Opinion
CASE NO. 4:17-CV-234-CDL-MSH
09-10-2018
JEFFREY JENKINS, Petitioner, v. Warden, LARRY MITCHELL, Respondent.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently pending before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) and Petitioner's motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 31, 33). For the reasons explained below, it is recommended that Respondent's motion be granted and Petitioner's motions be denied.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a pretrial detainee held at the Muscogee County Jail since approximately June 27, 2017. Pet. 1-2, ECF No. 8. He is charged with rape, sodomy, child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and incest. Id. at 2. Petitioner filed several motions in state court objecting to his detention and criminal prosecution. See Pet. 2-3; Ex. of Proof to Remedy 3-4, ECF No. 24-1 (listing motions filed in the superior court). He also attempted to file a state application for habeas relief in Muscogee County, but the clerk did not accept it for filing (at least initially) because it did not include an account statement. Pet. Ex. 1 at 9-10, ECF No. 8-1. In the state motions, Petitioner asserts claims for "actual malice" and "actual intent" by the Columbus police, "abuse of process" in his arrest and charges, and "malicious prosecution." Id. at 6-7. The record indicates Petitioner's motions are still pending in the state court.
Petitioner asserts the same grounds for relief in his federal petition for habeas corpus relief filed on January 10, 2018. Pet. 6-8. He asks this Court to prevent the Columbus Police Department from investigating the "family violence accusation" against him. Id. at 7. He asks that a "child advocate be present to prevent bolstered testimony" by investigators, presumably at his trial. Id. Finally, he seeks release from pretrial detention. Id.
Respondent moves to dismiss Petitioner's application, claiming that this Court should abstain from reviewing it under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Mem. in Supp. 5-8, ECF No. 18-1. Petitioner responds that the state court is not providing an adequate forum for relief because he has asked for a speedy trial and is still being detained. Rebuttal to Mot. to Dismiss 2-4, ECF No. 27. Petitioner also filed two motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 31, 33) based on what he asserts is the Respondent's "bad faith" in allowing his prosecution despite "perjured testimony knowingly used by state authorities[.]" Request for Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 31. These motions are ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Dismiss
A. Younger Abstention
Respondent claims that this Court should abstain from considering Petitioner's petition under the doctrine set forth in Younger. There, the United States Supreme Court explained that federal courts must refrain from intervening with pending state criminal proceedings when the party requesting federal intervention has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53. Younger abstention is thus required where (1) state judicial proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Newsome v. Broward Cty. Pub. Defs., 304 F. App'x 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). "When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief prior to a pending state criminal trial[,] the petitioner must satisfy the Younger abstention hurdles before the federal courts can grant such relief." Hughes v. Attn'y Gen. Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).
Petitioner admits that his state criminal proceedings are pending. Any decision by this Court with respect to the issues raised by Petitioner would substantially interfere with, and perhaps undermine, the decisions reached by the state court in those proceedings. See Newsome, 304 F. App'x at 816 (noting that the relevant inquiry with respect to the first Middlesex factor is "whether the federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Watson v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 618 F. App'x 487, 490 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). The pending criminal proceedings also implicate the state's important interest in prosecuting those who have violated its criminal laws. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (recognizing important state interest in the enforcement of its laws). Finally, Petitioner fails to show that the state proceeding will not provide him with an adequate opportunity to raise the claims asserted herein. See Watson, 618 F. App'x at 490 (noting that federal courts should assume that state procedures provide an adequate remedy absent "unambiguous authority" to the contrary).
Petitioner has also not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine applies. Younger abstention may not be required where "(1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith; (2) irreparable injury would occur; or (3) there is no adequate state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised." Hughes, 377 F.3d at 1263 n.6. Petitioner has not shown that there is a threat of irreparable harm if this Court fails to intervene in his ongoing criminal prosecution or that, without intervention, he will be deprived of an adequate forum where his constitutional challenges can be addressed. He generally states that the state proceedings are motivated by bad faith but has not provided the Court with any specific facts supporting this conclusory and speculative allegation. See, e.g., Del Valle Hernandez v. U.S. Family Court of Bronx Cnty., No. 96-7588, 1997 WL 4453, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 1997) (unpublished opinion) ("The bad faith/harassment exception to Younger abstention is narrow, and conclusory allegations are insufficient to bring a case within the exception[.]") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Schwartzmiller v. Roberts, No. 94-35241, 1995 WL 470882, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1995) (unpublished opinion) ("[A]ssertions of bad faith or harassment are insufficient if they are conclusory and unsupported by specific facts."). He similarly states—without support—that the state court does not provide him with an adequate forum for relief. Petitioner filed multiple motions in the state court seeking the same relief sought herein but failed to allow the state court to rule on those motions prior to filing his federal petition. Moreover, the fact that Petitioner must endure a state criminal prosecution fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
This Court must abstain from deciding Petitioner's application for habeas relief. Further, since Petitioner seeks only injunctive relief, his case is properly dismissed instead of stayed pending the resolution of the state court proceedings. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973). Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) be granted.
II. Petitioner's Motions for Summary Judgment
Petitioner seeks summary judgment (ECF Nos. 31, 33) based on his belief that the state authorities are acting in bad faith. See, e.g., Request for Summ. J. 2. As explained above, it is recommended that Respondent's motion to dismiss be granted. For the same reasons, it is recommended that Petitioner's motions for summary judgment be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is recommended that Respondent's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) be granted and Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed. Petitioner's motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 31, 33) should be denied. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO RECOMMENDED, this 10th day of September, 2018.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE