Opinion
CA 3:98-CV-0436-R.
May 22, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Irma Jean James ("James") and Terri Lary ("Lary") assert claims against Defendant City of Dallas ("the City") and HUD for: (1) violation of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unreasonable seizure; (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Now before this Court is Defendant City of Dallas's Motion to Dismiss, filed November 22, 2000. The Defendant alleges (1) Plaintiffs lack standing to assert race discrimination allegations; (2) the complaint does not support a claim for injunctive relief; (3) Plaintiffs are precluded from asserting claims that could have been asserted in an administrative proceeding; and (4) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated below, the City of Dallas's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff Irma Jean James ("James") is an African-American woman who owns real property in the City of Dallas at 2404 Alabama Ave., Dallas, TX. 75216. Plaintiff Terri Lary ("Lary") is also an African-American woman who owns real property at 3902 Coolidge Street, Dallas, TX. 75215. Both of these addresses are located in predominantly African-American neighborhoods. The property owned by James was demolished by the City without notice or an opportunity for hearing on the proposed demolition. The property owned by Lary was demolished before notice or opportunity for Ms. Lary to prove she had made the requisite repairs required by the City. The City demolished the homes of James and Lary and seized their contents without obtaining either a warrant or other judicial order authorizing the seizure. The City further assessed James and Lary the costs of the demolition and placed a lien on the property for the demolition costs, fees, and accruing interest.Plaintiffs James and Lary are members of the Rule 23(b)(3) certified classes including Due Process Class and Race Discrimination Class, which were certified by the Northern District of Texas on August 18, 2000. Plaintiffs assert that the City is engaged in and has engaged in a pattern and practice of racially discriminatory demolitions of single family homes by disproportionately imposing and enforcing demolitions orders against homes in African-American neighborhoods. The demolition orders are a sanction imposed by the City's Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board ("USRB"). The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") allegedly proposed and the City allegedly accepted and used a racial stereotype that African-American occupied housing and neighborhoods were inferior to white occupied housing and neighborhoods. The implementation of these practices has allegedly resulted in a disproportionate number of single family unit demolitions in predominantly A African-American neighborhoods.
The City seized members of the Due Process Class's homes by entering the property, demolishing the structures, and disposing of the resulting debris and personal property on the premises. The City subsequently assessed the costs of the demolition to the property owners and imposed a lien on the property for the costs and fees of the demolition. These actions by the City were allegedly taken without providing Plaintiffs notice of the proposed action or the opportunity for a fair hearing on the issues of whether the house should be demolished, or notice that the City intended to impose a lien on the property for the demolition related costs. Plaintiffs also assert that the City seized the Due Process Class members' property without obtaining a warrant or judicial order.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review on a Motion to Dismiss
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the pleading party. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). The complaint will only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the pleading party can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. See Campbell, 43 F.3d at 975; Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). The relevant question is not whether the pleading party will prevail, but whether it is entitled to offer evidence to support its claims.See Cross Timbers Concerned Citizens v. Saginaw, 991 F. Supp. 563, 571 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
B. Standing
The federal district court's adjudicatory power vests upon its determination that the matter before it is an actual "case or controversy" as referred to in Article III of the United States Constitution. Although several elements define whether or not a matter is an actual case or controversy, "the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). According to the Supreme Court, three elements make up the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing." Id. "First, the plaintiff must have suffered an `injury in fact' — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is a) concrete and particularized, and b) `actual or imminent, not `conjectural or hypothetical.'"Id. (citations omitted). "Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be `fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.'"Id (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). "Third, it must be `likely' as opposed to merely `speculative' that the injury will be `redressed by a favorable decision." Id. (citations omitted.)
The Defendant has raised its standing argument within the context of a motion to dismiss. "At the pleadings stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we `presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Id. at 561 (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 883-889 (1990)).
In its motion, the City asserts that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert race discrimination allegations because the property owners whose property was demolished in these neighborhoods could "just as easily be white." However, this argument ignores the basic requirements of standing required at the pleading stage, as explained by the Supreme Court. All the Plaintiffs must do to meet the standing requirements at this stage is make "general allegations" that support the three threshold issues of standing: injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. Id.
The Plaintiffs asserted in the Third Amended Complaint that the neighborhood where the Plaintiffs' properties are located is a predominantly African-American community. The Plaintiffs have further asserted that the USRB has adopted a discriminatory policy of demolishing a disproportionate number of homes in African-American neighborhoods and census tracts. Moreover, the Plaintiffs themselves were allegedly harmed when their homes were destroyed without due process of law, and they were subsequently charged and continue to be charged for the City's demolition expenses. To establish standing, the Plaintiffs do not have to do more than assert these claims and alert the Court that evidence supporting these claims exists. "When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent that must be averred . . . in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction had caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing the action will redress it." Id. at 561-562. Neither the City's brief, nor the cases cited within it raise a scintilla of doubt as to the appropriateness of the Plaintiffs' standing in this action.
C. Injunctive Relief
The City also alleges that the Third Amended Complaint does not assert an adequate claim for injunctive relief. This argument also fails. To survive a motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs need not provide evidence that meets all the elements required for an injunction to issue. Instead, the Plaintiffs must merely state a cause of action by which an injunction is a sound judicial remedy. As the Plaintiffs have alleged continuing harms in the form of continuing demolition debt charged to the Plaintiffs, liens on their properties, and continuous deleterious effects of racial discrimination on the property values in their neighborhoods, an injunction is a colorable method of relief in this case.
The Plaintiffs have cited cases in their brief that indicate injunctive relief is often an appropriate remedy in discrimination cases with ongoing harms as a result of the discrimination. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envir. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184-91 (2000);Brown v. Bd. of Education., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). Furthermore, the Plaintiffs do not have to assert and prove each element necessary for a permanent injunction in their pleadings in order for a request for injunctive relief to survive a motion to dismiss. Rather, Plaintiffs only have to plead that they are seeking an equitable remedy, which they have done, rather than monetary compensable damages. The cases cited by the Defendant discuss actions dismissed at the summary judgment stage of a proceeding, a more stringent standard of specific evidentiary review that is inapplicable here.
The City's argument that the Plaintiffs seek overbroad injunctive relief also fails because it is premature. To deny a motion to dismiss, the Court need not consider the merits of the Plaintiffs claim beyond an examination of whether or not a proper cause of action is stated. As such, the City's motion to dismiss for failure to make a claim supported by injunctive relief is denied on all grounds.
D. Claim Preclusion of Administrative Proceedings
The City next asserts that Plaintiffs cannot avail themselves to this Court before asserting these claims in an administrative proceeding. This assertion is flawed for several reasons. First, the City fails to distinguish between the two certified classes: Due Process class and Discrimination class. The USRB has no authority to hear or adjudicate claims of discrimination. However, even if the City had properly limited this assertion to the Due Process class, the argument still fails.
The 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act allow parties to choose whether to bring their cause of action in federal court or to an administrative proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 3601-19 (2000). For an administrative proceeding to preclude the Plaintiffs from suing in federal court they must have chosen to avail themselves to an administrative arena. See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986). Next, the administrative proceeding must have engaged in fact finding and come to a final decision. Id. No such process occurred here. There is no proof offered by the City that the USRB ever acted in a judicial capacity on the Plaintiffs' claims. Nor does the City offer proof that there was any type of fact-finding or final decision by the USRB that serves as an adjudication on said claims. Yet, the City refers the Court to University of Tennessee v. Elliott, which reiterates that preclusive effect is given to administrative proceedings only when the administrative body has acted in a "judicial capacity" by resolving disputed issues of fact properly, thus allowing the parties an adequate opportunity to litigate. See id. As such, the Elliot analysis is not appropriate here.
In contrast, the Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that they were not adequately heard in any forum. The Due Process class is suing because they were denied notice of the demolitions, and thus, were unaware that any potential USRB administrative proceeding was necessary. The City cannot cogently argue that the Plaintiffs are precluded from suing in federal court because they did not go through an administrative proceeding when an essential part of the Plaintiffs' claim is the denial of due process of law which would have alerted them to seek such a proceeding. As such, the City's motion to dismiss all claims that could have been brought to the administrative forum of the USRB is denied.
E. Statute of Limitations
This Court has previously denied the City's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim on statute of limitations grounds in a hearing on October 7, 1999. This is the law of the case, and the end of the issue. The Court therefore denies City's motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations.
F. Due Process Class and Freeman v. City of Dallas.
The City has supplemented its original brief in support of the motion to dismiss with the Fifth Circuit's recent holding inFreeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). However, that decision does not vitiate the Plaintiffs' Due Process claim. While Freeman did have a similar Due Process claim as the present case, the facts in this case are distinguishable from Freeman. First, the Certified Due Process class in this case is defined as:
"A Rule 23(b)(2) class composed of all property owners who had a repairable single family structure demolished by the City of Dallas' Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board ("USRB"): (i) and the City demolished the structure without providing the property owner notice of the opportunity to contest the proposed demolition at a hearing prior to the issuance for the order causing the demolition and (ii) whose structure was demolished without a warrant. This class includes those owners whose structures were demolished pursuant to a default demolition order." Memorandum Order, April 11, 2000.
The instant case, as explained by this class certification, is distinguishable from Freeman because (1) the structures at issue are "repairable single family structures" and (2) the City demolished the structures without providing the proper notice of a hearing regarding the demolition. In Freeman, the plaintiff did receive notice of the administrative hearing, and attended two separate administrative hearings. Id. at 645-47. In contrast, several of the Plaintiffs in the present case never even received notice of the hearing concerning the property or had the opportunity to be heard before the USRB prior to the demolition order. In addition, the structures in question inFreeman were apartment buildings, and the structures in the present case are single family homes. Id. at 645.
Moreover, the Due Process claim in the present case is different from the one in Freeman. The issue in Freeman was whether a warrant was necessary. Id. at 647-48. Here, Plaintiffs claim that due process violations occurred in the failure to give notice of the hearing and the seizure of the property without a warrant. The lack of notice precedes the issue of whether a warrant was necessary to demolish the Plaintiffs' homes. Thus, even if the demolition of a single family structure does not require a warrant, that does not affect the present Due Process Class. The major factor in determining the members of this class is whether or not they were denied due process because their homes were demolished before they received proper notice of an administrative hearing. Freeman does not destroy the claim of Plaintiffs in the Due Process Class because they were not given notice of USRB hearings. The City's motion to dismiss the claims of all members of the Due Process Class is therefore denied.
Some of the structures that were demolished were done so pursuant to a "default demolition order."
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant City of Dallas's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in its entirety.
It is so ORDERED.