Summary
applying first part of section 944.278, canceling awards for all inmates, to petitioner would be an ex post facto violation based on analysis in Lynce
Summary of this case from Donovan v. MooreOpinion
Case No. 96-2286
Opinion filed June 11, 1997.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Leslie Rothenberg, Judge.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and John E. Morrison, Special Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Judy Bone (Tallahassee), Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON and SORONDO, JJ.
Upon our conclusion that, in the circumstances of his case, the appellant Jackson became entitled to administrative gain time under section 944.276, Florida Statutes (1987) (repealed by ch. 88-122, § 6, at 527, 537, Laws of Fla.) and provisional credits under section 944.277, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988)(repealed by ch. 93-406, § 32, at 2911, 2966, Laws of Fla.), the order below denying mandamus is reversed because he was unlawfully deprived of those benefits by the enactment of section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993). Lynce v. Mathis, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); see also Orosz v. Singletary, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. Case no. 83,487, opinion filed, January 23, 1997)[22 FLW S51]. The cause is remanded for determination of the precise amount of time to which he is entitled.
We reject the appellee's claim that the appeal is untimely.