Opinion
No. CV 09-5027790 S
December 7, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This case involves a dispute over attorneys fees. The court heard the evidence presented at trial on October 7, 2009. Based on evidence and testimony presented at trial, the court finds the following facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff law firm was retained by the defendant, Joann Resnick, now known as Joann Keithan, to provide legal representation in a marriage dissolution action. On May 31, 2007, the parties executed a representation agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to represent the defendant in the underlying matter, and charge her for legal work done on an hourly basis at hourly rates ranging from $210.00 per hour to $500.00 per hour for attorneys and $90.00 per hour for legal assistants. The plaintiff also informed the defendant that there would be charges for certain costs and expenses incurred in connection with the representation. Pursuant to the agreement, the defendant paid the plaintiff a retainer fee of $7,500.00 at the commencement of the representation.
Beginning in October 2007, the defendant became dissatisfied with the plaintiff's representation, and the attorney-client relationship deteriorated. Around that time, her attorney, Howard Jacobs, became ill and was hospitalized. He was thus unable to work on the defendant's case, and another attorney within the firm was assigned to the case. The defendant claimed that she called the plaintiff several times between October 2007 and December 2007, and was unable to reach her attorney. She claims that on one occasion, she was told by a paralegal that the paralegal did not know which attorney was working on her case. In December 2007, the defendant hired another attorney to represent her in the marriage dissolution action.
The defendant alleges that she reached an agreement with the plaintiff, as outlined in her letter to the plaintiff dated December 28, 2007, to tender a sum of money in full satisfaction of her outstanding balance. The plaintiff received and cashed the payments made according to the December 28, 2007 letter, but sent the defendant a letter after cashing each payment stating that there was no agreement between the parties. The plaintiff continued to bill the defendant for work completed on her file. The defendant continued to pay the plaintiff according to the terms of the December 28, 2007 letter, with the last payment being made in May 2008.
On March 17, 2009, the plaintiff initiated these proceedings, essentially arguing that the defendant breached the representation agreement by failing to pay for legal services rendered pursuant thereto and claiming money damages, interest and costs. The plaintiff alleges that from May 31, 2007 until April 22, 2008, it provided legal representation to the defendant in accordance with the representation agreement and that the defendant has failed to pay for said legal services. The plaintiff submits that charges for legal services rendered during that period were $21,830.63, and during the period from May 31, 2007, through May 5, 2008, the defendant made payments to the plaintiff in an amount totaling only $13,734.77. After deducting all credits and payments on the defendant's behalf, the plaintiff alleges that there is an outstanding balance for legal services and expenses in the amount of $8,095.86.
This sum represents the initial retainer fee paid by the defendant ($7,500) in addition to subsequent payments tendered by the defendant to the plaintiff in the amount of $6,234.77.
The defendant disputes the amount owed to the plaintiff, and asserts a number of defenses, including negligence, contributory negligence, accord and satisfaction and payment.
As noted earlier, the trial was held on October 7, 2009, at which time both parties offered evidence and presented testimony to the court. The defendant represented herself.
I.
"Fundamental to the attorney-client relationship is the power of the client to terminate that relationship without being held liable for breach of contract." McCullough v. Waterside Associates, 102 Conn.App. 23, 28 (2007). "It is well settled that a client has the right to discharge [her] attorney and to substitute another at any time without cause and in spite of any contract." Cole v. Meyers, 128 Conn. 223, 229 (1941). "In a situation in which the attorney is discharged before he is able to perform under the terms of the contract, the attorney may still recover a reasonable fee, albeit not the contracted fee, for the work performed for the client by way of quantum meruit." Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. at 230. "The policy behind that principle is based on the unique relationship between attorney and client. `An attorney at law is an officer of the court; a minister of justice. He is entitled to fair compensation for his services, but since, because of the highly confidential relationship, the client may discharge him even without just cause, he should receive reasonable compensation for the work he has done up to that point, and not the agreed fee he probably would have earned had he been allowed to continue in his employment. This rule is not unfair to the attorney. He will receive fair compensation for what he has done; his position as an officer of the court does not entitle him to receive payment for services he has not rendered.'" McCullough v. Waterside Associates, 102 Conn.App. at 28 (quoting Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. at 231).
A party may not recover under a theory of quantum meruit for services rendered under a valid express contract. Somers v. Busch, 238 Conn. 396, 406-07 (2007). An attorney may recover the value of the services rendered for the benefit of the client under the theory of unjust enrichment. Id. In the instant case, the parties had a valid written representation agreement (plaintiff's exhibit 1). Therefore, the plaintiff may recover for legal services rendered under a theory of unjust enrichment.
II.
The defendant, however, argues that she is not liable to the plaintiff in the amount allegedly owed, and she asserts a number of special defenses. First, the defendant claims that the plaintiff was negligent in its representation of the defendant in the underlying matter. However, in so arguing, the defendant misunderstands the nature of the plaintiff's claim. As a general rule, negligence is not a defense to a breach of contract claim. P J, Inc. v Denardis, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV064017838S (Oct. 16, 2007 Silbert, J.). Therefore, this defense fails.
The defendant's second special defense alleges contributory negligence or comparative negligence. General Statutes § 52-572h defines the scope of comparative negligence in Connecticut. Specifically, this statute provides, in pertinent part, that: "In causes of action based upon negligence . . . [t]he economic or noneconomic damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572h(b). "While there is no appellate authority squarely addressing the applicability of § 52-572h to causes of action sounding in contract, the superior courts have noted that the comparative negligence statute does not apply to a breach of contract claim." SNET Information, Inc. v. Prime One/Prime Direct, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 075008131 (Aug. 7, 2009, Robinson, J.); See also Curtis Packaging Corp. v. KPMG, LLP, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. X06 CV 9 0156558 (July 31, 2002, McWeeny, J.); Center Court Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Maitland/Strauss Behr, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 6 0252381 (May 4, 1994, Healey, S.T.R.). Thus, this defense fails as well.
The defendant's third special defense is accord and satisfaction. "An accord is a contract under which an obligee promises to accept a stated performance in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty . . . Accord and satisfaction is a method of discharging a claim whereby the parties agree to give and accept something other than that which is due in settlement of the claim and to perform the agreement." SNET Information, Inc. v. Prime One/Prime Direct, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV075008131 (Aug. 7, 2009, Robinson, J.) (quoting Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 277, 828 A.2d 64 (2003)).
Here, however, the defendant has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of an agreement between the parties. The alleged agreement, unilaterally reached by the defendant in the December 28, 2007 letter, was rejected by the plaintiff in several letters to the defendant. Thus, the court finds that there was no accord and satisfaction and consequently, this defense fails.
The defendant's fourth special defense is payment. For reasons already stated, this defense fails. The court has found that there was no accord and satisfaction, and therefore, the payments made by the defendant to the plaintiff pursuant to the December 28, 2007 letter were not tendered in full satisfaction of the outstanding balance. Thus, although the defendant has made some payments to the plaintiff, the defendant has not fully paid for legal services performed on her behalf and in furtherance of the representation agreement. As a consequence, the defendant has been unjustly enriched.
III.
In its claims for relief, the plaintiff requests an award of interest. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a, "interest [at the rate of 10 per cent a year] may be recovered in a civil action as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable. We have construed the statute to make allowance of interest depend upon whether the detention of the money is or is not wrongful under the circumstances . . . The allowance of interest as an element of damages is, thus, primarily an equitable determination and a matter lying within the sound discretion of the trial court . . ." McCullough v. Waterside Associates, 102 Conn.App. at 32 (quoting O'Hara v. State, 218 Conn. 628, 643 (1991)). Here, the court finds that the defendant did not have the legal right to withhold payment to the plaintiff. However, notwithstanding this finding, the court, in exercise of its discretion, declines to grant an award of interest.
IV.
The court has examined all of the plaintiff's bills and heard and evaluated all of the evidence adduced at trial. The court has concluded that the plaintiff has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has failed to pay the plaintiff's fees for legal services rendered pursuant to the representation agreement. But, the court further concludes that the amount requested by the plaintiff must be adjusted downwards for the copying charges billed to the defendant after the date she terminated her retention of the plaintiff.
Accordingly, judgment may enter in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $7,841.08.