No. 04-06-00215-CR
February 28, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH.
From the 218th Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas, Trial Court No. 05-08-00088-CRK, Honorable Ron Carr, Judge Presiding.
Sitting: CATHERINE STONE, Justice, KAREN ANGELINI, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
KAREN ANGELINI, Justice.
AFFIRMED John Henry Jackson appeals his conviction for the offense of harassment by person in a correctional facility. Jackson argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) not making an informal inquiry as to Jackson's competency to stand trial, and (2) keeping Jackson in restraints in the presence of the jury. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Competency to Stand Trial
"A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against [him]." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003 (a) (Vernon Supp. 2006). A person is presumed competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. art. 46B.003 (b). Either party or the trial court may suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004 (a). "If evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion shall suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial." Id. art. 46B.004 (b). On suggestion that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall conduct an informal inquiry to determine whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004 (c). We review a trial court's refusal to conduct a competency inquiry for abuse of discretion. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). During pretrial proceedings, Jackson's attorney requested the trial court to conduct an informal inquiry as to Jackson's competency. The trial court, however, refused. Jackson argues on appeal that the trial court should have made the informal inquiry as requested because of Jackson's bizarre behavior. See McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (requiring competency inquiry if evidence shows "recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant"). Specifically, Jackson contends he engaged in the following bizarre behavior that required the trial court to inquire into his competency: 1. When the court addressed Jackson as "Mr. Jackson," he responded, "My name ain't no Jackson. I'm Matt Turner. I'm Matt Turner." 2. Sergeant De Leon, a TDCJ correctional officer who transported Jackson to court, testified that while being transported, Jackson tore up seats in the bus and in the van, tore up his clothes, and told the officers that once the restraints were removed he would fight the officers. 3. Sergeant De Leon testified that Jackson said his name was "something like" Ted Turner and that Jackson would not talk to the officers. 4. During a discussion between the court and the attorneys regarding whether the jury would be able to see Jackson's restraints, the trial court asked Jackson's attorney if he wanted to check with Jackson. Jackson apparently would not talk to his attorney when the attorney tried to talk to him about removing the restraints during trial because the court then stated for the record that Jackson would not respond to any questions and that the restraints would remain. We find that Jackson's behavior amounted to nothing more than unruly and disruptive demeanor, and a failure to cooperate. See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395 (rejecting contention that appellant's unruly and disruptive courtroom demeanor are probative of incompetence to stand trial); Smith v. State, 51 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (finding competency inquiry not required when "defendant removed his shirt, undid his pants, laid down on the floor, and refused to move"); Burks v. State, 792 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd) (rejecting contention that defendant's "unruly and disruptive courtroom demeanor . . . his distrust of the psychologist assigned to examine him, his failure to communicate or cooperate with either attorney, his abuse of counsel and his general failure to cooperate are probative of incompetence to stand trial"); Edmon v. State, No. 05-98-02154-CR, 2001 WL 827495, at *4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) (finding competency inquiry not required where appellant "scuffled with deputies who attempted to fingerprint him, shouted obscenities at the trial court, had to be restrained, and was eventually removed from court and placed in the holdover cell where he could hear the remainder of the proceedings") (not designated for publication). "If such actions were probative of incompetence, one could effectively avoid criminal justice through immature behavior." Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395 ( quoting Burks, 792 S.W.2d at 840). There is nothing in Jackson's behavior or in the record indicating that he did not have the sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or that he did not have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Thus, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to make a competency inquiry. We overrule Jackson's first issue on appeal. Restraints in the Presence of the Jury Panel
Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court ordered Jackson to be shackled because he would not assure the court that if the shackles were removed, he would not become violent. On appeal, Jackson contends that the trial court, in allowing the jury panel to observe him in restraints during voir dire, prejudiced his right to be presumed innocent. Although the use of visible shackles during the guilt stage of a trial is generally prohibited, in limited situations restraint of a defendant is justified. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005) (holding that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit use of physical restraints visible to jury "absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to the particular defendant on trial."). For example, restraining a defendant is justified when "an accused has expressed his intention to escape, has made threats of physical violence, has resisted being brought to court, has repeatedly interrupted the court proceedings, has attempted to leave the courtroom, or other egregious conduct." Shaw v. State, 846 S.W.2d 482, 486-87 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd). However, before ordering the use of shackles, the trial court must make a specific finding that they are necessary for reasons particular to the case. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 627. And, the use of shackles cannot be justified based on general courtroom security or the severity of the charged offense. See Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 283 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). We review the trial court's decision to order the defendant restrained under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 282. The trial court heard evidence that Jackson had torn up seats in a bus and a van, and had torn up his own clothing while being transported to court. Further, Jackson had told the correctional officers that once the restraints were removed he would fight them. The trial court even gave Jackson an opportunity to give the court assurances that he would not become violent if the restraints were removed. Jackson, however, refused to give such assurances. Given Jackson's violent and destructive behavior, his threat to fight the officers if the restraints were removed, and his unwillingness to assure the court he would not become violent upon removal of the restraints, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Jackson to be shackled during jury voir dire. We overrule Jackson's second issue on appeal. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.