Opinion
# 2018-015-173 Claim No. 129622 Motion No. M-92536
10-19-2018
KHALIL JENNINGS v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Law Office of Stephen B. Kaufman, P.C. By: John V. Decolator, Esq. Honorable Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General By: Paul F. Cagino, Esq., Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Summary judgment dismissing inmate's negligent supervision claim was granted as defendant established in support of its motion that it had no reason to know of the risk of harm posed by the claimant's assailants.
Case information
| UID: | 2018-015-173 |
| Claimant(s): | KHALIL JENNINGS |
| Claimant short name: | JENNINGS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 129622 |
| Motion number(s): | M-92536 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANCIS T. COLLINS |
| Claimant's attorney: | Law Office of Stephen B. Kaufman, P.C. By: John V. Decolator, Esq. |
| Defendant's attorney: | Honorable Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General By: Paul F. Cagino, Esq., Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | October 19, 2018 |
| City: | Saratoga Springs |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the claim pursuant to CPLR 3212.
Claimant, an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), seeks damages for injuries sustained on October 12, 2016 when he was assaulted by two inmates at Bare Hill Correctional Facility. Claimant testified at an examination before trial that he left his dorm for the evening meal and walked approximately 30 to 40 feet before he caught up with a crowd of inmates on the walkway leading to the mess hall. He described what happened next as follows:
"when I caught up to them I said to them excuse me fellas, like that and they all looked back and then I walked around. One of them stepped in the grass and then I went to walk around. As soon as I walked around and got in front of them they cut me" (defendant's Exhibit C, p. 63).
Claimant testified that one of the inmates used a weapon to slash his face while another punched him. Claimant denied that he knew either of the inmates prior to the attack, except to the extent that he had previously seen the shorter of the two smoking in the bathroom (id. at pp. 51 and 54).
Immediately after the assault claimant chased the inmate who had cut him until he was grabbed by a correction officer and, allegedly, beaten with clubs (id. at 65-68). Claimant was then taken to the prison infirmary and, later, to the emergency department of a local hospital where sutures were applied. According to Lieutenant T. White, who participated in the investigation of the incident, DOCCS had no reason to believe the claimant was in danger of being assaulted by either of his assailants and neither of his assailants, later identified as Malik Cargill and Denzel Brown, had a history of assaultive behavior (defendant's Exhibit D, affidavit of Lt. T. White, ¶¶ 7-9).
It is well settled that " 'summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue' " (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978][citation omitted]). "The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). At this stage, the evidence must be viewed " 'in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,' " (Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 49 [2015], rearg denied 27 NY3d 957 [2016], quoting Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 339 [2011]). Once the movant has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion "to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986], citing Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). "It is not the function of a court deciding a summary judgment motion to make credibility determinations or findings of fact, but rather to identify material triable issues of fact (or point to the lack thereof)" (Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 505 [2012]).
The law is clear that the State has a duty to safeguard inmates from foreseeable assaults by other inmates. As stated by the Court of Appeals in Sanchez v State of New York (99 NY2d 247, 252 [2002]) "[h]aving assumed physical custody of inmates, who cannot protect and defend themselves in the same way as those at liberty can, the State owes a duty of care to safeguard inmates, even from attacks by fellow inmates" (Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247, 252 [2002]). This duty does not require "unremitting surveillance in all circumstances" nor does it cast the State in the role of an insurer of inmate safety (Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 256). Rather, the scope of the duty is limited to risks of harm that are reasonably foreseeable (see id. at 253; Gilhooly v County of Suffolk, 164 AD3d 659 [2d Dept 2018]; Melvin v State of New York, 101 AD3d 1654 [4th Dept 2012]; Vasquez v State of New York, 68 AD3d 1275, 1276 [3d Dept 2009]; Di Donato v State of New York, 25 AD3d 944 [2006]; Blake v State of New York, 259 AD2d 878 [3d Dept 1999]; Auger v State of New York, 263 AD2d 929 [3d Dept 1999]; Littlejohn v State of New York, 218 AD2d 833 [3d Dept 1995]; Huertas v State of New York, 84 AD2d 650 [3d Dept 1981]). "Although the precise manner in which the harm occurred need not be foreseeable, liability does not attach unless the harm is within the class of reasonably foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to prevent" (Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 252 [citation omitted]).
Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the assault upon the claimant was not reasonably foreseeable. In support of its motion, defendant submitted proof that the claimant did not know either of his assailants (defendant's Exhibit C, claimant's examination before trial transcript, p. 51) and had no reason to believe they would assault him. According to Lieutenant White, based upon his investigation of the incident, including computer files maintained by the facility, "DOCCS had no reason to believe that claimant was in danger of being assaulted by Malik Cargill . . . or Denzel Brown . . ., nor could I find any reason to believe that Malik Cargill . . . or Denzel Brown . . . had any problem with the claimant before the attack. Neither Malik Cargill . . . nor Denzel Brown . . . had a history of assaultive behavior such as to constitute notice of violent propensities that would result in an assault on Khalil Jennings" (defendant's Exhibit D, ¶ ¶ 7 and 8) (cf. Wassmann v County of Ulster, 144 AD3d 1470 [3d Dept 2016] [question of fact required denial of defendant's summary judgment motion where regulation required consideration of inmates' behavior during present and prior incarcerations in making housing assignments, which was not done]). There being no evidence to establish that prison officials knew or should have known of a risk of harm to the claimant posed by the assailants, defendant met its burden of establishing its entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted, without opposition, and the claim is dismissed.
October 19, 2018
Saratoga Springs, New York
FRANCIS T. COLLINS
Judge of the Court of Claims Papers Considered:
1. Notice of motion, dated July 10, 2018;
2. Affirmation of Paul F. Cagino, Esq., dated July 10, 2018 with Exhibits A-F.