Opinion
CV420-184
11-14-2022
CALVIN JAMES, Plaintiff, v. U.S. MARSHALS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT for GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION, U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION BOARD OF DIRECTORS Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit while housed at the Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida. See doc. 1 at 5. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but he has failed to complete the process for qualifying as IFP. See doc. 6; see also doc. 7 (ordering Plaintiff to Amend his Complaint and file IFP forms). Plaintiff is well known to this Court and has filed numerous frivolous cases, often doing what he has done here: failing to return IFP forms or pay his filing fees in violation of court order despite being repeatedly warned of the repercussions for failure to comply. See James v. Chatham County Superior Court, CV420-169, doc. 4 at 5-6 (describing Plaintiff's repeated failure to comply with Court orders and willingness to abuse the courts after filing at least twenty-four cases and not complying with IFP procedures in those cases), adopted doc. 7 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2020); see also James v. City of Savannah, CV421-296, doc. 5 (S.D. Ga. June 21, 2022) (noting Plaintiff's Complaint was subject to dismissal for his failure to pay the filing fee or otherwise respond to the Clerk's deficiency notice); James v. Chatham County Jail, CV421-284, doc. 5 (S.D. Ga. June 21, 2022) (dismissing James' Complaint); James v. United States District Court, CV419-031, doc. 14 (S.D. Ga. May 6, 2019) (dismissing James' case because he has “continually refused to supply this Court with the information it needs to assess an appropriate initial filing fee and has never provided this Court with a certified copy of his trust fund account statement.”); James v. U.S. Marshals, CV419-287, doc. 21 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2021) (appeal rejected for failure to file consent form); James v. Christine, CV418-293, doc. 6 (S.D. Ga. March 4, 2019) (dismissing Complaint for failure to comply with a Court order); James v. Christine, CV418-306, doc. 6 (S.D. Ga. May 17, 2019) (dismissing Complaint for failure to comply with a Court order); James v. Gammon, CV418-307, doc. 7 (S.D. Ga. May 31, 2019) (dismissing Complaint for failure to comply with a Court order, while noting James' “clear intent not to appropriately litigate his case.”). Moreover, even though Plaintiff has been able to avoid many merits-based dismissals due to his noncompliance with the rules requiring payment of fees, he has, by date of this order, accumulated three strikes and will be limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) from filing frivolous claims in the future. See James v. Moore, CV421-327, doc. 4 (S.D. Ga. July 13, 2022).
The present case predates the three strikes determination and the filing restriction order. Thus, the below holding does not rely upon this rationale for dismissal.
Plaintiff filed this Complaint on August 11, 2020, doc. 1, and was notified by the Clerk that same day that his filing was deficient because he “sent neither a filing fee nor a completed ‘Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.'” Doc. 2. In response to the deficiency notice, he filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis on September 22, 2020. Doc. 6. He was thereafter ordered to amend his Complaint and to file an amended motion to proceed IFP, but he never responded to the Order and never paid his fees. Doc. 7 at 2; see generally docket.
As Plaintiff is aware, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (PLRA), all prisoners, even those who are allowed to proceed IFP, must pay the full filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); see Brooks v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis Cnty., 129 F.3d 121 (Table) (8th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has also been informed that proceeding IFP is a privilege, not an entitlement. See James v. United States District Court, CV419-031, doc. 8 at 2 n. 1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2019) (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 198 (1993)). Courts have discretion to afford litigants IFP status; it is not automatic. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (courts “may authorize the commencement” of IFP actions).
Nevertheless, although payment or a request to proceed in forma pauperis is mandatory, a party's failure to comply does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. See White v. Lemma, 947 F.3d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]lthough a non-IFP prisoner must pay the filing fee or face dismissal, [cit.], our precedent also holds that the timely payment of a filing fee is not a jurisdictional requisite.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Thus, as the Court is not deprived of jurisdiction on account of Plaintiff's disregard of the PLRA and related filing fee requirement, it will proceed to review Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). A pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), but the Court may dismiss the Complaint or any portion thereof if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was indicted by the U.S. Marshals on September 10, 2018, but during his first appearance in the U.S. District Court, he was not advised of the probable cause for his arrest or his right to a pre-indictment/preliminary hearing. Doc. 1 at 3. He states he was then placed in the custody of the U.S. Marshals and transferred from Chatham County Jail to a federal holding facility. Id. He was not advised of or provided with a jurisdictional statement to be placed in the custody of the U.S. Marshals. Id. During his trial, he was not provided with the probable cause statement even though it was promised to him by the presiding district judge. Id. He has requested $400,000,000 in relief.
Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's prior Order mandates dismissal of this claim. This Court may dismiss an action for want of prosecution when a party has “willful[ly] disobe[yed] . . . any order of the Court” or for “[a]ny other failure to prosecute a civil action with reasonable promptness.” S.D. Ga. L.R. 41.1(b), (c); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (mandating involuntary dismissal of a complaint either for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with an order of the court). Additionally, a district court retains the inherent power to police its docket and to enforce its orders. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-op, 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983); Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep't, 2006 WL 3307444, *1 (11th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff's deficient claims provide yet another reason for dismissal. James makes claims against two federal entities and the “U.S. District Court of Georgia Savannah Division Board of Directors.” Doc. 1. The Marshals represent an agency of the federal government, and the District Court constitutes a branch of the federal government itself. Neither are subject to suit in this instance. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 474 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”); see also Newsome v. E.E.O.C., 301 F.3d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the United States and its officials are entitled to sovereign immunity for civil rights claims because the United States has not consented to suit). Given the disposition of many of Plaintiff's other duplicative cases, he is well aware of this immunity. See e.g., James v. U.S. Marshals, CV420-093 (“Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against the United States Marshals Service fail.”); James v. City of Savannah, CV421-296, 2022 WL 2210066, at *2 (S.D. Ga. June 21, 2022) (“The United States District Court is not an entity subject to suit under any statute relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint.”). Additionally, there is no board of directors for the U.S. District Court; rather, district judges are appointed by the President of the United States and operate under the authority provided in Article III of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III. Thus, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he has not named a suable defendant.
Even if Plaintiff had named suable individuals as is proper under Bivens, his conclusory and deficient allegations that he was unlawfully arrested and prosecuted fail. Specifically, although he protests that he was not given certain notices or advisements, he does not support these allegations with any authority or factual context indicating they are required. See generally doc. 1. He merely provides a cursory description of his arrest and subsequent detention in a matter duplicitous of his other cases while failing to comply with Court order. Thus, any amendment of his Complaint would be futile, and his claim should be dismissed. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (A district court need not grant leave to amend where even “a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a claim.”); Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.”).
Because Plaintiff makes claims against federal actors, his claim is properly analyzed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), not Section 1983.
In other cases based on the same proceedings described in the present suit, Plaintiff stresses that he was maliciously prosecuted based upon evidence found after an illegal search and seizure. See CV420-111, doc. 1 (S.D. Ga. May 18, 2020). To the extent Plaintiff reiterates this claim without articulating it as such, it is meritless. See Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, does not apply in the context of arrestee's malicious prosecution claim and that evidence obtained in illegal search could prove that warrants were supported by probable cause in civil suit).
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's action should be DISMISSED in its entirety. His Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, doc. 6, is DENIED because he failed to comply with Court Order. See doc. 7 at 2. Plaintiff's failure to pay his filing fees is not excused by the immediate dismissal of this claim. The entire filing fee must be paid even if the suit is dismissed at the outset because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief or for failure to comply with court order. In this case, like others before it, Plaintiff never returned his IFP forms and has again disappeared from the docket. Considering Plaintiff's repeated failure to comply with Court order and his prior vexatious and abusive filing activity, the Court construes his noncompliance and defiant filings in this respect with an intention to proceed upon his frivolous claims without concern for the cost associated therewith. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596 (1998) (“Congress enacted the PLRA to discourage prisoners from filing baseless lawsuits” by, for example, requiring all inmates to pay filing fees.).
James v. Chatham County Superior Court, CV420-169, doc. 4 at 6, adopted doc. 7 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2020).
“To allow prisoners to file complaint after complaint, wait until a magistrate judge has invested valuable time assessing the complaint and outlining its merits or deficiencies, and then [voluntarily] dismiss only those complaints a magistrate judge has found wanting . . . would frustrate Congressional intent in enacting the PLRA, for it would allow prisoners to bombard the courts with frivolous or legally insufficient complaints and avoid receiving a strike for their conduct.” Stone v. Smith, 2009 WL 368620, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2009). Although Plaintiff has not filed a voluntary dismissal here, it is apparent that abandonment is Plaintiff's clear intent, based upon his failure to respond to the Court's Order or otherwise pursue his claims. Additionally, by filing repetitive litigation, he has abused the judicial process even while avoiding obtaining strikes, which has frustrated the purpose of the PLRA. See Traylor v. City of Atlanta, 805 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1986). Given this behavior, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to pay the required filing fee in this case. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (“Reimposing financial considerations in the form of filing fees on indigent litigants is one way the courts can fulfill their ‘constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.'”). To that end, the custodian of the Coleman Federal Correctional Complex shall set aside 20 percent of all future deposits to Plaintiff's account, then forward those funds to the Clerk each time the set aside amount reaches $10, until the balance of the Court's $350 filing fee has been paid in full.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send this Order to plaintiff's account custodian immediately, as this payment directive is non-dispositive within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), so no Rule 72(b) adoption is required. In the event plaintiff is transferred to another institution, his present custodian shall forward a copy of this Order and all financial information concerning payment of the filing fee and costs in this case to plaintiff's new custodian. The balance due from plaintiff shall be collected by the custodian at his next institution in accordance with the terms of the payment directive portion of this Order.
This Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the district court judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any party may file written objections to this R&R with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations.” Any request for additional time to file objections should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the assigned district judge.
After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The district judge will review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonette v. V.A. Leasing Corp., 648 Fed.Appx. 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 Fed.Appx. 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED