Opinion
5:19-cv-00457-TES-MSH
01-06-2023
TEO A. JAMISON, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff GARY LONG, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 154). For the reasons explained below, it is recommended that Defendants' motion be granted.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The present action arises out of Plaintiff Teo Jamison's former confinement at the Butts County Detention Center (“BCDC”). Pl.'s 3rd Recast Compl. 3, ECF No. 99. Jamison alleges generally that following his arrest on federal drug charges, the United States Marshal's Service (“USMS”) contracted with BCDC to house Jamison, and he was detained there from April 16, 2018, until November 21, 2019. According to Jamison, Defendants-who were in positions of authority at BCDC-denied him use of a medically prescribed cane. As a result, Jamison claims he suffered numerous falls, including one in April 2019 that resulted in a broken finger. After various amendments and screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), only Jamison's deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim related to denial of the cane remains.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on September 28, 2022 (ECF No. 154). The same day, the Clerk notified Jamison of his right to respond to the motion within thirty days. Notice, ECF No. 157. The notice warned Jamison that if he did not respond to the motion, the Court could “accept the factual assertions in the motion as true” and that final judgment could be entered in Defendants' favor without a trial. Id. On November 18, 2022, Jamison requested an extension of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment, contending Defendants had not complied with their discovery obligations. Pl.'s Mot. for Extension, ECF No. 163. Concurrently, Jamison filed a motion to compel (ECF No. 164). The Court denied the motion to compel and motion for extension premised on Defendants' alleged discovery violations. Order 2, Nov. 29, 2022, ECF No. 166. However, the Court noted that Jamison did not receive a copy of the summary judgment motion until the Clerk mailed him a copy on November 14, 2022, due to Jamison's failure to timely notify the Court and parties of his address change. Id. Therefore, the Court granted him until December 19, 2022, to file his response to the summary judgment motion. Id. At the same time, the Court warned Jamison that no further extensions would be granted. Id. Instead of timely responding, Jamison objected to the Court's Order, and his objection was overruled (ECF Nos. 167, 168). Jamison never responded to the summary judgment motion. The motion is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, or that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 324-26. This evidence must consist of more than conclusory allegations. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). In sum, summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
II. Plaintiff's Failure to Respond
Jamison did not respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment or their statement of facts despite the Court's notice of his need to do so. The Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (hereinafter “Local Rules”) provide:
The respondent to a motion for summary judgment shall attach to the response a separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine dispute to be tried. Response shall be made to each of the movant's numbered material facts. All material facts contained in the movant's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. The Court, however, “cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). In considering the merits of a motion for summary judgment-even an unopposed motion-a court must, at least, “review all of the evidentiary materials submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 1101-02. In other words, the court cannot simply accept the facts stated in a moving party's statement of material facts as true, but must also review the movant's citations to the record and confirm that there are no issues of material fact. Id. at 1103 n.6.
Moreover, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to consider the entire record when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); see Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“[T]he court must consider the entire record in the case, not just those pieces of evidence which have been singled out for attention by the parties.”). Here, the Court notes that it has carefully examined the documents filed in this case, including the numerous exhibits Jamison attached to his various pleadings and motions.
III. Factual Background
Jamison testified at his deposition that on March 29, 2018, he was arrested in Georgia for trafficking in cocaine. Pl.'s Dep. 7:13-14, 8:20-21. After initially being detained by state authorities, he was taken into federal custody and placed in BCDC on April 16, 2018, where he remained until November 22, 2019. Id. at 12:23-13:7. As a result of injuries received in a car accident, Jamison alleged he was partially paralyzed on his right side when he was received at BCDC. Id. at 7:9-10. He also had a diagnosis of spinal stenosis and history of bilateral lateral meniscus tears in his knees. Id. at 7:6-7; Pl.'s Mot. to Am. Attach. 3, at 10, ECF No. 63-3. He underwent surgery on his left knee on March 9, 2018. Pl.'s Mot. to Am. Attach. 3, at 11-13. Jamison testified that as a result of his medical condition, he is physically disabled and required use of a cane since 2016. Pl.'s Dep. 7:6-18.
According to Jamison, he had his cane on the bus transporting him to BCDC. Id. at 13:23-24. When he arrived, however, he was not given his cane or any of his other property. Id. at 13:24-14:1. During intake, Jamison informed jailers that he needed his cane and to be housed in the lower level with a bottom bunk. Id. at 14:1-5. The jailer told Jamison they never received his cane and he needed to speak with the medical unit. Id. at 16:23-25. Jamison then spoke with someone from the medical unit, who told him they needed to obtain his medical records. Id. at 17:1-3. According to medical screening records, Jamison reported his spine and knee issues. Pl.'s Attach. 6, at 2, ECF No. 99-6. The records also reflect his report of needing a cane-which he did not have with him- and partial paralysis on his right side. Pl.'s Attach. 7, ECF No. 99-7. Jamison asked his wife to bring a cane to the jail and also to help BCDC obtain his medical records, both of which she did. Pl.'s Dep. 17:3-8. According to Jamison, when the medical unit eventually received his medical records, “Nurse Nancy” with Southern Correctional Medicine- which provided medical care for BCDC inmates-approved his use of a cane along with a lower level and bottom bunk profile. Pl.'s Dep. 16:11-18, 17:8-11, 18:13-16. A clinic note and provider order from October 29, 2018, includes an entry from a nurse practitioner stating, “OK to use home cane[.]” Pl.'s Attach. 14, at 1, 3, ECF No. 99-14. In the “plan” section of a physical examination from April 30, 2019, an unidentified medical provider listed “needs cane.” Pl.'s Attach. 19, at 1. Near the end of Jamison's incarceration at BCDC on November 7, 2019, a provider ordered that he be housed in the medical unit and he was to use a cane when ambulating. Pl.'s Attach. 26, at 1, ECF No. 99-26. This was in response to a fall one week earlier. Id.
Jamison testified that, despite approval for use of a cane and a medical profile for lower level housing and a bottom bunk, Defendants refused to let him have a cane or accommodate his housing needs despite his multiple discussions and correspondence with them. Pl.'s Dep. 18:18-22:19, 34:3-17, 35:20-25, 63:23-64:21. He stated he never received a cane or other walking aid during his time at BCDC. Id. at 20:25-22:2. He also described spending the majority of his time in the upper level of the jail-which required his use of stairs-though he was able to switch with another inmate for a lower level cell before being told to return to his assigned cell. Id. at 25:6-7, 30:3-15. He was always able to convince his cellmates to allow him the lower bunk. Id. at 24:21-24.
Jamison testified that he needed a cane to walk while at BCDC. Id. at 13:16, 14:1112. Because he did not have a cane, Jamison stated that he “fell a lot” while attempting ambulate or climb stairs. Id. at 26:22-23, 31:1-5, 32:10-11, 17-19. Jamison is currently in federal prison, where he is allowed a cane at all times, though he admitted he still falls even with a cane. Pl.'s Dep. 31:12-13, 40:20-23. He stated that he fell “a little bit more often” at BCDC, however, because he did not have a cane. Id. at 31:24-32:2. Jamison testified that he fell once or twice a week and had five to six “full on” falls at BCDC where he suffered bruising or hit his head and went to the medical unit. Id. at 33:4-21. He still has a couple of scars on his elbow and knees from those falls. Id. at 58:19-59:1. Jamison said the most significant fall was in April 2019 when he fell and broke his finger, which he still cannot move. Id. at 30:22-25, 59:3-4.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants have submitted the declaration of Defendant Antonio Lee. Lee states he was the assistant jail administrator and then jail administrator at BCDC in 2018 and 2019. Lee Decl. §§ 3-4, ECF No. 154-1. According to Lee, jail staff “consulted with the medical staff” about whether Jamison's use of a cane was “medically necessary.” Id. § 6. Lee avers that “[t]he medical staff consistently indicated that a cane was not medically necessary for Mr. Jamison.” Id. In support of this assertion, Defendants have submitted a medical note and provider order from September 18, 2019, stating Jamison's use of a cane was not “medically necessary.” Defs' Attach. 2, at 2-3, ECF No. 154-2. The note states that the “[inmate] has been incarcerated for over a year-no documented provider visits for falls/trouble ambulating. [Inmate] has spinal stenosis but able to ambulate.” Id. at 3. Lee states that jail staff prohibited Jamison's use of a cane because of the security risk it posed, noting it could be used as a weapon either by Jamison or by another inmate who could take it from him. Id. § 7. Lee further states, however, that “[i]f the medical staff had indicated that the cane was a medical necessity for Mr. Jamison, the jail administration would have had to consider how to accommodate Mr. Jamison while maintaining security and limiting risk.” Id. § 8.
IV. Analysis
Defendants argue three grounds for summary judgment. First, they argue Plaintiff cannot show they were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 4-8, ECF No. 154-4. Second, they argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 8-9. Third, they contend Plaintiff's damages claim fails for lack of substantial physical injury. Id. at 9-11. Because the Court agrees that Jamison cannot show Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court recommends summary judgment be granted and does not address Defendants' third ground.
A. Deliberate Indifference
“The [E]ighth [A]mendment, which applies to the states through the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment .... [S]tates violate the [E]ighth [A]mendment if they are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs.” Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). “To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.” Hoffer v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). “To meet the first prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate an objectively serious medical need-i.e., one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention, and, in either instance, one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “To satisfy the second, subjective prong, the plaintiff must prove that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff “must prove: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence. Summary judgment will be granted in favor of a defendant unless the plaintiff presents evidence of each of these elements.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
Defendants argue Jamison cannot show that he had a serious medical need, citing the medical staff's “opin[ion] that a cane was not medically necessary.” Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 6-7. The Court, however, will accept that Jamison had a serious medical need in the sense that he was recovering from knee surgery and had been diagnosed with spinal stenosis and other underlying conditions mandating medical treatment. It is also reasonable to accept Jamison's contention that a doctor prescribed his use of a cane prior to his arrest in April 2018. The provision of a cane as an aid to activities of daily living in the non-jail context, however, does not necessarily entail that refusal to allow it in a jail constitutes deliberate indifference. Here, although there is evidence that a cane would be helpful to Jamison, the evidence does not show Defendants subjectively knew of, or disregarded, a risk of serious harm from him not having one.
Lee avers that jail staff consistently consulted with medical staff regarding Jamison's need for a cane, and Jamison presents no evidence to dispute this. Further, such communication is consistent with grievance responses documenting contact with the medical staff about the cane. Pl.'s Attach. 28, at 4-5, ECF No. 99-28. For most of Jamison's incarceration at BCDC, the references in Jamison's medical records to his use of a cane were termed more the vein of permissive rather than imperative. The nurse practitioner's note and order from October 29, 2018, only states that it was “ok” for Jamison to use a cane, not that it was essential. Pl.'s Attach. 14, at 1, 3. Further, while the April 30, 2019, examination note listed “needs cane” in the plan section, that entry, appears to be in response to Jamison's complaint of not being given a “previously ordered” cane. Pl.'s Attach. 19, at 1.
At the same time, the medical records throughout most of Jamison's incarceration, including those just cited, refer to him being ambulatory and with a steady gait. Pl.'s Attach. 14, at 1-2; Pl.'s Attach. 15, ECF No. 99-15; Pl.'s Attach. 24, at 1, ECF No. 99-24. This is also consistent with the jail's response to one of Jamison's grievances, wherein it was observed that he “did not have a walking device the entire time he was in block A, and there is no need for a walking device in the block he is in now.” Pl.'s Attach. 28, at 4. Moreover, a medical record from September 18, 2019, specifically stated that Jamison did not need a cane. Defs' Attach. 2, at 3; Pl.'s Attach. 25, at 2, ECF No. 99-25. It also refers to Jamison being able to ambulate despite having spinal stenosis. Id. While this record was from relatively late in his BCDC detention, Jamison did not testify that his ability to ambulate at this time differed from earlier in his incarceration. The first record wherein a provider clearly prescribed use of a cane was on November 7, 2019, two weeks before Jamison left BCDC. Pl.'s Attach. 26, at 1. Even then, the provider observed Jamison to have a steady gait despite Jamison's contention otherwise. Id.; Pl.'s Attach. 27, at 3, ECF No. 99-27.
Additionally, while Jamison testified to having several falls at BCDC, including five to six heavy falls where he went to the medical unit, he has not produced medical records to back this up. Jamison claims to have broken his finger as a result of a fall in April 2019. Pl.'s Dep. 41:2-43:7. According to the jail medical records, though, he attributed the broken finger to a fight with another inmate. Pl.'s Attach. 18, at 2, ECF No. 99-18; Pl.'s Attach. 19, at 1. In his deposition, Jamison suggested the medical and jail staff intentionally misrepresented the cause of his injury, but Jamison presents no evidence to corroborate this and does not explain why he also reported to an outside medical provider that he broke his finger in a fight.Pl.'s Dep. 42:2-43:8; Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Attach. 3, at 8, ECF No. 63-3; see Whitehead v. Burnside, 403 Fed.Appx. 401, 403 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Self-serving statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records.”).
Ultimately, the issue is not whether Jamison broke his finger in a fight or fall, but whether the April 2019 incident would have given Defendants subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm due to lack of a cane. The lack of documentation linking the broken finger to lack of a cane demonstrates it would not have. The Court further notes that Jamison's involvement in a fight would seemingly justify Defendants' refusal to allow him a cane.
The lack of medical visits for falls was noted in Jamison's September 18, 2019, visit.Pl.'s Attach. 25, at 2. The first record of Jamison reporting a fall due to lack of a cane was on October 7, 2019, when he reported falling six days earlier while getting out of bed, resulting only in a “scrape” to his right knuckle. Pl.'s Attach. 26, at 5-6. Then, on November 7, 2019, two weeks before he left BCDC and only five days before he filed his original complaint, he reported another fall that occurred one week earlier. Pl.'s Attach. 26, at 1; Pl.'s Attach. 27, at 3; Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. The only injury mentioned by Jamison was pain in his previously-injured finger, though even that appeared unrelated to the fall. Pl.'s Attach. 26, at 1; Pl.'s Attach. 27, at 3. Thus, whatever complaints Jamison made to Defendants about the need for a cane, the documented evidence available to medical and jail staff was that Jamison's lack of a cane did not pose a risk of serious harm.Perhaps it was negligent for staff to not perceive a danger, but mere negligence is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.
On June 19, 2019, Jamison reported falling out of his seat when a transport van applied brakes suddenly. Pl.'s Attach. 24, at 1.
In his deposition and pleadings, Jamison raised the issue of Defendants not providing him with lower level housing or other accommodation such as a walker or wheelchair in lieu of not providing a cane. Pl.'s Dep. 21:23-22:2, 24:14, 25:1-7, 51:12-16; Pl.'s 3rd Recast Compl. 9-10. However, all of Jamison's grievances and medical requests submitted to the Court consistently show his demand to Defendants was for a cane-not that he be provided with an alternative assistive device or moved to a lower tier at the jail. See generally, Pl.'s Attachs. 2-28.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with Defendants that, in conducting the deliberate indifference analysis, the assistance the cane provides to the inmate needs to be weighed against the genuine security concern of allowing such a potentially dangerous object in a confined, jail environment. See Rodriguez v. Asencio, No. 3:17cv155-RV-HTC, 2020 WL 5371517, at *9-10 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2020) (recommending summary judgment on claim alleging deliberate indifference for prison's denial of a cane or rolling walker where the inmate was observed ambulating with a normal gait, prison staff had legitimate security concerns, and the inmate's condition was otherwise treated), recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 5370548 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2020); see also Rix v. McClure, No. lO-cv-1224-CM, 2012 WL 1183435, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 9, 2012) (granting summary judgment on ADA claim, finding “Defendant's concern that plaintiff could use his cane as a weapon is legitimate and non-discriminatory”). Here, the medical records show that Defendants and medical staff did not ignore Jamison's underlying conditions, but treated them with pain medication and other measures, including a special mattress and soft-shoe profile. Pl.'s Attach. 13. Thus, the Court concludes that Jamison has failed to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendants' alleged deliberate indifference.
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also contend they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 8-9. The Court agrees. “[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 904 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant seeking qualified immunity must show that, at the time of the alleged wrongful acts, “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Id. at 905. Once this is established, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Id. To do so, a plaintiff must “demonstrate: first, that the facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a constitutional violation; and, second, that the illegality of the officer's actions was clearly established at the time of the incident.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is undisputed that Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority. Therefore, the burden shifts to Jamison to show that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate. The Court has already concluded that Jamison cannot establish a constitutional violation. Even if it did not, though, the Court still concludes Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the illegality of their conduct was not clearly established at the time of the incident. “Under the clearly established prong, the dispositive question is whether the law at the time of the challenged conduct gave the government official fair warning that his conduct was unconstitutional.” Wade v. United States, 13 F.4th 1217, 1225 (11th Cir. 2021). A plaintiff can show this in three ways:
First, a plaintiff can point to a materially similar case that has already been decided. The case need not be directly on point, but the existing precedent must have placed the constitutional question beyond debate. Additionally, because judicial precedents are tied to particularized facts, minor variations between cases may prove critical[.] Second, a plaintiff can point to a broader, clearly established principle that should control the novel facts of the situation. But a broader principle must establish with obvious clarity that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness of the official's conduct is apparent. And third, a plaintiff can show that the conduct involved in the case may so obviously violate the Constitution that prior case law is unnecessary. This narrow category encompasses those situations where the official's conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the relevant constitutional provision prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of case law.Id. at 1226 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court can find no binding precedent addressing denial of a cane in a jail to satisfy the first method. This is significant because “[if]if case law, in factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 180 n.10 (11th Cir. 2002). The Eleventh Circuit has noted that cases falling under the latter two methods-“known as the ‘obvious clarity cases'”-are a “narrow exception” that “are rare and don't arise often.” King v. Pridmore, 961 F.3d 1135, 1146 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
Defendants raised qualified immunity in their motions to dismiss, but the Court concluded there was insufficient information to allow it to determine whether Defendants' conduct would fall into the broader-principle category. Jamison v. Long, No. 5:19-cv-457-TES-MSH, 2022 WL 2132699, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 11, 2022), recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 2132699 (M.D. Ga. May 10, 2022). The Court noted the broad principle that “[t]he knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to provide that care has consistently been held to surpass negligence and constitute deliberate indifference.” Id. (quoting Patel v. Lanier Cnty., Ga., 969 F.3d 1173, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020)). With the benefit of a complete record, the Court now concludes that the broader-principle category and obvious clarity cases are inapplicable. Here, while the Defendants had fair warning that denial of medically prescribed cane could constitute unconstitutional conduct, they did not have fair warning that the provision of such cane would necessarily override valid security concerns over the possession of such object in the confined space of a jail. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 154) be granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.