Opinion
2:21-cv-03909-JFA-MGB
10-13-2022
Eric J. Jennings, Plaintiff, v. Clarendon County Detention Center, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Eric J. Jennings (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the Clarendon County Detention Center (“Defendant” or “CCDC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The undersigned notes at the outset that the disorganized, incoherent nature of Plaintiff's allegations makes it difficult to ascertain the claims on which his Complaint rests. Based on the undersigned's review, however, the instant case appears to be premised on CCDC's purported failure to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care during his time at the detention center. Specifically, the Complaint states that on or around July 1, 2021, Plaintiff noticed “crushed up glass substance” in his food, after which his “organs started hurting and then [his] private area became an issue.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5.) The Complaint acknowledges that CCDC's medical team conducted a urinalysis on or around August 10, 2021, and the test results were normal. (Id. at 4.)
Nevertheless, the Complaint suggests that Plaintiff has continued to experience pain in his private area, and that the condition has caused stress, loss of sleep, anxiety, chest pains, chronic stomach pains, and heart “damage.” (Id. at 4-5; see also Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1, noting that after his meals, Plaintiff's “brain starts ringing and [his] heart jump[s], gets lazy and [his] body just weakens.”)
The Complaint also states that Plaintiff has been unable to sleep because he is constantly “itching” and “feels like something is crawling all over [his] body.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Moreover, CCDC's shower is apparently “covered in mold and green stuff,” which has caused a burning sensation on Plaintiff's feet. (Id.)
The Complaint also references at least one physical altercation from late August 2021, during which Plaintiff was struck by another inmate. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4.) Plaintiff seems to suggest that during this same incident, a correctional officer grabbed him and “slung” him to the ground, and it now “feels like [his] spine [is] inside [his] brain.”(Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, he still has “heart and lung problems” as a result of this altercation and continues to experience “constant ringing in [his] ears, [and] chronic eye and brain pain.” (Id. at 4, 6.)
Plaintiff also claims that he was “slammed” and “choked” by a correctional officer after being tased in his room, although it is unclear whether Plaintiff is referring to a separate incident. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5, 8.)
Notably, the Complaint acknowledges that a doctor ordered blood tests for Plaintiff on or around August 26, 2021, presumably in relation to some of the aforementioned medical concerns. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5; Dkt. No. 1-2 at 10.) The Complaint also suggests that at some point during his detention, Plaintiff was taken to a Clarendon County hospital where medical personnel tested his blood and urine. (Dkt. No. 1 at 19). Although Plaintiff was informed that his results were “good,” the Complaint seems to assert that the medical staff should have ordered CT scans and X-rays, rather than blood work. (Id.)
Notwithstanding the treatment described above, the Complaint maintains that CCDC staff have continued to ignore Plaintiff's purported medical needs, possibly as part of an ongoing conspiracy to kill him. (See id. at 9, 17-18; Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3.) With respect to damages, Plaintiff states: “Most of my damages is enternal [sic], due to the pro-longing with affirmative medical treatment. My organs, lungs, spine, especially my heart, my brain, my left leg and my private area.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) The Complaint demands that Plaintiff be sent to the hospital immediately and awarded $40,000 for “pain and suffering, and mental and physical abuse.” (Id.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Upon reviewing the Complaint, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his action was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 5.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court within twenty-one days. The order warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the pleading deficiencies within the prescribed time would result in summary dismissal. (Id. at 5-6.) The order also warned Plaintiff that it was his responsibility to promptly notify the Clerk of Court regarding any changes to his address, and that his case would be dismissed if he missed a filing deadline set by the Court because he failed to do so. (Id. at 6.)
The undersigned notes that the Court had already notified Plaintiff of this general rule in a prior civil action involving similar claims of inadequate medical treatment at another correctional institution. (See Case No. 2:21-cv-449-JFA-MGB.) Indeed, the undersigned issued this warning as part of an initial proper form order on February 28, 2021, and again on August 27, 2021, when Plaintiff missed a subsequent deadline because he failed to timely notify the Court of a change in his address (Case No. 449, Dkt. Nos. 6, 18.) In short, Plaintiff was well-acquainted with this rule when he filed the instant Complaint.
Plaintiff apparently did not receive the undersigned's order, as it was returned to the Court as undeliverable with a stamp on the envelope stating, “Return to Sender; No Mail Receptacle; Unable to Forward.” (Dkt. No. 9.) In an abundance of caution, the Clerk of Court resent the order to Plaintiff's listed address and contacted CCDC regarding his whereabouts. (Dkt. No. 11.) The mail was once again returned as undeliverable and CCDC confirmed that Plaintiff was no longer at the facility and there was no forwarding address available. (Id.) Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a new address at which he receives mail, and the record indicates no attempt by Plaintiff to contact the Court since filing the Complaint. Thus, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, the undersigned reiterates that the Complaint is premised on rambling, unconnected, and conclusory allegations that make it difficult to discern the true facts underlying Plaintiff's claims against CCDC. While “a Pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, if a complaint's lack of clarity makes it unintelligible, as is the case here, dismissal under Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., is appropriate. (See Dkt. No. 5 at 3.) See Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-1570-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2-3 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007) (dismissing Pro se complaint where the allegations were “so incomprehensible and filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, unsupported statements or ‘gibberish' that they [did] not state a cause of action”); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”).
Notwithstanding the above, the undersigned finds that the instant action is subject to summary dismissal for several additional reasons. A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is well-established that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not “persons” and do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. See Sumpter v. Georgetown Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:20-cv-1770-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 3060395, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020). Accordingly, CCDC-the sole Defendant named in this action-does not qualify as a “person” under § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the “physical building” or the “staff and collection of officials it houses.” Studley v. Watford, No. 3:16-cv-439-JMC-PJG, 2016 WL 2893157, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 2853546 (D.S.C. May 16, 2016); see also Barnes v. Bakersville Corr. Ctr. Med. Staff, No. 3:07-cv-195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff must name specific staff members to state a claim against a “person” as required under § 1983). Plaintiff's Complaint is therefore subject to summary dismissal for failure to name a defendant amendable to suit under § 1983. (See Dkt. No. 5 at 3.)
Even if Plaintiff had named a proper defendant for purposes of § 1983, the undersigned finds that his allegations would still fall short of an actionable constitution violation under the statute. As noted above, the Complaint is largely premised on claims of inadequate medical care at CCDC, which fall under the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.To state such a claim, the plaintiff must show that, objectively, he had a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225-26 (4th Cir. 2016). As to the first prong, a “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). As to the second prong, a claim of deliberate indifference requires a showing that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014).
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff must bring his claims of inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021) (explaining that while the Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners against cruel and unusual punishment, a detainee cannot be subject to any form of punishment and must therefore bring such claims under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Notwithstanding this distinction, the court still looks to “Eighth Amendment precedents in considering a Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Mays, 992 F.3d at 300; see also Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021) (applying the same standard for detainee's medical treatment claims as that established for Eighth Amendment claims).
With respect to the first prong, the undersigned finds that the Complaint's haphazard references to Plaintiff's laundry list of vague, often nonsensical medical conditions fail to establish an objective medical need. Indeed, beyond Plaintiff's unconnected ramblings, the Complaint is largely devoid of any meaningful insight into the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's purported ailments. See, e.g., Wright v. Lassiter, No. 1:18-cv-90-FDW, 2018 WL 4186418, at *11 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2018) (dismissing medical treatment claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B) where prisoner's references to certain injuries were too conclusory and vague to demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need); see also Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278 (stating that the principle of liberal construction does not require district judges to “construct full-blown claims” on the Pro se plaintiff's behalf). Consequently, Plaintiff's kitchen-sink approach simply cannot satisfy the first prong of the test. (See Dkt. No. 5 at 2-3.)
The undersigned notes that Plaintiff employed a similar kitchen-sink approach in Case No. 449 and was warned that such vague, unconnected allegations failed to establish an actionable medical need for purposes of § 1983. (See Case No. 449, Dkt. No. 22.)
With respect to the second prong, any allegations of deliberate indifference are seriously undermined by the medical treatment Plaintiff apparently received prior to filing this action. As discussed above, Plaintiff was taken to the hospital on at least one occasion and has undergone several different blood and urine tests throughout his detention. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5, 19; Dkt. No. 1-2 at 10.) While Plaintiff seems to contest the propriety of these treatment decisions (Dkt. No. 1 at 6, 19), “[q]uestions of medical judgment” generally are not subject to judicial review under § 1983. Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975). For example, “[a] medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment” absent allegations of sufficient harm. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that a claim of cruel and unusual punishment must include a showing that the plaintiff suffered serious injury from the alleged violations). The undersigned simply cannot discern any such harm from the confused allegations here.Thus, while the Court need not reach the merits of Plaintiff s claims in this case, the undersigned finds that the allegations of inadequate medical care are likely subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim to relief. (See Dkt. No. 5 at 3-4.)
The undersigned further notes that to the extent Plaintiff's allegations are premised on the frivolous, unsubstantiated theory that Defendant purposefully denied him medical care as part of a conspiracy to kill him (see Dkt. No. 1 at 9, 17-18; Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3), the court has the authority to dismiss such obviously “fantastic” or “delusional” claims. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Cabbagestalk v. Sterling, No. 5:17-cv-2703-RMG, 2018 WL 339940, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2018) (“[W]ild allegations that prison staff and inmates are conspiring against Plaintiff are not ‘magic words' that permit endless abuse of judicial process.”).
Although far less prominent in the Complaint, the undersigned also finds Plaintiff's sporadic, cursory allegations regarding his conditions of his confinement likewise subject to dismissal.(See Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5, 17, vaguely referencing issues with Plaintiff's outdoor recreation, showers, food, and housing.) To prevail on a claim involving unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a detainee must prove that, objectively, the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious and, subjectively, the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (referencing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)). With respect to the objective prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate a “serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions,” Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381, or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner's unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993). However, due to the bare, incoherent, nature of Plaintiff's allegations, the undersigned once again finds that-absent further clarification of the facts-the Complaint fails to demonstrate any actionable constitutional violations. (See Dkt. No. 5 at 4-5.) See Iqbal, 556 at 678 (stating that while the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
The Fourteenth Amendment also allows detainees to raise substantive due process challenges to their conditions of confinement where the conditions are so disproportionate or arbitrary that they are not related to legitimate penological objectives and amount to punishment. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174-76 (4th Cir. 2018).
Finally, the undersigned notes that the Complaint references “intentional infliction of emotional distress” as a cause of action in this case. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) Notwithstanding the fact that the Complaint is completely devoid of any substantive allegations in support of this claim, the Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the same. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992); In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Thus, if a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that are “so related” to the claims under the court's original jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Without original jurisdiction, however, a federal court generally cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See id. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999). As discussed above, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are subject to summary dismissal. As a result, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any remaining state law causes of action, including Plaintiff's references to intentional infliction of emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice and without further leave to amend, as he has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
The Clerk of Court shall mail a hardcopy of this Report and Recommendation to Plaintiff at his last known address in an abundance of caution.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).