Summary
dismissing Section 1981 claims sua sponte
Summary of this case from Blackman v. City of DallasOpinion
Civil Action No. 3:98-CV-1079-D
February 14, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants Dr. Yvonne Gonzalez ("Dr. Gonzalez"), Robby Collins ("Collins"), William Cotton ("Cotton"), Dennis Eichelbaum ("Eichelbaum"), Robert Gordon ("Gordon"), Johnny Holt ("Holt"), Gary Lloyd ("Lloyd"), Curtis Smith ("Smith"), Paul Snelus ("Snelus") (collectively, the "Individual Defendants") and Dallas Independent School District ("DISD") move for summary judgment as to plaintiff Nethel Beatrice Jackson's ("Jackson's") remaining claims in this case. The court grants the motion for the reasons that follow.
Collins is sued as "Robbie" Collins. The correct spelling is "Robby." See Ds. MSJ at 1 n. 1.
I
The court has addressed the background facts and procedural history of this case in two prior memorandum opinions and orders, Jackson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 1998 WL 386158 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 1998), and Jackson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 58846 (ND. Tex. Feb. 1, 1999), and need not recount them at length. In sum, Jackson sued defendants in state court, maintaining that through a variety of adverse actions taken over a period of several years, defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by discriminating against her based on her race, sex, and age and retaliating against her; violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech, remediable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by creating a racially hostile work environment and harassing her based on her race and her anti-DISD political activities; committed the state-law torts of defamation, slander, and libel; and committed intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the court's July 2, 1998 memorandum opinion and order, it granted in part defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed Jackson's state-law official capacity claims against the Individual Defendants and her claims against DISD for defamation, libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In its February 1, 1999 memorandum opinion and order, it dismissed Jackson's Title VII-based age discrimination claim against all defendants, her Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, her § 1981 claim against DISD, her § 1983 First Amendment claim against defendant Lloyd, her § 1983 claims against defendants Collins, Snelus. Gordon, and Cotton, her § 1983 claim against DISD, and her state-law claims against the Individual Defendants. On March 5, 1999 the court by order dismissed Jackson's § 1981 claim against the Individual Defendants.
Defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing Jackson's remaining Title VII race and sex discrimination and retaliation claims against defendant DISD, and her § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against defendants Dr. Gonzalez, Smith, Eichelbaum, and Holt. See Ds. MSJ at 7 (setting out claims in chart form and addressing scope of motion). Defendants filed their motion on November 1, 1999. Jackson, then represented by counsel, sought and received extensions of time to respond by orders filed November 23, 1999, December 13, 1999, and December 22, 1999. The last extension order deferred Jackson's response date to December 28, 1999. Jackson did not file a response by the due date. On January 6, 2000 her attorney filed a motion to withdraw. The court granted the motion by order filed February 3, 2000. In so doing, the court specifically noted:
Defendants note that Jackson purports to bring Title VII claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities. See Ds. MSJ at 7 n. 19. The court has already held that the Individual Defendants cannot be held individually liable under Title VII. See Feb. 1, 1999 Mem. Op. at 3. A Title VII claim against a person in the individual's "official capacity" is a suit against the employer. Therefore, the court will resolve these "official capacity" claims in the context of DISD's motion for summary judgment dismissing the remaining Title VII claims against it.
In her motion, Jackson's counsel states that she is willing to assist Jackson in locating new counsel and assist new counsel in becoming familiar with the facts and evidence. By granting counsel's motion to withdraw, however, the court does not suggest that [it] intends to defer a ruling on defendants' November 1, 1999 motion for summary judgment during the time that Jackson seeks new counsel. That motion is ripe for decision at any time.
Order at 1. As of today, Jackson has not responded to defendants' motion for summary judgment.
II
The court turns first to Jackson's Title VII claims against DISD for race and sex discrimination and retaliation.
A
Assuming arguendo that these causes of action are not time-barred, her claims for race and sex discrimination are subject to the basic burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1996). The McDonnell Douglas method of proof also applies to her retaliation claim. See Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996).
DISD moves for summary judgment on the ground that these claims are barred by limitations. See Ds. Br. at 2-7. The court will assume, as have defendants in the alternative, see id. at 7, that the claims are not barred by limitations and will address whether Jackson can adduce evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find intentional discrimination or retaliation.
Jackson must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. The burden then shifts to DISD to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory actions taken. DISD's burden is one of production, not of proof. If DISD meets its production burden, Jackson must adduce evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that the articulated reasons are pretexts for intentional discrimination or retaliation. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-11 (1993); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Tutton v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (ND. Tex. 1990) (Fitzwater, J.) (holding that at summary judgment stage, plaintiff must raise fact issue).
B
The court will assume arguendo that Jackson has met her prima facie burden concerning her discrimination and retaliation claims. DISD has introduced evidence that it transferred Jackson in 1997 from the McDonald warehouse to the Kiest warehouse because Jackson had been transferred from the Kiest warehouse in the first place to avoid the effects of being place on probation at that facility, see Dr. Gonzalez Aff. ¶¶ 10-13, Ds. App. 187-88; gave her a satisfactory employment rating in 1996 based on her job performance, Holt Aff. ¶¶ 6-8, 21, Ds. App. 192, 194; and placed her probation in 1996 and 1997 due to her insubordination, Holt Aff. ¶¶ 9-21, Ds. App. 193-94. As the court has already noted, Jackson has not responded to defendants' summary judgment motion. Her failure to respond does not permit the court to enter a "default" summary judgment, but the court may accept as true all of DISD's undisputed facts. See Tutton, 733 F. Supp. at 1117. Moreover, her failure to respond also means that she has failed to adduce evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that DISD's reasons are pretexts for intentional discrimination or retaliation.
Jackson's transfer claim does not support a Title VII retaliation action, however, because it does not qualify as an ultimate employment decision. See Burger v. Central Apartment Mgmt. Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, the court grants DISD's motion for summary judgment and dismisses the Title VII race and sex discrimination and retaliation claims against it.
III
Defendants Dr. Gonzalez, Smith, Eichelbaum, and Holt move for summary judgment dismissing Jackson's First Amendment retaliation claim.
To establish a § 1983 claim of retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment activities, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she suffered an adverse employment action, (2) her speech involved a matter of public concern, (3) her interest in commenting on matters of public concern outweighed the defendant's interest in promoting efficiency, and (4) plaintiffs speech motivated defendant's action. Teague v. City of Flower Mound Tex., 179 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1999). Because defendants will not have the burden at trial concerning this claim, they can meet their summary judgment obligation by pointing the court to the absence of evidence to support it. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If they do so, Jackson must go beyond her pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). Jackson must produce evidence sufficient to establish the existence of all elements essential to her § 1983 claim. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Summary judgment is mandatory where the nonmoving party fails to meet her burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.
Among the arguments that defendants have advanced in their motion is the contention that no defendant took any adverse action against Jackson because of her speech. See Ds. Br. at 12. They have thus pointed the court to the absence of evidence to support one of the essential elements of her claim. Jackson has failed to respond to their motion and therefore has not adduced any evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find in her favor. The court grants summary judgment dismissing this cause of action.
* * *
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and this case is dismissed by judgment filed today. SO ORDERED.
Defendants have advanced several other arguments in support of their motion. The court need not reach them in view of the grounds on which it grants defendants' motion.