Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-1911 SECTION "J"
May 6, 2002
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Petition for Attorney's Fees (Rec. Doc. 16). The motion, set for hearing on May 8, 2002, is before the Court on the briefs, without oral argument. The Commissioner does not oppose the Court granting Plaintiff's attorney's fees, but does oppose the amount requested by Plaintiff's attorney. Upon considering the petition, the memoranda, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the petition for attorney's fees should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
This case was initially before the Court on appeal from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, denying Plaintiff's claim for disability benefits. After answering the complaint, the Commissioner filed an unopposed motion to reverse the Commissioner's decision and remand the case for further administrative proceedings, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court granted the motion, reversed the Commissioner's decision, and remanded the case on March 15, 2002.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant petition for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d), which provides in part:
(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
(B) A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.
The Supreme Court explained in Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), that a plaintiff whose case is remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) is a "prevailing party" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2412. However, the other requirements of that statute must also be met before the Court will make an award of attorney's fees.
In the instant case, Plaintiff's petition avers that all of the conditions are met and that his attorney should be compensated at the rate of $142.00 per hour for his work on this matter, for a total award of $5147.50. Plaintiff's counsel attaches an affidavit to the petition, detailing the 36.25 hours spent on this matter, which time the Court finds reasonable. However, Plaintiff's attorney argues that he should be compensated at a higher rate per hour than the statutory amount of $125.00 to reflect the increase in cost of living since 1996, when that statutory cap was set.
The Commissioner does not oppose Plaintiff's petition in general, but does argue that any award should be limited to the statutory cap of $125.00 per hour, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a higher fee is justified in this action, citing Hall v. Charter, 50 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 1995).
28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A) provides in relevant part:
[A]ttorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.
In Hall, the Plaintiff requested fees in the amount of $111.77 per hour, even though the statutory cap, at that time, was set at $75.00 per hour. 50 F.3d at 368. Plaintiff argued that the amount of $111.77 per hour was necessary to reflect the increase in cost of living between 1981, when the $75.00 cap was set, and 1994, when counsel undertook Plaintiff's case. Id. The district court, while recognizing that $111.77 reflected the statutory cap adjusted for inflation, denied counsel the increased rate per hour. Id. at 369. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding no abuse of discretion, as the district court recognized there was an increased cost of living, but found that a $75 per hour award satisfied the purposes of the EAJA — "`to ensure adequate representation for those who need it and to minimize the cost of this representation to taxpayers.'" Id. (quoting district court) (citingBaker v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1988)).
In the instant matter, the Court makes a similar finding that the EAJA's purposes are served by awarding Plaintiff's attorney's fees at the statutory rate of $125.00 per hour, for a total award of $4531.25. Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Petition for Attorney's Fees is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's counsel is awarded $4531.25 in attorney's fees for this matter.