Opinion
G054391
06-26-2018
In re the Marriage of LAUREN and LAWRENCE JACKSON. LAUREN JACKSON, Appellant, v. LAWRENCE JACKSON, Respondent.
Law Office of Thomas K. Bourke and Thomas K. Bourke for Appellant. Lawrence Jackson, in pro. per., for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14D009234) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Salvador Sarmiento, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Thomas K. Bourke and Thomas K. Bourke for Appellant. Lawrence Jackson, in pro. per., for Respondent.
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Appellant Lauren Jackson (Wife) appeals from a judgment annulling her marriage to respondent Lawrence Jackson (Husband). She contends there was insufficient evidence to support finding of annulment, there were evidentiary errors preventing a fair trial, and the court erred by denying her motion for new trial. We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the annulment. In addition, we determine there were no reversible evidentiary errors and the motion for new trial was properly denied. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Much of the statement of facts in Wife's brief was based on her testimony, which the court expressly found not credible. Thus we do not include her testimony in our factual summary.
The parties married in August 2013. At that time Wife was 62 and Husband was 70 or 71. In October 2014 Wife filed a dissolution action. Wife sought spousal support from Husband. She obtained temporary spousal support of $4,200 per month for 10 months. In Husband's response he asked for a dissolution of the marriage and a declaration of nullity based on fraud and unsound mind.
Wife sought a domestic violence restraining order against Husband. Wife alleged Husband "shoved" her, verbally abused her, and falsely accused her of stealing money from him. Wife also alleged that in August Husband had grabbed and violently shaken her causing swelling and bruising on her neck, requiring her to seek medical treatment.
Husband sought a restraining order against Wife, claiming, among other things, she had hit him and he feared she would physically harm him. He also stated he was afraid she would make false allegations he had committed domestic violence against him, citing Wife's allegation he had shaken her.
The parties ultimately stipulated the temporary domestic violence restraining orders would remain in effect until June 2015. They also stipulated Wife would have exclusive use of the residence, which Husband owned, until that same date, at which time Wife was to move out. Both parties filed new requests for domestic violence restraining orders after the June 15 deadline.
At trial, Husband testified that before the marriage Wife told him "she was a born-again Christian, born-again believer" but "almost immediately" thereafter he learned she was Jewish. Every night she insisted he participate in Jewish rituals and she kept kosher. She tried to have him convert to Judaism. If he had known Wife was not Christian Husband would never have married her because he "was looking for . . . a good Christian woman." Husband had been a senior elder in his church for thirteen years. Three months after the marriage Wife stopped attending church.
Husband testified that after the wedding Wife refused to wear her wedding ring and "disallowed" him from telling anyone they were married. He named three specific men who were Wife's boyfriends before the marriage. He testified Wife "continue[d] to see [each one of them] after the marriage." He further stated Wife "continue[d] that relationship" after the marriage. Additionally, Wife had "relations with some of those men today." He also testified "after our marriage I found out [one of the men] . . . was giving her massages and different things in parking lots [¶] . . . [¶] . . . at Mimi's, for one, and other places wherever you see men." Husband testified that if he had known Wife would continue having relationships with boyfriends he never would have married her.
Husband denied inflicting violence on Wife.
After the marriage the parties lived in Husband's house. Once Husband moved out of his house Wife failed to maintain it and refused to let him do so. The house was "destroyed" and ultimately went into foreclosure. Husband lost $600,000 in equity.
The court found Husband's consent to the marriage was "obtained by fraud" and ruled it was void. In making the ruling the court relied on Husband's testimony, finding it credible. It found Wife's testimony "not to be credible."
The court found the parties were married for 11 months. Further, being Christian is "very important" to Husband who is an elder in his church. He would marry only another Christian. After the marriage Husband learned Wife was Jewish.
The court found Husband believed Wife "would be faithful to the marriage." After the parties separated and Husband left the parties' home, Wife allowed men friends to stay there for four to five days. Wife admitted this during trial.
The court also found that after Husband moved from the residence, Wife sold more than $100,000 of his assets. It further found Wife "was only interested in [Husband's] home and assets."
Additionally, the court found Wife failed to visit Husband when he was hospitalized for more than three days. The court also stated Husband did not know Wife "was previously married no less than seven times," noting Wife neither admitted nor denied this.
The court pointed to Husband's testimony that had he known these facts he would not have married Wife. It found all of those facts went "to the very essence of a marriage."
Thereafter, Wife filed a motion for reconsideration and for new trial on the ground Wife was self-represented and thus "was unable to present any evidence at the trial." Wife wanted to put on evidence there had been domestic violence and that she had always been a Christian and did not defraud Husband.
In her declaration Wife stated the court had erred in concluding she misrepresented to Husband she was a Christian to induce him to marry her and wanted to present evidence she in fact was a Christian. She explained that if she had had counsel this evidence would have been admitted, claiming she had been "unlucky" in choosing two lawyers who had represented her before the trial. According to Wife, one had been disbarred and the other notified her "only days before the trial" he was unavailable. She also challenged the court's finding there was no domestic violence. There is no ruling on the motion in the appendix.
DISCUSSION
1. Principles of Annulment Based on Fraud
A marriage may be annulled when the consent of a party has been obtained by fraud. (Fam. Code, § 2210, subd. (d).) Annulment based on fraud may be granted "only 'in an extreme case where the particular fraud goes to the very essence of the marriage relation.'" (In re Marriage of Meagher & Maleki (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1, 3 (Meagher).) The fraud must "'relate[] to a matter which the state deems vital to the marriage relationship.'" (Id. at p. 6.) "'[B]ecause of its peculiar position as a silent but active party in annulment proceedings[,] the state is particularly interested in seeing that no marriage is declared void as the result of fraud unless the evidence in support thereof is both clear and convincing. Thus[,] . . . [because] "[t]he state has a rightful and legitimate concern with the marital status of the parties[,] . . . the fraud relied upon to secure a termination of the existing status must be such fraud as directly affects the marriage relationship and not merely such fraud as would be sufficient to rescind an ordinary civil contract."'" (Id. at pp. 6-7, italics omitted.)
Meagher explained annulments based on fraud generally are "granted only in cases where the fraud related in some way to the sexual or procreative aspects of marriage." (Meagher, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 7.) Examples of this include a secret intention not to consummate a marriage (In re Marriage of Liu (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 143, 156); concealment of sterility (Vileta v. Vileta (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 794); a woman's concealment she was pregnant by another man (Baker v. Baker (1859) 13 Cal. 87); a woman's undisclosed intent to continue an intimate relationship with another man after marriage (Schaub v. Schaub (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 467, 474-475); and a wife's secret intent never to live with the husband in his home (Bruce v. Bruce (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 641, 643).
"In the absence of fraud involving the party's intentions or abilities with respect to the sexual or procreative aspect of marriage, the long-standing rule is that neither party 'may question the validity of the marriage upon the ground of reliance upon the express or implied representations of the other with respect to such matters as character, habits, chastity, business or social standing, financial worth or prospects, or matters of similar nature.'" (Meagher, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 8, italics omitted.)
There is a dearth of authority in California as to annulment based on religion. In Lamberti v. Lamberti (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 482, the wife married the husband, not a United States citizen, less than one month after they met, so the husband would not be deported. They agreed to a civil ceremony with the understanding they would marry in a Roman Catholic ceremony within three months and then would consummate the marriage and live together. Immediately following the civil ceremony, the husband's "ardor [toward the wife] seemed noticeably to cool." (Id. at p. 484.) The husband refused to engage in arrangements for the religious ceremony and go to church, and spent time with the wife only to satisfy immigration authorities. The marriage was never consummated and the parties never lived together as husband and wife.
In a very recent case, In re Marriage of Turfe (2018) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, the issue was whether the husband was entitled to an annulment because the wife allegedly misrepresented she would be bound by a mahr agreement. (Id. at p. ___, .) A mahr agreement "'is an agreement based on Islamic law under which a husband agrees to pay a dowry to his wife.'" (Id. at p. ___, fn. 2, [233 Cal.App. Rptr.3d at p. 316, fn. 2].) The appellate court affirmed the denial of an annulment based on insufficient evidence of misrepresentation. (Id. at p. ___, .) The court did not decide whether the alleged fraud as to the mahr agreement went to the "'"essence of the marriage relation."'" (Id. at p. ___, .)
The Court of Appeal affirmed an annulment, determining the husband's promise to participate in a Catholic wedding was a misrepresentation of a material fact because a Catholic ceremony was essential to the wife. (Lamberti v. Lamberti, supra, 272 Cal.App.2d at p. 485.) It held that "where one prospective spouse, in order to induce the other to enter into a civil marriage, makes a promise of a subsequent religious ceremony without intending to keep it, an annulment will be granted, at least where as in the present case there was no consummation by cohabitation." (Ibid.) 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Wife contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of annulment. When we are faced with a sufficiency of the evidence argument, we start with the presumption the judgment is correct. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957.) "'[T]he evidence [is viewed] in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference.'" (Id. at pp. 957-958.) If "'"there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted," to support the findings,'" we "must uphold that finding." (Ibid.) We may not reweigh or resolve conflicts in the evidence or redetermine the credibility of witnesses. (Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 602, 613.) The testimony of a single witness can be sufficient. (Ibid.) We disregard all conflicting evidence. (Guillory v. Hill (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 240, 249.)
One of the grounds for the annulment was Wife's continued relationships with boyfriends after the marriage. As to this issue, the court found that after Husband left his home, Wife let male friends stay there for days at a time. Wife claims this does not show she was unfaithful. But we review the court's result, not its reasoning. (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1325.) And in reviewing for substantial evidence we consider the entire record. (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 501.)
There was evidence in addition to what the court found in the order. Husband named three of Wife's boyfriends before marriage, testifying she continued to see all of them during the marriage. He also testified that had he known Wife would continue in relationships with boyfriends he never would have married her.
Wife argues Husband provided no foundation or "substantiation" for his belief. But as discussed below in section 3, Wife did not properly object to this evidence and has thereby waived any argument on appeal. (In re Carrie W. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 746, 755.)
While it is not the strongest evidence, bearing in mind the presumption the judgment is correct and viewing the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Husband, we conclude it is sufficient to support the annulment. It is reasonable to presume that Wife's continued relationship with at least three boyfriends she had before her marriage evidenced an intent at the time of marriage to continue those relationships after the wedding. Wife's refusal to wear a wedding ring and her insistence Husband not tell people of the marriage add additional weight. Wife's conduct is related to the sexual aspect of a marriage, which goes to its essence. (Meagher, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 7.) And it is comparable to the conduct in Schaub v. Schaub, supra, 71 Cal.App.2d 467, 474-475, where the court affirmed an annulment on that basis.
Wife's testimony denying Husband's evidence is irrelevant. The court did not find her credible and at best it is conflicting evidence we do not consider in a substantial evidence analysis. (Guillory v. Hill, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 249.) This is also true of testimony by one of the boyfriends Husband named, who denied ever having sexual relations with Wife.
Wife also challenges the court's reliance on her misrepresentation to Husband she was Christian when in fact she was Jewish. While that may have been a proper basis for the ruling, we do not decide this issue. Wife's intent at the time of marriage to continue relationships with boyfriends during the marriage and her conduct in doing so is a sufficient ground. (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1461 [we affirm if judgment correct on any ground].)
In affirming the judgment on this ground we also are not relying Wife's prior marriages, her failure to visit Husband in the hospital or her sale of Husband's assets. Thus, we need not discuss any argument Wife made on those issues. 3. Evidentiary Claims
Wife makes several charges of evidentiary errors. Most of them, including those relating to the religion argument, Wife's sale of Husband assets, Wife's housekeeping, and domestic violence issues, are irrelevant to our decision and we do not discuss them. None of the remaining claims suffice to reverse the judgment.
Wife contends the court held her to a higher standard in making objections, claiming it required her to state specific grounds but did not always hold Husband's lawyer to the same standard. We have reviewed the entire transcript and found no unfairness. Rather, the court was trying to keep control of the proceedings.
The court was generally patient with Wife. At times Wife carried on a running commentary during a witness's testimony. Her objections in the main were disagreements with a witness's testimony or statements of contrary facts. The court explained on numerous occasions she had to make legal objections and tried to explain what that meant. When Wife made general objections the court inquired as to the legal basis, allowing her the opportunity to voice a proper objection.
Although Wife was put at a disadvantage by representing herself at trial, self-represented litigants must conform to the same standards as lawyers (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543) because anything less "would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation" (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985).
Wife complains the court erred in overruling her objection to what she characterizes as Husband's "conclusory testimony" "without foundation" about her continuing to have relationships with men after the marriage. But Wife never made such an objection. Instead, when asked for the basis of her objection she starting reciting contrary facts. This objection was waived. (In re Carrie W., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.)
Wife argues the court "prejudicially" told her that because she was not seeking an annulment there was no reason for her to put on such evidence. She asserts that if she had known the court would grant an annulment based on her religion or affairs with other men "she might want to preemptively offer proof of their falsity."
Wife fails to put this colloquy in context. Before trial began, the court suggested that even though Wife was the petitioner, because she was in propria persona, it might be easier for Husband to put on his case first and allow her to reply and "present whatever you want to present." Wife did not initially agree because she had documents to introduce and a witness with a scheduling problem. The court allowed her to call that witness immediately. When that testimony concluded, the court again made its request that Husband put on his case first, repeating that Wife could "respond to whatever you think you need to respond [to]" and show the court "anything else" she believed was relevant.
When Husband's counsel stated he wanted to have Wife testify first, suggesting it would make the trial shorter, Wife objected, claiming he was "setting [her] up." The court then asked Wife what issues she needed to resolve. Wife replied, "It's a divorce versus the annulment." The court stated Husband would raise that issue, asking Wife if she wanted an annulment. When she answered she did not, the court stated, "Then you have no reason to present any evidence on that."
Thus, the court's comment about Wife putting on evidence of the annulment merely went to the order of the proceedings, which the court had the power to control. (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1351.) At no time did the court bar Wife from properly putting on evidence in opposition to the annulment.
Wife's claim the court refused to allow her to ask one of her boyfriends whether they had engaged in sexual relations is wrong. Wife asked the witness whether he had "ever made love to [her]," to which he replied, "No." She was also allowed to ask him whether the two of them had ever slept in the same bed, to which he again replied, "No." It was only when Wife asked the witness whether he had "ever put [his] hands on [her] body in any way, shape or form that was out of context" that the court asked the relevance of the question. When Wife replied it was because Husband was accusing her of having an affair, the court directed her to ask the next question.
The court did not err. The question was merely cumulative of the testimony where the witness stated he had never had sexual relations with Wife.
Wife argues Husband's counsel committed misconduct in his opening statement by claiming there was a team of 19, then 12, gentlemen, widowers, on whom Wife preyed. He repeated a similar claim in closing argument. But there was no jury and the court did not rely on these statements in making its decision nor do we. Thus, if error, it was harmless and does not warrant reversal.
Finally, we reject Wife's claim of error as to the following question asked of Husband: "Did [Wife] ever tell you that she did not have an intent to remain married to you?" Husband stated she did not. Wife claims the question and answer are not evidence and the court should not have relied on it. There is no evidence it did, and we are not relying on it as a basis for our decision. 4. Domestic Violence
Wife contests the court's finding there was "no domestic violence by either party," claiming she presented substantial evidence to show Husband committed domestic violence against her.
There are several problems with Wife's argument. First, we do not see why this finding is relevant to the issues before us and Wife has not provided an explanation. Second, a substantial amount of the evidence on which Wife relies is her own testimony. Again, the court did not find her testimony credible, and there is no evidence to support her position. Husband denied inflicting violence on Wife. We do not consider conflicting evidence. (Guillory v. Hill, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 249.) And evidence Wife had been choked does not prove Husband committed the act. Contrary to Wife's implication, Husband had no obligation to introduce evidence to show how she "otherwise received" her injury. 5. Motion for New Trial
Wife contends the court should have granted her new trial motion, relying on several grounds in Code of Civil Procedure section 657, including irregularity in the proceedings, accident or surprise, insufficiency of the evidence and error in law. She argues the court's alleged unfair evidentiary rulings that purportedly held her to a higher standard than Husband's lawyer, insufficient evidence of no domestic abuse by Husband, and Wife's lack of knowledge she would have to prove she was not Jewish.
But neither of the first two grounds were stated in her motion and we cannot consider them now for the first time on appeal. (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 117.) As to the question of religion, among other reasons, we are not relying on that as the basis to affirm the ruling.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of nullity is affirmed. Husband is entitled to costs on appeal.
THOMPSON, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. BEDSWORTH, J.