Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:04-CV-138-TSL-JCS.
June 23, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Procedural History
Steve Jasper was convicted of felony shoplifting in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Mississippi, after a jury trial conducted on January 9, 2002. He was subsequently sentenced as a habitual offender to a term of five (5) years imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections without benefit of parole or probation.
Jasper appealed his conviction and sentence to the Mississippi Supreme Court, assigning the following grounds for relief:
A. The trial court committed reversible error by sentencing Mr. Jasper as a habitual offender in this case as the State did not prove that the defendant had two prior felonies serving one year or more in prison. Further, the evidence presented at sentencing as to alleged prior felonies of Mr. Jasper did not match the same prior felonies as those listed in Mr. Jasper's indictment.
B. The court committed reversible error by allowing Officer Kevin Stevens to testify in this case especially since his name was not disclosed until the morning of trial and his testimony went into matters which were privileged information.
C. The court committed reversible error by failing to give the defendant's requested lessor included offense jury instruction.
On July 29, 2003, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed Jasper's conviction and sentence in a published opinion. Jasper v. State, 858 So.2d 149 (Miss.App. 2003), reh'g denied, October 28, 2003 (2002-KA-00317-COA). The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following issue:
Whether the trial court erred by allowing Deputy Kevin Stevens to give testimony regarding privileged information.
On April 29, 2004, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in a written opinion. Jasper v. State, 871 So.2d 729 (Miss. 2004).
On August 2, 2004, Petitioner filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief in this Court, alleging the following grounds for relief:
A. Ground 1 — Trial court committed reversible error by sentencing Jasper as a habitual offender as the state did not prove that Jasper had two (2) prior felonies. Further, the evidence presented at sentencing did not match the prior felonies listed within Jasper's indictment.
B. Ground 2 — Trial court committed reversible error by allowing Deputy Kevin Stevens to give testimony regarding privileged information.
C. Ground 3 — Trial court committed reversible error by failing to give the defendant's requested lesser included offense jury instruction.
Standard of Review
The applicable portions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. 104-32, 110 Stat. 12144, and the standard of review imposed upon this court by AEDPA, prevent the granting of habeas relief in this action. Title I of the AEDPA modified 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by providing the following:(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Under AEDPA, where the state court adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits, this Court reviews questions of fact under § 2254(d)(2), while questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1). Factual findings are presumed to be correct, and the Court defers to the state court's decision regarding factual determinations unless it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000); § 2254(d)(2). The Court independently reviews questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact to determine whether the state court's decision thereon was either "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" federal law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-408 (2000); Hill, 210 F.3d at 485.
The first step in this inquiry is to determine what federal law should be applied to the state court's decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404. The determinations of the state courts must be tested against "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id.; § 2254(d)(1). Next, this Court must determine whether the state court's decision was "contrary to" that established Federal law. The proper standard is an objective one, not subjective. Id. at 408-409. The term "unreasonable" was distinguished from "erroneous" or "incorrect"; thus, a state court's incorrect application of the law may be permitted to stand if it was, nonetheless, "reasonable."
A summary of the AEDPA law is that ultimately, "[t]o prevail on a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court proceeding `resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Robertson v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 243, 247-48 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)). The courts have no authority to grant habeas corpus relief simply because "we conclude, in our independent judgment, that a state supreme court's application of [federal] law is erroneous or incorrect." Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 2002).
Under the AEDPA standard, this Court must determine whether or not the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision was an unreasonable application of any clearly established Federal law or either contrary to any clearly established Federal law, as set forth in a United States Supreme Court case.
Facts
The evidence revealed that on April 10, 2001, Bubba Hutto, owner of Hutto Furniture, was working at his store with Carol Hutto and Gaston Hutcherson, employees. A man identified as the Petitioner entered the store, and all of the employees at one time asked if he or she could help him. He told them that he was just looking for a television and went to the back of the store. The employees later heard the bell on the door ring and knew someone had left. They looked in the area where Jasper had been and noticed that an air conditioner was missing, a display model. They looked out the door, saw the brackets that held the air conditioner, and saw the Petitioner leaving in a red Grand Am. Bubba Hutto followed him in his truck, and Gaston later followed in his car. The police were notified. Officer Robert Owen, an investigator with the Waynesboro Police Department, spotted Jasper and stopped him. Jasper had no driver's license, so Officer Owen arrested him for that. An inventory search was made of the vehicle, and the air conditioner from Hutto Furniture was found in the trunk. The proof showed that the air conditioner, an 8000 BTU, was worth over $379. The Petitioner's palmprint was found on the unit.
Over the Petitioner's objection, Officer Kevin Stevens testified that he overheard Jasper say that he purposely made certain the air conditioner was worth less than $250, so that it would be a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Jasper said this while having a conversation with his attorney and the district attorney as they discussed plea negotiations.
The State presented the testimony of Bubba Hutto; Officer Robert Owen; Jamie Bush, Mississippi Crime Laboratory; and Deputy Sheriff Kevin Stevens. The Defendant testified on his own behalf.
Jasper was represented at trial and on appeal by Attorney Leslie Roussell, Laurel, Mississippi. The State was represented by Assistant District Attorneys Dan Angero and Lisa Howell. The trial judge was the Honorable Robert W. Bailey.
Analysis of the Issues and the Applicable Law
The Mississippi Court of Appeals considered all of the grounds presented in the habeas petition and found that no reversible error was committed by the trial court. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the court's decision, but found that it was error to allow Officer Stevens to testify regarding what he overheard Jasper say during plea negotiations with his attorney and the district attorney. However, the error was harmless, according to the court, and the conviction was affirmed. 871 So.2d at 731.
In order for habeas relief to be granted in his case, Jasper must show that the court's decision on these claims was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The Respondents contend that the grounds set forth in the Petition failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right. "A state prisoner is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he is held `in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" Engles v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 188 (1981). The courts have "long recognized that a `mere error of state law' is not a denial of due process. If the contrary were true, then `every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question.'" Id. at 121 n. 21. A state's interpretation of its own laws or rules is no basis for federal habeas corpus relief since no constitutional question is involved. Bronstein v. Wainwright, 646 F.2d 1048, 1050 (5th Cir. 1981).
The undersigned agrees that no constitutional errors have been set forth by the Petitioner. In Ground 1, Jasper contends that the court committed reversible error by sentencing him as a habitual offender because the State failed to prove that Jasper had two prior felonies and served separate terms of one year or more in prison, as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (Rev. 2000). He contends that the evidence presented at the sentencing did not match the prior felonies listed in the indictment. The state courts rejected these claims, finding that the certified copies of three "pen packs," records maintained by the Department of Corrections, were sufficient to establish his habitual status. 858 So.2d at 152.
A federal habeas court cannot review the correctness of the state court's interpretation of its own law. Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 628 (5th Cir. 2004) citing Johnson v. Cain, 215 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2000). Under AEDPA, this Court must "defer to this implicit conclusion and interpretation of state law" by the state court. Id. Findings of fact made by the state court concerning the evidence supporting the habitual portion of the indictment are presumed correct, and Jasper has the burden of rebutting this presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5TH Cir. 2000). He has failed to do so. No habeas relief regarding his habitual offender status may be granted.
In Ground 2, Jasper contends that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing deputy Kevin Stevens to give testimony regarding privileged information, i.e., communications between a client to an attorney regarding plea negotiations. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed, but found that the error was harmless.
This issue regarding the admissibility of Deputy Stevens' testimony is a mere evidentiary matter which is ordinarily not a basis for habeas relief. A federal court in a habeas corpus petition reviewing state evidentiary rulings does not sit as a super state supreme court to review error under state law.Bridge v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1988). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has firmly established resistance to challenges of evidentiary matters by habeas corpus petitions. See, Porter v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 944, 957 (5th Cir. 1983); Bryson v. Alabama, 634 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 1981); Woods v. Estelle, 547 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1977).
As a general rule, admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law, and only a contention that the admission of the evidence rendered the trial fundamentally unfair or violated a specific constitutional right will be considered in a federal collateral proceeding. Edwards v. Butler, 882 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Puckett, 176 F.3d 809, 820 (5th Cir. 1999), citing Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1994). Further, federal courts "are without authority to correct simple misapplications of state criminal law or procedure. The federal habeas court `may intervene only to correct wrongs of [federal] constitutional dimension.'" Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1988); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982).
The "erroneous admission of prejudicial testimony does not justify habeas relief unless the evidence played a `crucial, critical, and highly significant' role in the jury's determination." Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1999). Deputy Stevens' testimony was clearly not vital in the jury's conclusion that Jasper was guilty of shoplifting. The testimony was extraneous and not significant to the verdict.
In Ground 3, the Petitioner contends that reversible error was committed by the trial court's failure to grant his request for a lesser included offense jury instruction. The state courts found that there was no evidence to support Jasper's "theory" that the value of the air conditioner taken was less than $250. 858 So.2d at 153. In a non-capital case, the failure to give a lesser-included instruction does not raise a federal constitutional issue. Valles v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1988); Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 390 (5th Cir. 1998). "Absent a violation of the Constitution, [the federal court] defer[s] to the state court interpretation of its law for whether a lesser-included-offense instruction is warranted."Creel, 162 F.2d at 391. This law is dispositive of Ground 3: no constitutional issue has been set forth under the law.
Although Jasper attempts to phrase his claims in constitutional terms, the "errors" he contends occurred are only errors under the state's criminal law. Jasper has not shown that the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of any clearly established Federal law. None of the claims would serve to support a finding that habeas relief should be granted.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the trial record and the appellate record regarding Jasper's conviction for felony shoplifting. His trial was conducted in a fair manner, and no errors permeated the proceedings so as to render his trial unfair in a constitutional sense. No habeas relief may be granted under the circumstances of his case.It is therefore the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the Petition of Steve Jasper be dismissed with prejudice and that a Final Judgment in favor of the Respondents be entered.
The parties are hereby notified that failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained within this report and recommendation within ten (10) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 636,Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).