Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-001161-WC
05-27-2016
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: W. Greg Harvey Bowling Green, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Richard W. Hartsock Bowling Green, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-12-60714 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; J. LAMBERT; AND MAZE, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: This appeal arises from an opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board (hereinafter "Board") affirming an Administrative Law Judge's (hereinafter "ALJ") denial of Appellant Diane Jennings's claim for Workers' Compensation Benefits. The evidence of record shows that the ALJ made his decision based on substantial evidence and that the Board properly interpreted the relevant law. Therefore, we affirm.
Background
On or about November 19, 2012, Appellant, Diane Jennings, fell from a broken chair at work, resulting in injuries. At the time, Jennings was sixty-one years of age and an employee at AFNI, Inc. in Bowling Green, Kentucky. She worked in the AFNI, Inc. call center where she provided customer service via phone. Jennings claims that she accidentally sat in a broken chair at her desk, which forced her to go backwards and then be sprung forward out of the chair onto the floor. The next day, Jennings began to experience pain in her left arm, lower back, and neck, and she developed bruises on her knees. Jennings reported the incident to her supervisor on November 21, 2012. Jennings states that she reported the incident the following Monday to the head of Human Resources. Two days later, Jennings was fired due to performance issues unrelated to her injury.
As a result of her fall, Jennings sought medical care in Kentucky at an emergency room and also received physical therapy. She later moved to Florida where she received chiropractic care and sought various other methods of treatment. Reports from these medical facilities acknowledged that Jennings has or had a sprain, osteoarthritis, and various other spinal health issues. However, none of these reports expressly connected Jennings's condition with her fall at AFNI, Inc. Specifically, Dr. Norman, a Florida orthopedic surgeon AFNI, Inc. hired to evaluate Jennings for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Claim, explained that Jennings had degenerative arthritis and that
she has reached maximum medical improvement regarding the myofascial sprain that she may have sustained at the time of the fall on November 19, 2012. No further treatment is required regarding the sprain. There was no evidence of permanent impairment that could be directly related to the fall from the chair.
In his order denying Jennings's Workers' Compensation Claim, the ALJ relied on Dr. Norman's report. The ALJ found that "the Plaintiff [had] not introduced sufficient medical evidence to substantiate her subjective complaints of chronic and debilitating pain as a result of her work injury." The ALJ explained that after looking at the totality of the evidence, "there [was] not one single physician that testified in this claim that has specifically stated that Plaintiff's problems were causally related to the effect of the November 19, 2012, accident ...." The ALJ therefore dismissed Jennings's claim.
Jennings appealed to the Board which reviewed the evidence and the ALJ's findings and determined that the "ALJ's assessment of the proof [was] reasonable." The Board, therefore, affirmed the decision, and this appeal followed.
Standard of Review
When reviewing a decision of the Board, we will reverse only if the Board "has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice." W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-688 (Ky. 1992). The ALJ's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Transp. Cabinet v. Poe, 69 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Ky. 2001), citing Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky. App. 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984). "Substantial evidence is evidence of relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people." Id., citing Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chemical Co., 474 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. App. 1971). The ALJ is vested with the "sole authority to determine the weight, credibility, and substance of the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence." Id., citing Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1985).
Analysis
On appeal, Jennings contends that the ALJ's conclusion that she did not suffer an injury as defined by statute was clearly erroneous and that the Board erred in affirming the ALJ's decision to dismiss her claim. Jennings argues that the record establishes she suffered an injury from her fall at work. She also contends that she has not yet reached "maximum medical improvement" as defined by statute.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.0011(1) states than an injury in the context of a Workers' Compensation claim is defined as
any work-related traumatic event . . . arising out of and in the course of employment which is the proximate cause producing a harmful change in the human organism
evidenced by objective medical findings. 'Injury' does not include the effects of the natural aging process . . ..KRS 342.0011(1). The ALJ found that substantial evidence did not exist in the record indicating that Jennings's fall from of the chair at AFNI, Inc. was the "proximate cause" of her claimed condition or injuries.
The record before us includes Dr. Norman's written assertions that "there was no evidence of permanent impairment that could be directly related to the fall from the chair" and that Jennings had reached maximum medical improvement for any possible temporary injuries she had suffered (such as a sprained neck). Additionally, nothing else in the record indicates direct causation between Jennings's current injuries and the fall at AFNI, Inc.
The ALJ considered the weight of this record and reviewed the evidence, eventually finding Dr. Norman's testimony to be substantial and persuasive. Even if other evidence had existed within the record which contradicted Dr. Norman's evaluation, the ALJ would still have the discretion to make the decision he did, because it was supported by substantial evidence. Hall v. Is. Creek Coal Co., 474 S.W.2d 890, 891 (Ky. App. 1971) (citing Thompson v. Ky. Appalachian Indus., Inc., 451 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. App. 1970)). Therefore, the ALJ's decision was not clearly erroneous; and the Board's subsequent decision affirming the ALJ's opinion was not the result of any error so egregious as to cause gross injustice.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the ALJ's order dismissing Jennings's Workers' Compensation Claim and the subsequent decision of the Board are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: W. Greg Harvey
Bowling Green, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Richard W. Hartsock
Bowling Green, Kentucky