Opinion
520236
11-05-2015
In the Matter of Lawrence JACKSON, Petitioner, v. Annette BARBER, as Cortland County Director of Personnel and Civil Service Personnel Officer, et al., Respondents.
Steven Crain & Daren Rylewitz, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO, Syracuse (D. Jeffrey Gosch of counsel), for petitioner. Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP, Binghamton (Lars P. Mead of counsel), for respondents.
Steven Crain & Daren Rylewitz, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL–CIO, Syracuse (D. Jeffrey Gosch of counsel), for petitioner.
Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP, Binghamton (Lars P. Mead of counsel), for respondents.
Opinion
McCARTHY, J.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Cortland County) to review a determination of respondent Annette Barber denying petitioner's application for General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits.
Petitioner was diagnosed with plantar fasciitis in his left foot while working as a correction officer for the Cortland County Sheriff's Department. He thereafter filed an application for workers' compensation benefits, which claim was granted and subsequently confirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board. Petitioner also applied for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–c. Respondent Annette Barber, the personnel officer of respondent County of Cortland, denied the application on the merits upon her determination that petitioner's condition was idiopathic, i.e., without a specific cause. Following an appeal and subsequent hearing, Barber upheld her initial determination based on the Hearing Officer's recommendation to do so. Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding alleging that the denial of his application was, among other things, not supported by substantial evidence. Supreme Court transferred the matter to this Court.
Contrary to petitioner's initial contention, it is settled law that “a determination by the Workers' Compensation Board that an injury is work-related” does not, “by operation of collateral estoppel, automatically entitle an injured employee to General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits” (Matter of Balcerak v. County of Nassau, 94 N.Y.2d 253, 256, 701 N.Y.S.2d 700, 723 N.E.2d 555 1999; see Auqui v. Seven Thirty One Ltd. Partnership, 22 N.Y.3d 246, 256, 980 N.Y.S.2d 345, 3 N.E.3d 682 2013 ). Accordingly, the Board's determination did not collaterally estop Barber from denying petitioner's application for General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits.
Further, substantial evidence supports the determination denying petitioner benefits. Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207–c, correction officers are entitled to benefits when they are injured “in the performance of [their] duties” (General Municipal Law § 207–c 1; see Matter of Brunner v. Bertoni, 91 A.D.3d 1100, 1101, 936 N.Y.S.2d 731 2012 ), so long as they can establish the existence of a “ ‘direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting illness or injury’ ” (Matter of Theroux v. Reilly, 1 N.Y.3d 232, 243–244, 771 N.Y.S.2d 43, 803 N.E.2d 364 2003, quoting Matter of White v. County of Cortland, 97 N.Y.2d 336, 340, 740 N.Y.S.2d 288, 766 N.E.2d 950 2002 ). This Court will uphold a determination regarding a correction officer's eligibility for benefits if such decision is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Chase v. County of Albany, 127 A.D.3d 1446, 1447, 7 N.Y.S.3d 666 2015; Matter of Brunner v. Bertoni, 91 A.D.3d at 1101, 936 N.Y.S.2d 731), i.e., “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact, [which] is ‘less than a preponderance of the evidence’ ” (Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v. Schiano, 16 N.Y.3d 494, 499, 922 N.Y.S.2d 249, 947 N.E.2d 140 2011, quoting 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180–181, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 1978 ). Notably, credibility determinations are within the sole province of the Hearing Officer (see Matter of Berenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 443–444, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478, 517 N.E.2d 193 1987; Matter of Kuznia v. Adams, 106 A.D.3d 1227, 1229, 966 N.Y.S.2d 240 2013 ), and the burden of proof rests with the petitioner (see Matter of Brunner v. Bertoni, 91 A.D.3d at 1101, 936 N.Y.S.2d 731).
Orthopaedic surgeon Daniel Carr reviewed petitioner's medical records and conducted an independent medical examination of petitioner. He opined that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, petitioner's plantar fasciitis was idiopathic. Despite petitioner's introduction of contrary expert evidence, the Hearing Officer “was entitled to weigh the conflicting medical opinions and determine which expert to credit” (Matter of Chase v. County of Albany, 127 A.D.3d at 1447; see Matter of Roache v. Hevesi, 38 A.D.3d 1036, 1037, 831 N.Y.S.2d 574 2007 ). Given that Carr “ ‘articulate[d] a rational and fact-based opinion founded upon a physical examination and review of the pertinent medical records' ” (Matter of Calhoun v. New York State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 112 A.D.3d 1172, 1174, 977 N.Y.S.2d 474 2013, quoting Matter of Mulvaney v. DiNapoli, 92 A.D.3d 1021, 1021, 937 N.Y.S.2d 480 2012 [internal quotations marks and citation omitted] ), the Hearing Officer's reliance thereon was reasonable and, therefore, petitioner's application was properly denied (see Matter of Brunner v. Bertoni, 91 A.D.3d at 1101, 936 N.Y.S.2d 731). Petitioner's remaining arguments are unpreserved and/or without merit.
ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN and LYNCH, JJ., concur.