Opinion
C042018.
10-20-2003
COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, Cross-Complainant and Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Cross-Defendants and Respondents.
Sixteen year-old Jessica Chavez was a ward of the juvenile court and housed in the San Joaquin Juvenile Detention Facility when she went into active labor. She was left to give birth alone in her cell without medical assistance. Chavez brought suit, inter alia, against the County of San Joaquin (County) and the State of California and Judicial Council (State) for damages.
The County filed a cross-complaint against the State for equitable indemnity if Chavez prevailed against the County and State in her tort action for joint and several liability.
The State was dismissed from the tort action when its demurrer was sustained on the ground it was not liable to Chavez. The County did not appeal the judgment of dismissal. The State then demurred to the Countys cross-complaint for equitable indemnity on the ground the judgment of dismissal barred the Countys cross-complaint. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend and a judgment was entered in favor of the State. The County now appeals from that judgment.
On appeal, the County contends the trial court erred because the juvenile hall employees were acting on behalf of the State when they failed to obtain medical care for Chavez, rendering it liable under Government Code section 845.6. The County also contends the judgment dismissing the State from the tort action was not a bar to the Countys cross-complaint against the State on principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
All further section references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.
In light of our holding, we need not address the Countys remaining claims that judicial immunity does not protect the State because the conduct at issue is supervisory and administrative rather than judicial in nature and that the Countys cross-complaint for indemnity based upon a violation of section 845.6 is not barred by the Tort Claims Act.
We shall affirm the judgment. The judgment in the tort action, which determined the State was not jointly liable to Chavez, bars the Countys cross-complaint for indemnity against the State under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We take the facts from the pleadings in both the underlying action and the cross-complaint. The facts alleged in Chavezs underlying complaint are not in dispute and we treat them as true. Because this case comes to us on appeal from the granting of the States demurrer to the Countys cross-complaint, we assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations in the cross-complaint. (Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)
A. The Underlying Incident
On July 12, 2000, Jessica Chavez was 16 years old, pregnant, and housed as a ward of the San Joaquin County Juvenile Detention Facility in French Camp (juvenile hall). Alex Padilla, a group counselor employed at juvenile hall, was aware of her pregnancy. During the early morning hours of July 12th, Chavez went into premature active labor. Over the course of several hours, she cried out in pain, screaming and pleading for assistance. Her pleas for help were heard by a number of the wards. On several occasions, Chavez contacted Padilla by an intercom in her cell and advised him she was having her baby and needed help. He told her she would have to wait until a female counselor came on duty in the morning. On at least one of these occasions, she heard Padilla speaking to another individual believed to be Padillas supervisor, Willie Douglass. Both men failed to respond to Chavezs pleas for help. Thereafter, Chavez gave birth to a premature infant without the benefit of anesthetic or medical assistance. More than 30 minutes later, emergency medical personnel entered her cell and transported her and the infant to the hospital.
B. The Pleadings
Chavez and her infant daughter, by and through their guardian ad litem, filed a first amended complaint (complaint) for damages against defendants County, county employees Alex Padilla and Willie Douglass, the State, and Judges Terrance Van Oss and Michael Platt of the Superior Court for the County of San Joaquin. The complaint alleged four causes of action against the State for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
The causes of action against the State were predicated on the States vicarious liability under principles of respondeat superior. It alleged that while Padilla and Douglass were county employees, superior court judges are state employees who have supervisory responsibility over the juvenile hall and appointing authority over the chief probation officer, and the San Joaquin County Superior Court, through its juvenile court judges, failed to properly supervise the employees at juvenile hall.
The State and Judges Van Oss and Platt filed a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds, inter alia, the County, not the State or its judges, is responsible for the operations and conditions of the juvenile hall, that Padilla and Douglass were, as pled, county employees, and that under California law, the chief probation officer is a county officer not a state officer. The trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the States demurrer to Chavezs complaint, and entered a judgment in favor of the State.
The County filed an amended cross-complaint (cross-complaint) against the State for declaratory relief, equitable indemnity, comparative indemnity, and contribution. All four causes of action were based upon the States asserted liability. It was alleged that the State controls the superior court and its judges, the presiding judge of the superior court has the power to appoint and remove the chief probation officer, that through the chief probation officer, the superior court is responsible for the management and control of the juvenile hall and the supervision of its employees, and that Padilla and Douglass were state agents who failed to summon medical care for Chavez, rendering the State liable under section 845.6.
Section 845.6 provides: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state from liability for injury proximately caused by malpractice or exonerates the public entity from its obligation to pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement that it is required to pay under subdivision (d) of Section 844.6."
The State demurred to the cross-complaint on the ground, inter alia, the judgment rendered in its favor in the underlying tort action precludes the Countys claim for indemnification. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on a number of different grounds, including the bar of its prior judgment, and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the State. The County filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal.
The court also found that the County conceded that the Judicial Council is not a proper party to the cross-complaint.
DISCUSSION
The County contends the trial court erred in sustaining the States demurrer because in the Countys view, the prior judgment dismissing the State from the plaintiffs underlying action does not bar the Countys cross-complaint for equitable indemnity against the State.
The County bases this claim on the argument that its cross-complaint is predicated upon a different factual and legal theory than the complaint in the tort action and for that reason the judgment dismissing the State does not operate as a bar under principles of collateral estoppel.
The State contends the prior judgment exonerating them from joint and several liability to the plaintiff precludes their liability to the County for indemnity. It argues that the Countys cross-complaint is not based upon a different legal theory and does not defeat the preclusive effect of the prior judgment. We agree with the State.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the sufficiency of the cross-complaint against a general demurrer sustained by the trial court, "`"we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] . . ." When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] . . ." (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126, quoting Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
It is error to sustain a demurrer where a plaintiff has stated facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (Major Clients Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1122.) However, on appeal from a judgment of dismissal after entry of a demurrer without leave to amend, the appellate court must affirm the judgment if the demurrer was properly sustained on any ground. (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742; Munoz v. Davis (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 420, 422.)
B. Equitable Indemnity
Under the common law, the doctrine of equitable indemnity provided for an all or nothing shifting of loss. (American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 593-594 (AMA).) The doctrine was modified in AMA to allow "in appropriate cases, a right of partial indemnity, under which liability among multiple tortfeasors may be apportioned on a comparative negligence basis." (Id. at p. 583.) The doctrine now affords "`the entire range of possible apportionments, from no right to any indemnity to a right of complete indemnity. Total indemnification is just one end of the spectrum of comparative equitable indemnification." (Far West Financial Corp. v. D. & S. Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 808, quoting Standard Pacific of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 577, 587-588.)
While the holding in AMA was "a significant development" in the law of equitable indemnity, it did not affect the essential character of the doctrine which remains restitutionary in character. (Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 109 (Western Steamship).) As to matters of substantive law, the right of equitable indemnity is "wholly derivative and subject to whatever immunities or other limitations on liability would otherwise be available." (Id. at p. 115, fn. omitted.) "[A]s against the indemnitee, the indemnitor can invoke any substantive defense to liability that would be available against the injured party. . . . [although] for certain procedural purposes, such as statutes of limitations, an indemnity claim is an independent action." (Id. at pp. 114-115 and fn. 11; see People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1980) 26 Cal.3d 744, 756.)
Because "a procedural bar bears no relation to the fundamental question of liability," the cases governing procedural bars do not limit an indemnitors ability to assert a substantive defense to or a limitation on liability against the indemnitee to the same extent the defense or limitation would be available against the injured party." (Western Steamship, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 115, fn. 11.)
Consequently, there is no right of "`indemnity without liability." (Western Steamship, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 116, quoting Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1225, 1236; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1159 (Allis-Chalmers).) "[U]nless the prospective indemnitor and indemnitee are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff there is no basis for indemnity." (Munoz v. Davis, supra, 141 Cal.App.3d at p. 425;
Columbus Line v. Gray Line Sight-Seeing Companies Associated, Inc. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 622, 628 (Columbus Line.) A defendant who is liable to a plaintiff for his injuries has no right to indemnification from a codefendant who was exonerated of joint and several liability to that injured plaintiff. (Munoz v. Davis, supra, 141 Cal.App.3d at p. 427; Allis-Chalmers, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 1158-1159; Childrens Hospital v. Sedgwick (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1787.) Moreover, under principles of collateral estoppel, where all parties were present in the main action and the codefendants could challenge the defendants exoneration, the prior judgment precludes the codefendants from relitigating the exonerated defendants liability to the plaintiff. (Ibid.; Columbus Line, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at pp. 630-632.)
The State obtained a judgment in its favor after the trial court sustained its demurrer to Chavezs complaint, without leave to amend. The judgment constituted a prior adjudication exonerating the State from joint and several liability to Chavez.
The County contends, however, that judgment does not operate as a bar to its cross-complaint because the requirements of collateral estoppel are not met. We disagree.
C. Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue in a different proceeding on a different cause of action that was actually litigated and determined in the former proceeding. (Columbus Line, supra , 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 628; see also Rest.2d, Judgments, § 27.) The doctrine "rest[s] `upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy. [Citation.] `This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case." (Long Beach Grand Prix Assn. v. Hunt (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1199, quoting Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 811 and Jorgensen v. Jorgensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13, 18, orig. emphasis omitted.)
The bar of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue if all three of the following conditions are met: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with that presented in the present action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. (Columbus Line, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 628 ; Childrens Hospital v. Sedgwick, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1788.)
Relying on Frank v. State of California (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 488 (Frank), the County contends the first condition, the requirement of identity of issues, is not met because their cross-complaint raised a new legal theory under section 845.6 as a basis for the States liability, which it asserts, was not raised by Chavezs complaint. We disagree.
In Frank, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 488, the Court of Appeal held the State of California was not entitled to assert the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a prior judgment to bar a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity. The underlying complaint sought damages for personal injuries sustained in a traffic accident caused by a driver who was taking a drivers license test. The complaint based its claim for negligence on the Department of Motor Vehicles negligence in issuing the driver a license. The cross-complaint, on the other hand, based its claim for equitable indemnity on the States maintenance of a dangerous condition in a traffic intersection.
The Court of Appeal held that the ruling sustaining the demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend determined only that the State was not liable for negligence in issuing the drivers license. It did not determine the States liability for the plaintiffs injuries due to a dangerous condition in a traffic intersection. It therefore had no preclusive effect on that theory of liability.
In this case the Countys cross-complaint was not based on a factual basis which differed from that alleged in the complaint. To the contrary, the complaint and the cross-complaint both alleged the States liability as vicarious based upon its role as the employer of superior court judges and the chief probation officer and as the public entity with the duty to manage and control the juvenile hall and its employees. Thus, both pleadings put in issue the States vicarious liability based upon the same factual grounds.
Both pleadings alleged the superior court and its juvenile court judges were responsible for the management and control of the juvenile hall through the chief probation officer, who runs the daily operations of the juvenile hall, and through the courts duty to supervise the chief probation officer and the juvenile hall. Both pleadings further alleged the chief probation officer is appointed by a judge of the superior court and that judges of the superior court are state employees.
It is true the Countys cross-complaint raised a claim under section 845.6, by alleging the cross-defendants "failed to summon medical care for a ward allegedly known to be in need of immediate medical care", while the complaint did not specifically allege a claim under that section. However, the County essentially concedes, in the context of a separate contention, that Chavezs complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under section 845.6. The County cannot have it both ways.
On appeal, the County claims its government claim was sufficient under the Tort Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) to state a claim under section 845.6 because it incorporated Chavezs complaint, which it asserts, contained factual allegations sufficient to state a claim under section 845.6. The complaint alleged that Padilla and Douglass failed to obtain medical assistance for Chavez while she went into active labor in her cell.
Nevertheless, we need not decide whether the complaint stated sufficient facts to state a valid substantive claim under section 845.6, because that claim, as well as all causes of action alleged in the complaint, were based on the States derivative vicarious liability to Chavez. Section 845.6 imposes liability on a public entity only if the employee (here Padilla or Douglass) was acting within the scope of his or her employment. Under principles of respondeat superior, the States liability under section 845.6, as well as for general negligence, is vicarious because it turns on a finding that Padilla and Douglass were employees or agents of the State. (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 959; Rest.2d, Agency, §§ 219, 243; 2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Agency and Employment, § 115, p. 109.)
In its demurrer to the complaint, the State contended Padilla, Douglass, and the chief probation officer were employees of the County, not the State, and the County, not the State, had supervisory authority over juvenile hall. In sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court determined the State was not vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of Padilla and Douglass. That determination was pivotal to the Countys claim under section 845.6.
Because the States vicarious liability was the common legal issue (Farmers Ins. Group v. Co. of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1019) alleged in both the complaint and the cross-complaint, we find the first condition is met.
"`Ordinarily, the determination whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment presents a question of fact; it becomes a question of law, however, when "the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible."" (Farmers Ins. Group v. Co. of Santa Clara, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1019.)
The second condition, the requirement of a final judgment on the merits, is also met. "For purposes of res judicata, the effective date of a final judgment is the date of its rendition . . . ." (Rest.2d Judgments, § 14.) "[W]hen two actions are pending which are based on the same claim, or which involve the same issue, it is the final judgment first rendered in one of the actions which becomes conclusive in the other action . . . ." (Id . at com. a, p. 142.)
The trial court entered judgment of dismissal after it had sustained the States demurrer to Chavezs complaint without leave to amend on December 20, 2001. The judgment was not appealed. It therefore constitutes a final judgment on the merits on the issue of the States vicarious liability to Chavez.
However, relying on California Dental Assn. v. California Dental Hygienists Assn. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 49, 59 (CDA), the County contends the judgment was not a final judgment on the merits because its cross-complaint was pending when the trial court dismissed the complaint against the State. The Countys reliance on CDA is misplaced.
In CDA, the court held that under the one final judgment rule governing appellate jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 904.1), a judgment entered upon the dismissal of a complaint is not a final appealable judgment where a cross-complaint is pending between the parties to the dismissal. (222 Cal.App.3d at p. 59.) However, the court recognized the dismissal was final as to the parties which faced no further proceedings in the trial court. (Id. at p. 60.)
The definition of finality for purposes of collateral estoppel resembles the traditional strict formulation of finality for purposes of appellate review. (Rest.2d Judgments, § 13, com. b, p. 132.) Thus, some courts look to the rules governing appealable judgments in determining the preclusive effect of a prior judgment. (See CDA, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 59.)
Under the "one final judgment" rule, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 740-741; First Security Bank of Cal. v. Paquet (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 468, 473.) An order of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (f)(1)) is generally an appealable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 581d, 904.1, subd. (a).)
"`Judgments that leave nothing to be decided between one or more parties and their adversaries . . . have the finality required by section 904.1, subdivision (a). A judgment that disposes of fewer than all of the causes of action framed by the pleadings, however, is necessarily "interlocutory" . . . and not yet final, as to any parties between whom another cause of action remains pending. (Morehart, [supra], at p. 741; accord, Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 399 [197 Cal.Rptr. 843, 673 P.2d 720].) For instance, a judgment that decides the issues raised in a cross-complaint but not the issues in the complaint is not final (Nicholson v. Henderson (1944) 25 Cal.2d 375, 381 ) unless it decides all issues as to some of the parties. (Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 118 .)" (First Security Bank of Cal. v. Paquet, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 473; Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953) 41 Cal.2d 300, 303; Howe v. Key System Transit Co. (1926) 198 Cal. 525, 534; CDA, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 58; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, §§ 69, 73, 82, pp. 126, 128, 138-139.)
Applying these principles, we find the judgment entered upon the dismissal of Chavezs action against the State was a final judgment. No cross-complaint was pending between Chavez and the State. The parties to the complaint were not identical to the parties to the cross-complaint between the County and the State. The dismissal of the Chavez complaint against the State left nothing to be decided between Chavez and the State. It was therefore a final adjudication of the issues between them.
The third condition requires privity between Chavez and the County or that they shared a common identity or community of interest. This condition ensures that due process requirements are met. Before a party can be bound on an issue by a prior adjudication, the party "must have been afforded notice and an opportunity to contest the previous determination and an incentive to do so." (Long Beach Grand Prix Assn. v. Hunt, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1203; Rest.2d Judgments, § 38, com. a, pp. 378-379.)
In Columbus Line, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 622, two passengers on a cruise ship brought suit for personal injuries sustained in an accident involving the bus they were on while they were on a shore excursion. Defendants were the owner of the ship, the manager of the shore excursion, and a trade association for the sightseeing industry, one of whose members operated the bus. The ship owner and excursion manager filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity against the trade association. The trial court granted the trade associations motion for summary judgment on the complaint and cross-complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the cross-complaint for equitable indemnity was precluded by the summary judgment under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
In so doing, the Court of Appeal noted "the concept of privity has been expanded `to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is "sufficiently close" so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [Citations.] [¶] Notwithstanding the expanded notions of privity, collateral estoppel may be applied only if due process requirements are satisfied. [Citations.] In the context of collateral estoppel, due process requires that the party to be estopped must have had an identity or community of interest with, and adequate representation by, the losing party in the first action as well as that the circumstances must have been such that the party to be estopped should reasonably have expected to be bound by the prior adjudication. [Citation.] Thus, in deciding whether to apply collateral estoppel, the court must balance the rights of the party to be estopped against the need for applying collateral estoppel in the particular case, in order to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, or to protect against vexatious litigation." (Id . at p. 630, quoting Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 875.)
The court in Columbus Line concluded that, because both the plaintiff and the cross-complainant sought to hold the trade association liable on the same grounds, "plaintiffs and [the excursion manager] both were interested (though for different reasons) in establishing [trade associations] liability based on its own negligence and on its principal-agency relationship with [the bus owner]." (120 Cal.App.3d at p. 630.) Noting that the motion for summary judgment on the complaint was made on notice to all parties and was served on the cross-complainant, whose attorneys appeared at the hearing in opposition to the motion, the court rejected the cross-complaints contention that its representation was inadequate. It stated, "it was incumbent on Columbus to protect its own interests by vigorously opposing the motion instead of merely relying on plaintiffs opposition, for Columbus knew (or should have known) that summary judgment exonerating Gray Line from liability to plaintiffs, if it became final, would preclude any claim of indemnity." (Id. at p. 631.)
We find Columbus Line controlling. As discussed, both the complaint and the cross-complaint raised the common and dispositive issue of the States vicarious liability for the acts and omissions of the employees of juvenile hall. Chavez was represented by counsel who was well motivated to oppose the demurrer. Additionally, the County was a party to the main action and had filed a cross-complaint against the State for equitable indemnity prior to the time the trial court heard the matter of the States demurrer. It therefore stood in an adversarial posture to the State and should have known a dismissal following the sustaining of the demurrer without leave to amend would preclude its claim of indemnity. The County was served with a copy of the demurrer, had an opportunity to oppose the demurrer, and appeared at the hearing on the matter.
In sum, both Chavez and the County had notice and an opportunity to be heard on the States demurrer to the complaint and shared a common interest in opposing the demurrer and establishing the superior courts responsibility and control over juvenile hall. If the County believed Chavezs counsel failed to adequately litigate the issue of the States vicarious liability, it was incumbent upon the County to protect its own interests at the time the trial court heard the matter of the demurrer. Under the circumstances in this case, its failure to do so does not undermine the binding effect of the judgment resulting from that ruling.
Accordingly, the principles of collateral estoppel preclude the County from relitigating the States liability to the plaintiff. We therefore find the trial court properly sustained the States demurrer to the Countys cross-complaint for equitable indemnity without leave to amend because it had previously determined the State was not jointly and severally liable to Chavez in the underlying action in any manner.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The State shall recover its costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 27(a)(1).)
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J. and SIMS, J.