Opinion
C24-5171 RSM
07-30-2024
JARED YOUNG S., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
ORDER AFFIRMING AND DISMISSING THE CASE
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at step two and by rejecting medical opinion evidence. Dkt. 9. As discussed below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's final decision and DISMISSES the case with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is 36 years old, has at least a high school education, and has no past relevant work. Admin. Record (AR) 35. In November 2020, Plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging disability as of January 1, 2003. AR 83, 94. Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on reconsideration. AR 91, 111. The ALJ conducted a hearing in January 2023, where Plaintiff amended his alleged onset date. AR 44-77. In March 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. AR 21-43.
DISCUSSION
The Court may reverse the ALJ's decision only if it is legally erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence of record. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). The Court must examine the record but cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the ALJ's. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the Court must uphold the ALJ's interpretation if rational. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154. Also, the Court “may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012).
1. Step Two
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by declining to find his mental impairments “severe” at step two. Dkt. 9 at 2-3.
At step two of the sequential evaluation, the Commissioner must determine “whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.” See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment or combination of impairments is severe if it significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). An impairment is not severe if it is merely “a slight abnormality (or combination of slight abnormalities) that has no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). Finding a medically determinable impairment nonsevere “requires a careful evaluation of the medical findings which describe the impairment(s) and an informed judgment about its (their) limiting effects on the individual's physical and mental ability(ies) to perform basic work activities.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85-28. The claimant has the burden of showing that he or she has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, and the medically determinable impairment is severe. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987).
Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of anxiety disorder, unspecified personality disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) nonsevere because they cause no more than minimal limitations in Plaintiff's ability to perform basic mental work activities. AR 27. The ALJ explained Plaintiff's symptoms do not impose more than mild limitations in the “paragraph B” functional areas of: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. AR 27-28. The ALJ supported this finding by pointing to records that show Plaintiff's primary concerns were his physical, not mental, impairments. See AR 94-95, 250-57. Plaintiff's function report shows he can drive, shop, and manage his own finances. AR 253. He denied memory issues and indicated no difficulties with understanding and concentrating, stating he can follow instructions “reasonably well.” AR 252, 254-55. Plaintiff also reported spending time with others online and in person a “few times a week.” AR 254-55. When asked about changes in his routines, Plaintiff answered he handles them “well.” AR 256.
The ALJ's assessment falls short of the “careful evaluation of the medical findings” required at this step, given its reliance only on Plaintiff's statements. See SSR 85-28. However, the ALJ's error is harmless. A claimant cannot be prejudiced by failure to consider a particular impairment severe at step two as long as the ALJ finds the claimant has at least one severe impairment, and still addresses the non-severe impairment when considering the claimant's RFC. Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Molina, 674 at 1115). Here, though the ALJ declined to find Plaintiff's mental health impairments nonsevere at step two, the ALJ nonetheless proceeded to consider Plaintiff's mental health symptoms by evaluating the opinions of Dr. Russell, Dr. Boyle, Dr. Harrison, and Dr. Drake during the RFC assessment. AR 34-35.
Plaintiff also appears to argue the ALJ's error at step two impacted the ALJ's RFC assessment. Dkt. 9 at 3. The ALJ's evaluation at step two and the assessment of a claimant's RFC are two separate aspects of the disability evaluation process. The step two inquiry “is not meant to identify the impairments that should be taken into account when determining the RFC.” Buck, 869 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47). At the RFC phase, the ALJ must consider the claimant's limitations from all impairments, including those that are not severe. Id. at 1049. The ALJ also has no obligation to include in a claimant's RFC limitations that are not supported by the record. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174 (9th Cir. 2008); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2001). As stated, in assessing Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's mental health symptoms by evaluating the opinions of Dr. Russell, Dr. Boyle, Dr. Harrison, and Dr. Drake. See AR 34-35. Plaintiff does not meaningfully challenge the ALJ's reasoning in assessing his RFC assessment, therefore the Court will not discuss whether the ALJ properly incorporated mental health limitations in his RFC. Carmickle v. Commissioner, Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)) (noting the court will not consider matters that are not “‘specifically and distinctly'” argued in the plaintiff's opening brief).
2. Dr. Boyle
Under the applicable rules, the ALJ must “articulate how [he] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [he] find[s] all of the medical opinions” by considering their supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c). The ALJ is specifically required to consider the two most important factors, supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). The supportability factor requires the ALJ to consider the relevance of the objective medical evidence and the supporting explanations presented by the medical source to justify their opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). The consistency factor involves consideration of how consistent a medical opinion is with the other record evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2). Further, under the new regulations, “an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor's opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022).
Dr. Boyle completed a psychological disability evaluation of Plaintiff and opined “[t]here is not sufficient evidence that [Plaintiff's] ability to do work-related activities is significantly limited by a mental health issue.” AR 967. She further opined that “[n]o problems were identified with regard to his ability to reason and understand information or engage in basic back-and-forth conversation.” Id. She identified “[n]o major deficits in memory, concentration or persistence.” Id. She proceeded to state, “[a]daptation problems were identified in that his trouble with [rheumatoid arthritis] will likely to continue to make some roles difficult and emotionally overwhelming.” Id. She concluded that if Plaintiff “is unable to return to work at this time, the information gleaned from this evaluation suggests this is primarily due to a medical issue.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The ALJ found Dr. Boyle's opinion partially persuasive, finding it most supported by the physician's examination findings and consistent with Plaintiff's therapy notes. AR 34. However, the ALJ rejected the portion regarding the likelihood of Plaintiff's adaptation difficulties based on the fact that Dr. Boyle is a licensed psychologist who does not specialize in rheumatology. Id. Plaintiff contends the ALJ's partial rejection of Dr. Boyle's opinion was erroneous given the new regulations' emphasis on the supportability and consistency of a medical opinion. Dkt. 9 at 3-4; AR 34.
The factors of “supportability” and “consistency” are “the most important factors” the ALJ must considering when evaluation medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). But the regulations provide the ALJ also may consider other factors, including a medical source's specialization. 20 C.F.R. 416.920c(c)(4). More importantly, in finding Dr. Boyle's opinion partially persuasive, the ALJ did consider its supportability and consistency. See AR 34. The ALJ explained the majority of Dr. Boyle's opinion was supported by Plaintiff's “mostly unremarkable mental exam.” See AR 964-65. The record shows Dr. Boyle found Plaintiff cooperative, pleasant, and a good historian, though he did start crying at one point after being overwhelmed. AR 964. Dr. Boyle found Plaintiff “did not present with overly pessimistic thought content,” his speech reality-based, and his mental activity “organized and goal-directed.” AR 965. The exam shows Plaintiff had a “fair ability for abstract thinking,” and his memory, fund of knowledge, concentration, and insight were all “adequate.” Id. The ALJ also explained Dr. Boyle's opinion was consistent with Plaintiff's therapy notes. AR 34. The record shows Plaintiff consistently improved during his sessions, and Plaintiff himself admitted feeling better or less anxious. See AR 902-943, 1008-88. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show the ALJ's findings were groundless.
In sum, the ALJ was able to articulate how he considered the supportability and consistency factors. The ALJ's reasonings are also supported by substantial evidence, therefore the Court finds no error with the treatment of Dr. Boyle's medical opinion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.