Opinion
No. 1923 C.D. 2013
07-17-2014
Danielle Jenkins v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEAVITT
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles (PennDOT) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 26th Judicial District (Montour County Branch) (trial court) granting the statutory appeal of Danielle Jenkins (Licensee) and rescinding the three-month suspension of her motor vehicle registration for failure to maintain financial responsibility coverage. We vacate and remand.
Licensee is the registered owner of a 2008 Toyota coupe that was insured by GEICO Casualty Company (GEICO). On May 1, 2013, GEICO terminated Licensee's policy due to nonpayment of premium. GEICO electronically reported the termination to PennDOT as required by Section 1786 of the Motor Vehicle Code and 67 Pa. Code §221.3. On June 11, 2013, PennDOT mailed a notification to Licensee that it had received information from GEICO that Licensee's insurance was cancelled on May 1, 2013. On July 4, 2013, PennDOT notified Licensee that the Toyota's registration would be suspended for three months effective August 8, 2013, pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d). On July 8, 2013, Licensee filed a timely statutory appeal of the registration suspension.
Section 1786(e)(3) states, in pertinent part:
An insurer who has issued a contract of motor vehicle liability insurance and knows or has reason to believe that the contract is only for the purpose of providing proof of financial responsibility shall notify the Department if the insurance has been canceled or terminated by the insured or by the insurer. The insurer shall notify the Department not later than ten days following the effective date of the cancellation or termination.75 Pa. C.S. §1786(e)(3).
Section 221.3(a) provides:
An insurer who has issued a contract of motor vehicle liability insurance and knows or has reason to believe that the contract is for the purpose of providing financial responsibility, shall immediately notify the Department if the insurance has been cancelled or terminated by the insured or by the insurer. The insurer shall notify the Department not later than 10 days following the effective date of the cancellation or termination. This requirement shall not apply to a policy which has been in effect for more than 6 months from the date the policy was initially issued.67 Pa. Code §221.3(a).
Section 1786(d)(1) states:
The Department of Transportation shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it determines the required financial responsibility was not secured as required by this chapter and shall suspend the operating privilege of the owner or registrant for a period of three months if the Department determines that the owner or registrant has operated or permitted the operation of the vehicle without the required financial responsibility.75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(1).
The trial court held a de novo hearing on October 2, 2013. PennDOT's counsel introduced certified copies of the above-described documents. The trial court questioned PennDOT's attorney regarding the July 4, 2013, "Mail Date" on the notice of suspension, noting that July 4th is a national holiday. PennDOT's attorney explained that the "Processing Date," which in this case was June 27, 2013, is the date the notice is actually mailed. However, PennDOT adds seven days to the "Processing Date" to determine the "Mail Date" to ensure that the licensee will have the full 30-day appeal period required by law. The documents were then offered into evidence and admitted without objection.
PennDOT's attorney stated that "I am not here to testify on behalf of [PennDOT]. I am here just to explain it for the Court." Reproduced Record at 12a (R.R. ___).
Licensee, appearing pro se, testified that she became aware that her insurance policy had been terminated when she received the letter from PennDOT dated June 11, 2013. She admitted that she had not paid her premium and that she obtained insurance "within like a week" after receiving PennDOT's June 11 notice. Reproduced Record at 15a (R.R. ___). Licensee stated that she had moved over a year earlier and had failed to notify PennDOT of her change of address. Nevertheless, she acknowledged receiving the notices from PennDOT because she knew "people who use to live [at her old address]," but stated that she had not received the May 1, 2013, cancellation notice from GEICO. R.R. 17a. Licensee testified that she had updated her address with GEICO after her move.
The trial court asked PennDOT's attorney whether there was "some due process fairness thing she has to have been notified and given an opportunity and given alternative insurance?" Id. PennDOT's attorney responded that "it may be appropriate to hold this matter in abeyance until [Licensee] pursues any remedy she might have with the Insurance Commission about the cancellation of the insurance." Id. Furthermore, the attorney stated "that if there is a question about whether an insurance company acted appropriately it is not the role of this Court to make that determination and officiate." R.R. 20a.
The trial court credited Licensee's testimony that she never received GEICO's notice of insurance cancellation and expressed concern that Licensee had not received adequate due process. The trial court held that there was insufficient evidence that PennDOT had mailed a proper notice of suspension to Licensee because the notice offered into evidence bore a mail date that was a national holiday. The trial court also rejected PennDOT's proof of an electronic notification of cancellation from GEICO because there was no certification that the transmission was "received" by PennDOT. The trial court granted Licensee's statutory appeal. PennDOT now appeals to this Court.
We note that Licensee has been precluded from filing a brief in this matter due to her failure to do so within the mandated time frame.
On appeal, PennDOT argues that the trial court's finding that PennDOT did not send a proper notice of suspension is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, PennDOT contends that the trial court erred in determining that PennDOT did not submit competent evidence that it received GEICO's notification of termination of Licensee's insurance policy. Third, PennDOT argues that the trial court should have held Licensee's appeal in abeyance while she sought review by the Insurance Commissioner of her claim that GEICO never notified her that her policy was cancelled. Finally, PennDOT contends that Licensee received both notice and an opportunity to be heard, thus satisfying Licensee's due process rights.
In reviewing the grant of a statutory appeal of a vehicular registration suspension, this Court must determine whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Deklinski v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 938 A.2d 1191, 1194 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
We begin with a review of the law regarding suspension of a vehicle's registration for failure to maintain financial responsibility coverage. PennDOT has the initial burden of proving that the vehicle in question is of the type required to be registered and that PennDOT received notification that the registrant's automobile insurance policy had been terminated. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3). This burden may be satisfied by the certified receipt of an electronic transmission from an insurance company stating that a registrant's policy has been terminated. 75 Pa. C.S. §1377(b). This type of evidence, when submitted by PennDOT, will constitute prima facie proof that the termination by the insurance company was legally effective and that the registrant's vehicle lacked the required financial responsibility coverage. Id. This presumption may be rebutted by the registrant with "clear and convincing evidence" that the vehicle was insured at all relevant times. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3)(ii). When a registration suspension is appealed to a court of common pleas, that court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the vehicle is of the type required to be insured and whether PennDOT received a notice of termination from an insurance company. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3).
When PennDOT determines that a vehicle lacked the required financial responsibility coverage, it must suspend the registration of the vehicle for three months. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(1). If the registrant disputes the validity of an insurance policy cancellation, he must challenge it by requesting review from the Insurance Commissioner. This request, once made, acts as a supersedeas on the suspension until the Insurance Commissioner's review is complete. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(5).
There are several exceptions to this rule that are not applicable in this case.
PennDOT first argues that the trial court's finding that PennDOT "did not prove to the trier of fact that it sent a proper Notice of Suspension (the dubious July 4, 2013 notice)" is not supported by substantial evidence. Trial court op. at 4. PennDOT contends that it submitted a certified copy of the notice of suspension. PennDOT argues that proof of mailing creates a rebuttable presumption that the item was received and in the present case Licensee did in fact receive the notice. PennDOT admits that the "Mail Date" is not the date when the notice is actually mailed but rather one week after the "Processing Date." This practice is employed to provide licensees with the full 30 days required by statute to appeal the suspension. PennDOT argues that there is no requirement that the "Processing Date" must be used as the "Mail Date." We agree.
An administrative agency may submit a certified document, including a photocopy, as evidence, provided that the document is attested by the legal custodian and includes a certificate that the custodian has custody. 42 Pa. C.S. §§6103(a), 6109(b). Submission of such a document is sufficient to prove that the agency took action. 42 Pa. C.S. § 6104(a). For instance, PennDOT's document, certifying that a notice was sent, establishes a rebuttable presumption that the notice was sent. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Grasse, 606 A.2d 544, 545-46 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). PennDOT is not required to prove actual receipt by the licensee. Id. The date the notice is mailed constitutes the date on which the suspension order is entered and a licensee must file an appeal within 30 days of the mailing date. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Walzer, 625 A.2d 1346, 1347 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). See also 42 Pa. C.S. §5572 ("The date of service of an order of a government unit, which shall be the date of mailing if service is by mail, shall be deemed to be the date of entry of the order for the purposes of this subchapter.").
42 Pa. C.S. §6103(a) states in relevant part:
General rule.--An official record kept within this Commonwealth by any . . . government unit, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by . . . a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record . . . and accompanied by a certificate that the officer has the custody. The certificate may be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties with respect to the government unit in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of that office . . . .
42 Pa. C.S. §6109(b) states in relevant part:
General rule.--If any . . . department or agency of government, in the regular course of business or activity, has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation, or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, . . . [s]uch reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding, whether the original is in existence or not . . . .
42 Pa. C.S. §6104(a) states in relevant part:
General rule.--A copy of a record of governmental action or inaction authenticated as provided in section 6103 (relating to proof of official records) shall be admissible as evidence that the governmental action or inaction disclosed therein was in fact taken or omitted.
In this case, the notice of suspension offered into evidence by PennDOT was certified in accordance with Sections 6103 and 6109 of the Judicial Code and, therefore, admissible under Section 6104. The suspension notice satisfied PennDOT's prima facie burden that it mailed the notice to Licensee. We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the July 4th "Mail Date" rendered the notice incredible. As indicated above, the purpose of the mail date is to determine when the 30 day appeal period commences. There is no statutory requirement that the mail date must be the actual date that the notice was placed in the mail. Furthermore, Licensee received the notice because she filed a timely appeal on July 8, 2013, which included a copy of the notice. Consequently, the trial court's finding that PennDOT failed to properly notify Licensee of the suspension is not supported by substantial evidence.
Next, PennDOT argues that the trial court erred in holding that PennDOT's certification of the electronic transmission from GEICO informing PennDOT of the termination of Licensee's insurance policy was defective because the certification did not include the word "received." Specifically, the trial court stated that "[a]t no place on the cover sheet of [PennDOT's certification] does it state that [PennDOT] 'received' the information by electronic transmission. Rather, [the certification] simply states that [the document provided] is the electronic transmission from Geico." Trial court op. at 2. PennDOT contends that use of the word "received" is unnecessary because the document is clearly from GEICO and therefore it must have been "received" by PennDOT.
Section 1377(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code provides in pertinent part:
In a proceeding relating to the suspension of the registration of a motor vehicle [due to lack of insurance], [PennDOT's] certification of its receipt of documents or electronic transmission from an insurance company informing [PennDOT] that the person's coverage has lapsed, been canceled or terminated shall also constitute prima facie proof that the lapse, cancellation or termination of the policy of insurance described in the electronic transmission was effective under the laws of this Commonwealth.75 Pa. C.S. §1377(b)(2). As noted above, PennDOT's burden under 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d) is to show that (1) the vehicle is of a type required to be registered and (2) PennDOT received notice that financial responsibility coverage had lapsed. 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3)(i), (ii).
The trial court erred in holding that the certification by PennDOT must include the word "received" in order to satisfy the requirement of 75 Pa. C.S. §1377(b). We agree with PennDOT that it "obviously received" the electronic transmission because the transmission was from GEICO. Common sense dictates that for something to be received, it must be from somewhere. Furthermore, the trial court's statement that the document introduced by PennDOT is "a typical [PennDOT] generated document . . . and that it is not an electronic transmission from Geico" is of no moment. Trial court op. at 2. This Court has held that a computer printout of its business record is sufficient to satisfy PennDOT's prima facie burden. Fell v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 925 A.2d 232, 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (finding that PennDOT satisfied its prima facie burden by introducing "a computer printout of an electronic transmission from [the insurance company] certifying termination of the insurance policy. . . .") (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that PennDOT satisfied its prima facie burden.
PennDOT's third argument is that the trial court erred in granting Licensee's appeal because GEICO did not comply with the statutory requirements for notifying Licensee of the cancellation of her insurance policy. PennDOT notes that GEICO is required to comply with Section 2006 of The Insurance Company Law of 1921, Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 682, 40 P.S. §991.2006, when notifying an individual of a cancellation of an insurance policy. PennDOT does not dispute Licensee's claim that she did not receive any notification from GEICO. However, PennDOT argues that the scope of the trial court's review is limited to PennDOT's suspension and does not include the validity of the insurance company's action. Therefore, PennDOT contends that the proper procedure was for the trial court to hold the appeal of the registration suspension in abeyance while Licensee sought review by the Insurance Commissioner.
Section 2006 was added by the Act of June 17, 1998, P.L. 464. It states in relevant part:
A cancellation or refusal to renew by an insurer of a policy of automobile insurance shall not be effective unless the insurer delivers or mails to the named insured at the address shown in the policy a written notice of the cancellation or refusal to renew. The notice shall:
40 P.S. §991.2006. --------
***
(4) Advise the insured of his right to request in writing, within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the notice of cancellation or intention not to renew and of the receipt of the reason or reasons for the cancellation or refusal to renew as stated in the notice of cancellation or of intention not to renew, that the Insurance Commissioner review the action of the insurer.
This Court has stated repeatedly that examination "beyond the record on its face, into the validity of an insurer's policy cancellation . . . is properly brought for review to the Insurance Commissioner under Section 1786(d)(5), and not to a trial court." Webb v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 870 A.2d 968, 974 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). The appropriate remedy is for the trial court to transfer "an improvidently filed underlying challenge to an insurer's policy cancellation to the Insurance Commissioner, or . . . stay[] a registration suspension appeal pending the resolution of a properly pursued policy cancellation before the Insurance Commissioner if the merits of a case demand such review." Id.
The key issue below was whether Licensee received a proper notice from GEICO informing her of the cancellation of her insurance. In granting Licensee's appeal, the trial court relied on Eckenrode v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 853 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In Eckenrode, PennDOT introduced proof that the insurance company mailed a notice of cancellation to the licensee. However, the address to which the notice was mailed was different from the address where the licensee resided. The trial court made no finding as to whether the address where the notice was mailed was the same as the address on the insurance policy. Therefore, this Court remanded the matter to determine whether the mailing and policy addresses were the same. We noted that actual receipt of the insurance company's notice was not required, but rather "the insurance company must mail the notice to the address on the policy as it would in the regular course of business." Id. at 1145 n.11.
In the present case, because Licensee did not receive the notice from GEICO, there is no way to compare the address where the notice was mailed and Licensee's address on the policy. The trial court held that because it believed that PennDOT's notice was improper, there was no need for the Insurance Department to be involved. It relied upon Eckenrode in so holding. However, Eckenrode applies to cases involving notice from the insurance company, not to cases involving PennDOT's notice. Therefore, the trial court's reliance on Eckenrode was misplaced.
Instead, we find Roscioli v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 37 A.3d 1278 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), to be controlling. In Roscioli, the licensees claimed to not have received notification from their insurance company that the insurance policy in question was cancelled. We noted that "[t]his Court has a history of returning cases to the court of common pleas under circumstances where an insured claims not to have received a cancellation notice and has failed to submit the matter for the Insurance Commissioner's review." Id. at 1282. Similarly, Licensee in the present case claims to have not received the cancellation notice from GEICO. Consequently, we agree with PennDOT that the proper remedy was for the trial court to hold the matter in abeyance while Licensee pursues a remedy against GEICO with the Insurance Commissioner.
Finally, PennDOT contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Licensee was denied due process. PennDOT notes that due process requires notice and the opportunity to respond. PennDOT argues that Licensee was afforded due process because it notified her of the suspension, which she received, and the trial court's de novo hearing gave her the opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, PennDOT notes that it has included language informing licensees that if they did not receive notification from their insurance company of the cancellation, the licensee should file a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner.
It is axiomatic that due process requires notice and the opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). In the present case, Licensee received both notice of the suspension from PennDOT and a de novo hearing before the trial court. PennDOT also advised Licensee of her right to challenge GEICO's notice of termination of her insurance policy with the Insurance Commissioner. In either case, Licensee's right to due process was satisfied. As a result, we agree with PennDOT that the trial court erred in holding that Licensee was denied due process.
For the above-stated reasons, we vacate and remand with instructions that the trial court hold the matter in abeyance while Licensee pursues a remedy with the Insurance Department.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of July, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 26th Judicial District (Montour County Branch) dated October 15, 2013, in the above-captioned matter is hereby VACATED and this matter is REMANDED with instructions that the trial court hold the matter in abeyance while Danielle Jenkins pursues a remedy with the Insurance Department.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge