Opinion
C.A. No. 03A-01-003 WCC.
Submitted: June 13, 2003
Decided: September 30, 2003
On Appellant's Appeal from the Industrial Accident Board. DENIED.
Lillie M. Jackson Pro se.
John W. Morgan, Esquire; Wilmington, DE. Attorney for Ametek, Inc./Haveg Division.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Before this Court is Appellant's Appeal to the Industrial Accident Board. Upon review of Appellant's Opening Brief and Reply Brief and Appellee's Answering Brief, it appears to this Court that Appellant's appeal should be DENIED.
II. Background
The facts surrounding the accident at Ametek, Inc./Haveg Division (the "employer") and Lillie M. Jackson's (the "claimant") original petition to the Industrial Accident Board (the "Board") was set forth in this Court's decision previously issued on January 31, 1996. While the Court's remand to the Board was pending, the claimant filed a petition to commute benefits. This appeal relates to the claimant's subsequent dissatisfaction with the Boards approval of the petition.The Board conducted a hearing on June 13, 1996 to consider the Petition brought by the claimant to commute benefits. The claimant and the employer negotiated a settlement of $30,000. At the hearing, Robert Lobue, claimant's attorney, represented to the Board that the claimant no longer lived in Delaware, as she had moved to Georgia and that the settlement amount took into account her recent departure from Delaware and the risk that if the claimant was unsuccessful on remand that she potentially could receive no benefits. Thereafter, the claimant was sworn and her attorney questioned her. The claimant testified that she desired to settle the case for $30,000 and that she understood that if the Board approved the agreement, she could not seek further monetary recovery. The claimant further testified that her attorney had not only explained the matter to her on June 13, 1996, but on prior occasions as well and that she had a high school diploma and some college education and she was able to understand the consequences of her decision. She indicated that she would continue to receive Social Security disability benefits for physical problems unrelated to the work injury. The claimant explained that the settlement was in her best interest in light of her health problems and that she intended to use the money to move out of her daughter's house and into a place of her own. As a result of the decision to approve the settlement, the Board approved the commutation agreement and it was signed by claimant, her attorney, and the attorney for the employer.
On March 23, 1999, the claimant, pro se, filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due, where she sought permanent impairment benefits as a result of the October 1991 work accident. In response, the employer filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 19, 1999 based upon the terms of the 1996 commutation agreement. On June 17, 1999, the Board heard arguments on the Motion and found that the claimant had not produced any evidence to persuade the Board that she entered into the commutation agreement under duress or false pretenses. The Board granted the employer's Motion to Dismiss.
Thereafter, on February 11, 2002, claimant filed another Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due seeking permanent impairment benefits as a result of the October 1991 work accident. On May 29, 2002, the employer filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the terms of the 1996 commutation. On July 18, 2002 the Board heard the Motion and concluded that the claimant failed to produce any evidence to persuade the Board that she entered into the commutation agreement under duress or false pretenses. The Board granted the employer's Motion to Dismiss.
On September 24, 2002, the claimant again filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due. The claimant sought permanent impairment benefits as a result of her October 1991 work accident. The employer responded on November 13, 2002 with a Motion to Dismiss based upon the terms of the 1996 commutation. The Board heard the Motion on December 12, 2002 and again granted the Motion to Dismiss. The Board found that claimant produced no evidence, nor made any compelling arguments, that would persuade the Board that she entered into the commutation agreement under duress or false pretenses. Thereafter, claimant filed this appeal.
III. Standard of Review
This Court's standard of review for an appeal from a Board decision is to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the Board, and, if it finds such in the record, to affirm the findings of the Board. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court is not the trier of fact nor has the authority to weigh evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings and conclusions. Rather, this Court merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board's factual findings. Weighing the evidence and determining questions of credibility, which are implicit in factual findings, are functions reserved exclusively for the Board.
DiSabatino Bros., Inc. v. Wortman, 453 A.2d 102 (Del. 1982).
See Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).
See Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64 (Del. 1965).
See DEL. CODE ANN tit. 29, § 10142(d) (1997).
See Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1106 (Del. 1988), Conner v. Wells Fargo, 1994 WL 682486 (Del.Super.Ct.).
IV. Discussion
A. There Is Substantial Evidence To Support Board's Decision In Granting Employer's Motion To DismissThe commutation of benefits is governed by 19 Delaware Code, sectn 2358, which provides in relevant part, "[s]uch commutation may be allowed if it appears that it will be for the best interest of the employee or the dependents of the deceased employee, or that it will avoid undue expense or hardship to either party. . . ." Since the Board's approval of the commutation agreement was not timely appealed to this Court, that decision is final and may not be reviewed. On March 23, 1999 and February 11, 2002, the claimant, pro se, filed petitions to determine additional compensation. Those petitions were denied by the Board and were not appealed to this Court. On September 24, 2002, the claimant again filed a third petition to determine additional compensation. The Board denied this petition stating, "The Board again concludes that the claimant has produced no evidence, nor made any compelling argument, that would persuade it that she entered into the commutation agreement under duress or false pretenses and, therefore, the employer's Motion to Dismiss is granted." It is this decision that has been appealed and this Court is required to determine if substantial evidence exists to support that decision.
19 Del. C. section 2358 (2003).
Jackson v. Ametek, Inc./Haveg Division, IAB No. 1002536 at ¶ 6 (Dec. 12, 2002).
In claimant's Petitions to Determine Additional Compensation Due and on appeal, she argues that she entered into the commutation agreement under duress and false pretenses. She claims that her attorney failed to explain the terms of the commutation agreement and as a result, she did not understand what it meant. However, the claimant testified under oath at the hearing on June 13, 1996 that she understood the terms of the agreement and that she thought the agreement was in her best interest. Her testimony included the following comments:
BY MR. LOBUE:
Q Ms. Jackson, you just heard me moments ago explain to the Board how it is we are here today. It's been a long process for you, it's traveled about for years, and we are seeking the Board approval today of a $30,000 settlement. Is this what you want to do with your case?
A Yes.
Q Do you understand if the Board approves it here today that you will be unable to come back in for any further monetary recovers (sic) and that your only benefits will be the payment of medical expenses for your shoulder? Do you understand that?
A Yes.
Q Have I explained this matter to you not only today, but on prior occasions when the case was in the settlement stages?
A Yes.
Q Is this what you want to do?
A Yes.
BY MR. RICHTER:
Q Ms. Jackson, you understand that if the Board approves the settlement the only other benefits you will ever be able to come back for related to the accident of October 1st 1991 are reasonable, necessary and related medical expenses related to your right shoulder?
A Yes, I understand that. . . .
MR. DONOHUE: Are you sure this is what you want? The way you talk, I'm getting the signs that you're not happy. They are not emphatic answers.
MS. JACKSON: Well, it's been a long time and I'm tired; it's a lot of stress on me, you know, with this waiting. I just don't think my health will hold up any longer, so I'm going to agree to it.
MR. DONOHUE: You feel it is in your best interest?
MS. JACKSON: Yes, as far as my health is concerned, yes.
Tr. 06/13/1996, page 5-6, 7.
In contrast to these representations, at the Board's hearing held over five years later on December 12, 2002, she testified in response to a question whether she understood the meaning of the commutation:
MS JACKSON: No, I didn't and as far as being represented by counsel, I wasn't. There was someone pretending to be counsel for me but he wasn't and there was a done deal made in 1994 when my case should have not been denied because of some kind of mistake or something and this is why I'm thinking, I don't know what done deal there was but I would like to know what the done deal was, after all this was my Workman's Compensation that was stolen from me because off this done deal in 1994. Two years later they come running talking about giving computation of my benefits, how can I get additional when I haven't even gotten original benefits And as far as the computation, that should be considered null and void because of what happened in 1994 because something went on, it was a done deal. I should know about the done deal, my benefits were stolen because of this done deal.
HEARING OFFICER: From what he hear this issue has been raised several times since 1996 and each of those times various Boards, Members of the Industrial Accident Board have determined that under the circumstances the fact that you commuted your benefits, the fact based on the computation, you were not in a position to re-file for any other benefits and that decision, a similar decision has been made over and over again.
MS. JACKSON: Yes, but you're overlooking the fact, what dirty deal took place in 1994, why are you trying to cover this up to save the insurance company money, they've stolen from me. I exist on a Social Security check because of my injury, because of this insurance company want money, they've stolen it from me but I found out about it and their greedy and they've stolen from me and you keep trying to tell me, "Yes, you signed it, you signed this and that," what about what happened when they stole my benefits in 1994 with the done deal, "what is the done deal," I want to know what the "done deal" was, do you know Mr. Morgan?
Tr. 12/12/2002, page 3-4.
When specifically asked what the "done deal" claimed by her was, she responded, "I don't know what the "done deal' is you need to find out from the Industrial Accident Board, what is the `done deal', I would like to know what it is and you need to find that out before you dismiss my case. Mr. Morgan, your firm helped my case and made a done deal." It is upon this record that the claimant now requests that the Court reverse the Board's decision.
Id. at 5.
In Ware v. Baker Driveway, a Board decision granting commutation benefits to a claimant who needed the funds to start a new business was upheld. There, the establishment of a business was intended to help rehabilitate the claimant, as his physical and mental condition were eroding. Similarly, in the case at bar, the Board accepted the testimony of the claimant that the commutation agreement would be in her best interest in light of her health problems and her desire to use the funds to find a place of her own and move on with her life.
See Ware v. Baker Driveway, Inc., 295 A.2d 734 (Del.Super. 1972). It should be noted that a portion of the holding in Ware was subsequently overruled in Beam v. Chrysler Corp., 332 A.2d 143 (Del. 1975). However, the commutation of benefits issue was not affected.
The assertions made by the claimant in this appeal are nothing more than desperate, unsupportable allegations made by a claimant that in hindsight is dissatisfied with the settlement she knowingly and voluntarily previously entered into. Her arguments to the Board were vague and she failed to articulate a single fact to support a claim of fraud or misrepresentation. At best her allegation is that there was some conspiratorial agreement between her attorney, the employer and the Board to prevent her from obtaining her full benefits. Other than the claimant's unsupported assertion of a "done deal" there is no evidence to support this claim. Further, other than her obvious disapproval of the deal obtained by counsel, she has offered nothing to the Board to support the claim that she was inappropriately represented in the settlement agreement.
Simply put, the claimant under oath acknowledged the consequences of her decision to accept the commutation at the Board's hearing on June 13, 1996. She has offered nothing other than unsubstantiated speculation to undermine the Board's previous finding. As such, the Board's decision to dismiss her appeal for additional benefits was supported by substantial evidence and is legally adequate.
V. Conclusion
The Court finds the Board's decision to be sufficiently supported by the evidence for purposes of this appeal. Where the evidence is adequate to support the Board's conclusion, the Board's decision cannot be disturbed absent an error of law. Contrary to claimant's assertion, the record fails to indicate that an error of law occurred. The Court finds that the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error, and for the reasons set forth above, its decision is AFFIRMED and claimant's appeal is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.