopts the following table of constructions for the "significant" disputed terms in this case.
| Term | Patent | Court's AdoptedConstruction |
|---|
| "upper edge" | 6,871,356 | Plain and ordinary meaning(no construction necessary) |
| "second housing" | 7,267,402 | Plain and ordinary meaning(no construction necessary) |
| "second screen structure | 7,267,402 | Plain and ordinary meaning(no construction necessary) |
| "pivot-limiting portion" | 7,448,679 | "a bracket [structure] thatlimits the rotation of thescreen to less thanperpendicular relative to theclosed position of the screenstructure [function]" |
| "substantially parallel withan interior surface of a roof" | 7,379,125 | "having an angularrelationship between 170degrees and 180 degrees,inclusive, with the ceiling ofa vehicle cabin." |
| "elongated console housing" | 5,775,762 | "a console housing longerthan it is wide" |
| "a compartment for storing asource of video signalsformed in the trailing end ofthe console housing" | 5,775,762 | "a separate and partitionedspace formed entirely withinthe trailing end of the consolehousing" |
| "conductive meansassociated with thecompartment for connecting | 5,775,762 | This term is governed by 35U.S.C. § 112¶6. |
| the television monitor to thecompartment to provideready attachment of thesource of video signals tothe television monitor andtransmission of videosignals between the sourceof video signals and thetelevision monitor" | Function:Connecting the televisionmonitor to the compartmentto provide ready attachmentof the source of video signalsto the television monitor andtransmission of video signalsbetween the source of videosignals and the televisionmonitorStructures:Electrical wires orequivalents thereof | |
| "a location between the firstand second panels" | 7,050,124 | Plain and ordinary meaning(no construction necessary) |
| "portable" | 7,050,124 | "easily transferable by a userbetween vehicles and othersettings" |
| "accommodates" | 7,245,274 | "provides sufficient spacefor" |
| Three similar phrasescombined for efficiencypurposes: | 6,678,892 | Plain and ordinary meaning(no construction necessary) |
| "at least one wirelesstransmitter . . ., adapted towirelessly andsimultaneously transmit aplurality of audio programsfrom each of the plurality ofinput devices to a pluralityof wireless headphones"(claim 1)"a wireless transmitter . . .,adapted to wirelessly andsimultaneously transmit aplurality of audio programsfrom at least some of theplurality of input devices toa plurality of wirelessheadphone sets" (claim 25)"a wireless transmitter . . .,adapted to wirelessly andsimultaneously transmit theaudio signals from the atleast two input devices to atleast two wirelessheadphone sets, so that eachwireless headphone set |
| receives an audio signalfrom a different one of the atleast two input devices"(claim 26) | ||
| "bus" | 6,678,892 | "one or more wires or othersignal transmission meanscarrying similar types ofsignals" |
| "assembly housing" | 7,839,355 | Plain and ordinary meaning(no construction necessary) |
| "the face portion restsoutside of the hole on anoutside surface of the seat" | 7,839,355 | Plain and ordinary meaning(no construction necessary) |
IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 16, 2016
/s/ _________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE