Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-40078-RWZ
July 1, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Petitioner, Raul Jaramillo, pled guilty to Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine and Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846, respectively, in August of 1996. The United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of Florida (the "District Court") accepted the plea and imposed a sentence of 135 months the following October.
Although the Judge informed petitioner of his right to appeal both the conviction and the sentence, petitioner failed to appeal either. He did, however, petition the District Court for collateral relief, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied in December, 1998.
Petitioner now requests relief from this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He identifies the following four grounds in support of his petition: ineffective assistance of counsel, non-compliance with the notification requirements of the Vienna Convention, violations of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and prosecutorial misconduct.
Respondent opposes the petition both on the merits and on the ground that this Court lacks proper jurisdiction to adjudicate petitioner's claims, under section 2241. Because this Court does, indeed, lack jurisdiction, the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.
Although petitioner styles his request as one pursuant to section 2241, that section is inapplicable to the facts stated above. Rather, his petition is a "second or successive" section 2255 petition that challenges the imposition of his sentence.
Section 2255 encompasses claims that "involve the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum allowed by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The purpose of section 2255 is to "provide a method of determining the validity of a judgment by the court which imposed the sentence. . . ." Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 357 n. 15 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Taylor, 347 F.2d 365, 366 (10th Cir. 1965). In contrast, Section 2241 generally challenges the execution of the sentence, such as the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, types of detention and prison conditions. See Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474-75 (2d Cir. 1997) (articulating instances where a federal prisoner may properly file a § 2241 petition); Gonzalez v. United States, 150 F. Supp.2d 236, 240 (D.Mass. 2001). Although this distinction is confusing, given that the text of § 2241(c)(3) permits federal courts to entertain habeas petitions from federal prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," the general rule imposed by courts is that a federal prisoner must use § 2255 to challenge the constitutionality of his or her sentence. See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 373 (2d Cir. 1997). As explained by the Triestman court, § 2255 was enacted in 1948 to channel collateral attacks on sentencing to the sentencing court itself, in order to more efficiently address these issues. Id. In doing so, Congress severely restricted the right of federal prisoners to petition the district court where the petitioner was being held, under the established channels of § 2241(c)(3). See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (section 2255 was intended to provide "a remedy exactly commensurate with that which previously had been available by habeas corpus").
None of petitioner's grounds challenges the manner, location, or conditions of his sentence. Rather, he attacks the validity of his conviction and the imposition of his sentence. As stated above, these challenges must be brought directly to the sentencing court, pursuant to section 2255. Regardless, petitioner argues that the so-called "savings clause" gives this court jurisdiction over his petition.
Pursuant to the "savings clause," contained in § 2255, a federal prisoner can still challenge the validity of his conviction and sentence under § 2241 if the prisoner establishes that the remedy afforded under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1999). The prisoner bears the burden of proving that the remedy under § 2255 is inadequate. Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1999).
The "savings clause" provision of Section 2255 provides, in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to [§ 2255], shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (emphasis added).
It is unclear on what basis petitioner seeks to invoke the Savings Clause. His petition merely states that "[t]he restrictions placed by the Anti-Terrorism Effective Death Penalty Act on the successive filing of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion renders [section 2255] an inappropriate remedy." Nowhere does it explain how the AEDPA has made relief under a "second or successive" section 2255 petition in his case "inadequate or ineffective." That section provides that a prisoner may bring a "second or successive" section 2255 petition in the trial court, but only if the court of appeals in that district certifies, in advance of the filing of the second petition, that it is based either on: (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in the light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. See Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2000) (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2255). It is settled law that the remedy afforded by section 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual is procedurally barred from invoking its protection. United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Rather, the limited purpose of the savings clause allows a petitioner to make a claim based on actual innocence that would otherwise be barred by § 2255. See Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 1999) (analyzing 2d 3rd, and 7th circuit holdings). For example, the savings clause would apply to cases where the petitioner demonstrates that, due to a change in substantive law, he is being imprisoned for a now nonexistent offense. Barrett, 178 F.3d at 51-52. Petitioner presents no such argument here. Because his claim falls outside the "appropriately narrow standards" of the savings clause, Id. at 53, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Judgment may be entered dismissing the petition.