Opinion
Decided December, 1880.
Single instances of neglect by one having the means to provide his wife with the necessaries of life, or to furnish her with medical assistance, unaccompanied by circumstances showing danger or reasonable apprehension of danger to her life or health, do not, as matter of law, constitute extreme cruelty as a cause of divorce.
LIBEL FOR DIVORCE. The petition charged extreme cruelty, and specified acts which, if true, would support the charge. A referee reported that the libellant was not entitled to a divorce, and at her request also reported that the libellee, being of sufficient ability, failed in a few instances to make the provision for his wife that he ought, and that upon one occasion, more than five years previous to the libel, he neglected to procure a physician in her sickness. The court denied the motion of the libellant to recommit the cause for further hearing, and dismissed the libel. The libellant excepted.
J. H. Hobbs, for the libellant.
S. B. Carter, for the libellee.
What conduct constitutes extreme cruelty as a cause of divorce is matter of law. Whether such conduct exists is matter of fact to be proved by competent evidence. Janvrin v. Janvrin, 58 N.H. 144. Isolated instances of neglect by a husband having the ability to provide his wife with the necessaries of life, or to furnish a physician in case of sickness, unaccompanied by circumstances showing danger or apprehension of danger to, her life or health, are not, as matter of law, extreme cruelty. Whether the instances of neglect were such as to cause danger or a reasonable apprehension of danger to the life or health of the libellant, and prevent her from safely discharging her marital duties, was a question of fact. 1 Bish. Mar. Div., s. 769. There having been a full hearing upon the facts before the referee, there was no error in the refusal of the court to recommit the cause for further hearing. Janvrin v. Janvrin, 58 N.H. 144, 146.
Exceptions overruled.
FOSTER, J., did not sit: the others concurred.