Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9818.
August 20, 2008.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Peter A. Michalski, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-06-84 DL.
J. Stefan Otterson, Otterson Law Office, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Terisia K. Chleborad, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
A jury found that J.A.M., a minor, sexually penetrated N.A. while knowing that she was incapacitated or that she was unaware that she was engaging in sexual intercourse. This conduct would constitute second-degree sexual assault if J.A.M. were an adult. J.A.M. contends that the superior court admitted evidence in violation of the corpus delicti rule. He also argues that the jury's verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence.
AS 11.41.420(a)(3).
We conclude that, even if the State was required to satisfy the corpus delicti rule before admitting J.A.M.'s admissions, the rule was satisfied. We also conclude that sufficient evidence was admitted to permit a reasonable juror to find that the State had proven the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm the superior court.
Facts and proceedings
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on April 1, 2006, N.A. started drinking with J.A.M., Rateef Morris, Marty Blevins, and Kevin Fowler at Morris's residence. They shared a bottle of brandy, and N.A. drank about one-fourth of the bottle. She also smoked marijuana.
N.A. and J.A.M. were not in a relationship, but they had engaged in consensual sex with one another on three prior occasions. At approximately 1:00 a.m., Fowler and Blevins left Morris's residence. N.A. appeared to be "pretty intoxicated," at a level of about seven out of ten.
N.A. did not remember Blevins and Fowler leaving. The last thing she remembered before waking up in the hospital was talking to her cousin on her cell phone. Before Blevins and Fowler left, there was no sexual contact between N.A. and J.A.M. in Morris's residence.
At approximately 4:00 a.m. April 2, 2006, the police found N.A. lying in the snow in an alley, partially nude, and unresponsive. Her personal items were strewn about her in the snow. It appeared to the police that N.A. had been "dumped" there.
Officer Michael Wise suspected that N.A. had been sexually assaulted. Wise guessed that N.A. had been lying in the snow for at least five to ten minutes before the police discovered her because her personal items and nearby tire tracks were covered with snow.
Paramedics were unable to awaken N.A., and she was taken to a nearby hospital where she awoke about 10:00 a.m. N.A. stated that she had no memory of what happened except that she had been drinking alcohol with four guys at a friend's house. She thought that she had "passed out." She reported no pain or injuries and that she last had intercourse two weeks prior. She was taken to the Sexual Assault Response Team center where a SART examination was performed. At 11:45 a.m., her alcohol level measured .107 percent. N.A. had "a significant amount of genital trauma," various scratches to her pubic area and outer thigh, an abrasion on her hip, and some bruising on her arm. Tissue samples from N.A.'s vagina and cervix tested positive for the presence of sperm from two men. Subsequent DNA testing confirmed that the sperm was a statistical match to DNA from J.A.M. and Rateef Morris.
After Detective Kenneth McCoy interviewed N.A., he interviewed J.A.M. J.A.M. reported that, on the night in question, he had consensual sex with N.A. in Fowler's van and then dropped her off at a Carrs grocery store. He told McCoy that N.A. was not with him at Morris's residence later that evening.
Detective McCoy then met with Blevins after learning that Blevins had spoken with a school official about what happened to N.A. Blevins told McCoy (and testified at trial) that J.A.M. spoke to him in school and told him that J.A.M., Morris and N.A. were doing lines of cocaine that night; that J.A.M. and Morris "ran a train" on N.A.; that N.A. was passed out at the time; that they put burn marks on her; and that J.A.M. and Morris dragged N.A. "butt-ass naked "into the alley where an ambulance came and picked her up. Blevins understood J.A.M.'s comment "running a train" to mean that two or more people have sex, at the same time or sequentially, with one person. Based on the information McCoy learned from Blevins, he applied for a Glass warrant to monitor and record telephone calls between J.A.M. and Blevins.
See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881 (Alaska 1978), on reh'g, 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1979) (holding that the Alaska Constitution requires police to obtain judicial authorization before secretly recording a person's private conversations).
Police recorded several phone calls between J.A.M. and Blevins. In one of the recordings, Blevins told J.A.M. that he did not think the "story" that they had dropped N.A. off at Carrs before going to Morris's residence was a good one. J.A.M. told Blevins to stick to the story. He assured Blevins that N.A. would not remember what happened.
The State petitioned the superior court to adjudicate J.A.M. a delinquent, charging that J.A.M. had engaged in conduct that would constitute second-degree sexual assault, reckless endangerment, and first-degree hindering prosecution if J.A.M. were an adult.
AS 11.41.250(a).
AS 11.56.770(a)(1).
At the close of the State's case at trial, J.A.M. moved for a judgment of acquittal or for his admissions to be stricken from the record. He argued that, under the corpus delicti rule, the State had failed to provide sufficient evidence to corroborate his admissions to Blevins. Superior Court Judge Larry D. Card denied the motion. Judge Card pointed to the DNA evidence as corroborating that "[J.A.M. was] present at the scene." J.A.M. requested reconsideration, arguing that Judge Card could not use J.A.M.'s recorded statements to corroborate his admissions to Blevins. Again, Judge Card denied the motion. After the jury found J.A.M. guilty on all the counts, J.A.M. moved for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.
Judge Card ruled that there was sufficient evidence corroborating J.A.M.'s admissions. He cited the DNA evidence that corroborated J.A.M.'s contact with N.A. and N.A.'s likely incapacitation at the time of sexual penetration because she was found lying in an alley unconscious in the snow with her clothing partially removed.
Discussion
J.A.M. advances two interrelated arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the State failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule because it failed to offer substantial evidence — independent from J.A.M.'s admissions — that N.A. was incapacitated at the time of intercourse with J.A.M. J.A.M. contends that his intercourse with N.A. was consensual and that, without his statements, there is no evidence to prove otherwise. Second, J.A.M. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's sexual assault verdict.
The corpus delicti requirement precludes a criminal conviction based solely on the uncorroborated statement of a defendant. The function of the doctrine is to avoid unjust convictions by imposing a requirement that, before a case is submitted to the trier of fact, an extrajudicial confession or admission be supported by independent evidence that a crime occurred. To establish corpus delicti, the State need not offer independent evidence of all of the elements of a crime. Rather, the State must introduce "substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the [defendant's] statement."
E.g., Jacinth v. State, 593 P.2d 263, 265-66 (A laska 1979); Arm strong v. State, 502 P.2d 440, 447 (Alaska 1972); Drumbarger v. State, 716 P.2d 6, 12 (Alaska App. 1986).
Armstrong, 502 P.2d at 447 (quoting Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S. Ct. 158, 164, 99 L. Ed. 2d 101, 109 (1954)).
J.A.M. argues that, because there is no direct evidence of what N.A. did after 12:30 a.m. — when she telephoned her cousin — until the police found her in the alley at 4:00 a.m., "[t]here [is] nothing to contradict [J.A.M.'s] report that he and [N.A.] had sex around 1:00 a.m." According to J.A.M., the State must "prove that [N.A.] passed out between approximately 1:00 and 1:30 [a.m.]" J.A.M. contends that, "[g]iven the presumption of innocence, the jury is required to believe [J.A.M.] . . . until the state proves otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt." And because Fowler and Blevins testified that, she was only intoxicated at a level of about 7 out of ten and no one else who was drinking that night passed out, J.A.M. argues that the evidence supports his story that he and N.A. had sex around 1:00 a.m.
To prove the allegation that J.A.M . committed second-degree sexual assault, the State had to prove that N.A. and J.A.M. had intercourse and that, at the time of intercourse, N.A. was incapacitated or unaware that she was engaging in intercourse, and that J.A.M. knew of her incapacity or unawareness. There is sufficient evidence, independent of J.A.M.'s statements, to support a reasonable conclusion that J.A.M.'s incriminating statements were trustworthy. N.A. testified that she could not remember anything after calling her cousin; she did not even remember Blevins and Fowler leaving Morris's residence. Blevins testified that, when he and Fowler left, N.A. was "kind of passing out on the couch." N.A., who could not recall having intercourse that evening, had injuries in her genital area, various scratches to her pubic area and outer thigh, an abrasion on her hip, and some bruising on her arm. The DNA of the sperm found in N.A. showed that she recently engaged in intercourse with J.A.M. N.A. did not regain consciousness in the hospital until hours after she was found in the alley. N.A. had a blood alcohol level of .107 percent approximately eight hours after she was found in the alley. This evidence is substantial independent evidence that establishes the trustworthiness of J.A.M.'s statements. Thus, the corpus delicti rule was satisfied. Sufficient evidence supports J.A.M.'s adjudication
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction when fair-minded jurors exercising reasonable judgment could find that the government had met its burden of establishing the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981).
J.A.M. concedes that he sexually penetrated N.A., and this is corroborated by evidence that J.A.M.'s DNA was found in sperm collected from N.A. Furthermore, N.A. sustained injuries to her vaginal area. There was also substantial evidence from which the jury could find that N.A. was incapacitated or unaware that she was engaging in sexual intercourse and that J.A .M . was aware of N.A.'s incapacity or lack of awareness. From our examination of the record, we conclude that the superior court properly denied J.A.M.'s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
I write separately to further clarify the basis of our decision that J.A.M.'s out-of-court confession was sufficiently corroborated to satisfy Alaska's corpus delicti rule.
The confession at issue consisted of J.A.M.'s statements to a friend that the victim, N.A., passed out after using cocaine, that J.A.M. and another man had sexual relations with her while she was unconscious, and that they then dragged her half-naked body into an alley and left her there.
The State presented the following evidence to corroborate this confession: The police found N.A. in the alley, half-naked and comatose. When N.A. regained consciousness hours later, she had no memory of engaging in sexual intercourse with anyone the preceding night. An examination of her body showed "significant . . . genital trauma" and the presence of sperm inside her vagina. DNA testing of this sperm showed that it likely came from J.A.M. and the other man who was with him on the night in question.
In this appeal, J.A.M. asserts that the evidence recited in the preceding paragraph was insufficient to corroborate one important aspect of J.A.M.'s confession. J.A.M. concedes that there was ample evidence to corroborate his out-of-court statement that he engaged in sexual relations with N.A., but he points out that the unlawfulness of his sexual relations with N.A. hinges on the assertion that N.A. was unconscious at the time. J.A.M. acknowledges that N.A. was unconscious when she was found in the alley, but J.A.M. argues that there was no independent evidence to show that N.A. lapsed into unconsciousness before J.A.M. engaged in sexual relations with her (as opposed to afterwards).
If J.A.M.'s view of the corpus delicti rule were correct, it would mean that if the police called the district attorney's office, told a prosecutor about J.A.M.'s confession and all of the corroborating evidence described here, and then asked for the prosecutor's assistance in obtaining a warrant for J.A.M.'s arrest, the prosecutor would have to say, "No. There is no triable case here." But that is not the law of corpus delicti in Alaska.
The Alaska Supreme Court has declared that our corpus delicti rule requires the government to present "substantial independent evidence" that "tend[s] to establish the trustworthiness" of a defendant's out-of-court admission or confession. Armstrong v. State, 502 P.2d 440, 447 (Alaska 1972). But the Armstrong formulation of the corpus delicti rule does not require the State to independently prove all of the elements of the crime. See Drumbarger v. State, 716 P.2d 6, 12 (Alaska App. 1986). Nor does the rule require direct, independent corroboration of every detail of a defendant's out-of-court confession. Rather, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied if there is substantial circumstantial corroboration of the defendant's out-of-court confession — corroboration sufficient to allay concerns that the defendant might have falsely confessed to a supposed crime that did not actually occur.
See State v. Morgan, 61 P.3d 460, 467 (A riz. App. 2002); State v. Gillies, 662 P.2d 1007 (Ariz. 1983); People v. Alvarez, 46 P.3d 372, 377 (Cal. 2002); People v. Jennings, 807 P.2d 1009 (Cal. 1991). In general, see Rollin M. Perkins Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law (3rd edition 1982), pp. 140-44.
That test was met here.