Opinion
E038529
5-3-2007
J.A. et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL et al., Defendants and Respondents.
The Cifarelli Law Firm, Thomas A. Cifarelli and Dawn M. Smith, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Robie & Matthai, Edith R. Matthai, Bernadine J. Stolar, Gabrielle M. Jackson, and Natalie A. Kouyoumdjian, for Defendant and Respondent Little League Baseball. Ballard Rosenberg Golper & Savitt, Linda Miller Savitt, Adrian J. Guidotti, and Philip L. Reznik, for Defendant and Respondent East Baseline Little League.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs and appellants J.A. and S.W. appeal from judgment in favor of defendants Little League Baseball and East Baseline Little League following the trial courts granting of defendants motions for summary judgment in plaintiffs lawsuit against defendants seeking damages for sexual abuse they suffered from Norman Watson, a registered sex offender, through his association with East Baseline Little League. Plaintiffs contend that triable issues of fact exist as to whether East Baseline Little League was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries and as to Little League Baseballs liability for East Baseline Little Leagues direct negligence based on an agency relationship. We will affirm the summary judgment as to Little League Baseball and reverse as to East Baseline Little League.
Plaintiffs have requested this court to take judicial notice of the orders and rulings in a related superior court case, Hickman v. Little League Baseball, Inc., case No. SCV 078705, and of this courts file in the appeal of that case, No. E036838. Plaintiffs have not cited those documents in their briefs and have not explained their relevance. The request for judicial notice is therefore denied. Plaintiffs have also requested that we take judicial notice of the 1990 Little League Baseball Rules and Regulations. That document is not the proper subject of judicial notice, and the request is denied.
A third plaintiff, B.R., is also a party to the underlying action. B.R.s claims have been stayed pending resolution of this appeal.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We state the facts in accordance with the general rule that admissible evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
(Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.)
Little League Baseball is a nonprofit organization founded in 1939 and granted a federal charter in 1964. Little League Baseball operates through local leagues, which obtain charters from Little League Baseball. Little League Baseball allows the local leagues to use the Little League Baseball name and official emblem.
Under the Little League Operating Manual and Official Rules and Regulations (Regulations), each local league is autonomous. Each local league establishes its own administration, elects its own board of directors, and establishes guidelines that best suit the needs of the local community. The local league is responsible for the selection and supervision of coaches, managers, umpires, and other local volunteers. At all times relevant to the current lawsuit, Little League Baseball did not require local leagues to perform background checks of volunteers, although Little League Baseball did recommend league screening committees for selection of team managers.
Local leagues must comply with Little League Baseballs Regulations, which address the manner in which teams are to be established, the official playing rules, and basic safety rules. The Regulations do not give Little League Baseball control over the day-to-day operations of the local leagues. Little League Baseball, with a staff of a hundred or so employees, has about 2.8 million participants worldwide.
East Baseline Little League is a nonprofit California corporation that has been issued a charter from Little League Baseball. In 1990, Watson, who was a registered high-risk sex offender, began volunteering as an umpire and later as a team manager and coach for East Baseline Little League. East Baseline Little League did not check into his background.
In 1990, S.W. was five or six years old, and her 12-year-old brother K.W. played baseball at East Baseline Little League. Watson frequently visited the W.s home to play baseball with K.W. and K.W.s friend. He often picked up K.W. from baseball practice and took him to the W.s home when no other adult was there.
Watson occasionally stayed for dinner with the W.s, and he attended outings with them. Between 1990 and 1992, Watson sometimes babysat for S.W. and K.W. at their home while their mother was traveling out of town for weekends.
In about 1990, Watson began molesting the W. children at their home. He molested K.W. at least twice, and he molested S.W. by touching her unclothed breasts, digitally penetrating her vagina, attempting anal penetration with his penis, and directing her to orally copulate him.
Apparently, K.W. never revealed the molestations to anyone until his deposition was taken in the present lawsuit.
J.A. lived next door to the W.s., and in 1990 and 1991, J.A. was a member of an East Baseline Little League team managed by Watson. In 1991, Watson twice invited J.A. to come over to the W.s house to talk about baseball, and he molested J.A. at the W.s home when no other adult was at the house. On the first occasion, Watson told the other children to go outside and play. Watson then massaged J.A.s back, touched J.A.s penis through his pants, and had J.A. touch Watsons exposed penis. On the second occasion, a few weeks later, Watson took J.A. into the W.s house and tried to show J.A. how to masturbate. He and J.A. touched each others penises.
S.W. played T-ball with East Baseline Little League for the 1992 season, when she was seven years old. Watson did not coach her T-ball team. Sometimes on the East Baseline ball field, Watson suggested to S.W. that they go back to her house and play. He sometimes leaned close to her when he spoke to her and touched her face.
S.W. later joined Civitan Little League (Civitan), a separate local little league organization. Watson umpired some of her games at Civitan. He also sometimes rubbed her back and hung onto her shoulder straps while she played catcher.
When S.W. was nine years old, Watson sometimes waited for her outside the restroom during Civitan practices. He walked her back to the field, and he placed his arm around her and sometimes brushed near her breast. S.W. was fully clothed when this happened. She told Watson to stop, and he did.
In 1990, Don Lawrence was on the board of directors of East Baseline Little League. On one occasion, Lawrence was locking up the facilities after a game when he heard Watsons voice in the field house say, "`Hey, hey. Were up here." or "Were getting dressed." Lawrence later saw a man and a boy walking toward a car; they had to have come from the field house. Based in part on that incident, Lawrence suspected that Watson was a "pervert." Lawrence told other board members about the field house incident and told them he believed Watson was a pervert. The board seemed to take Watsons side. Board members told Lawrence he could be sued because of his statements about Watson.
Lawrence observed Watson spending too much time with some of the boys in the league and buying them gifts. Lawrence told his son to stay away from Watson. In addition, Lawrence told a friend, also a board member, that they needed to keep an eye on Watson and advised the friend to tell his own children to stay away from Watson. Lawrence felt that Watson could pose a risk toward children in the league from broken homes. On one occasion, Watson offered to give one of the boys in the league a ride on his motorcycle to get ice cream after a practice, and Lawrence prevented the boy from going with him because Lawrence felt Watson might be a threat to the boy.
In the early 1990s, when Lawrence was the president of East Baseline Little League, he took steps to remove Watson from working with children in the local league because Lawrence felt Watson was a danger to certain children in the league, but when Lawrence himself left the following year, Watson was brought back. When Watson returned to East Baseline Little League, he told a board member he had been in jail for a gambling debt.
In 1997, Thomas Simanek, an East Baseline Little League board member and parent, discovered that Watson was listed as a high-risk sex offender on the Megans Law CD-ROM at the sheriffs station. A board meeting was called, and thereafter, Watson resigned from East Baseline Little League. He was arrested in September 1998 on child molestation charges. He pleaded guilty to multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor and is currently serving an 84-year prison sentence. None of the plaintiffs had reported their molestations before July 1997.
In February 2004, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Watson, East Baseline Little League, and Little League Baseball. Plaintiffs alleged claims against East Baseline Little League and Little League Baseball on theories of (1) negligent screening, selection, retention, and supervision; (2) negligent failure to take reasonable protective measures; (3) negligence — violation of special relationship; (4) negligence — breach of fiduciary duty; (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (6) sexual harassment in violation of Civil Code section 51.9.
Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion for summary judgment as it related to the claim of violation of Civil Code section 51.9 and have not raised any contention on appeal relating to that claim. That claim is therefore not further discussed in this opinion.
East Baseline Little League and Little League Baseball filed motions for summary judgment on the ground, among others, that their acts and omissions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants on the ground that, as a matter of law, the public policy element of proximate cause precluded liability for Watsons criminal conduct at locations and during activities unrelated to East Baseline Little League or Little League Baseball. Judgment was thereafter entered.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
After a motion for summary judgment has been granted, this court "examine[s] the record de novo and independently determine[s] whether [the] decision is correct. [Citation.]" (Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149.) In doing so, we use the same three-step process employed by the trial court. First, we identify the issues raised by the pleadings. Second, we determine whether the moving partys showing establishes facts sufficient to negate the opposing partys claims, and to justify judgment in the moving partys favor. If so, third, we determine whether the opposing party has raised a triable material issue of fact. (Dawson v. Toledano (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 387, 392.) In making the determination whether a triable issue of material fact exists, "the court may not weigh the plaintiffs evidence or inferences against the defendants[] as though it were sitting as the trier of fact." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 856.)
B. Claims Based on Alleged Direct Negligence
Plaintiffs claims against East Baseline Little League and Little League Baseball are all grounded in negligence — (1) negligent screening, selection, retention, and supervision; (2) negligent failure to take reasonable protective measures; (3) negligence — violation of special relationship; (4) negligence — breach of fiduciary duty; and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Regardless of the theory asserted, the elements of actionable negligence include (1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) that the breach is the proximate cause of the resulting injury. (Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837; see also Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 292.)
The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that, based on public policy considerations, East Baseline Little League and Little League Baseball were not the proximate cause of plaintiffs damages. We will consider the issue separately as to each defendant.
1. Summary Judgment in Favor of Little League Baseball
Proximate cause involves two elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2) the extent to which public policy considerations limit a defendants liability for its acts. (PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 310, 315-316 [holding that an insurers negligent failure to settle a personal injury lawsuit was a cause in fact, but not a proximate cause, of the award of punitive damages].) The first element, cause in fact, is established if an act "`is a necessary antecedent of an event," and this element "`is a factual question for the jury to resolve." (Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1037, 1045.) The second element is "`"concerned, not with the fact of causation, but with the various considerations of policy that limit an actors responsibility for the consequences of his conduct."" (Id. at p. 1045 [holding that public policy considerations strongly militated against allowing a plaintiff to recover lost punitive damages as compensatory damages in a legal malpractice action].) Because "the purported causes of an event may be traced back to the dawn of humanity," the law imposes additional limits on liability that are not related to "simple causality." (Ibid.)
In Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, the court explained that the public policy considerations element of proximate causation is a "`policy-based legal filter on "but for" causation" that courts apply "`"to those more or less undefined considerations which limit liability even where the fact of causation is clearly established."" (Id. at p. 464.) Because this prong focuses on the public policy considerations limiting liability, and not on the fact of causation, it is a question of law for the court. (Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 547, 563; Brewer v. Teano (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1035 ["`Whether a defendants conduct is an actual cause of a plaintiffs harm is a question of fact, but the existence and extent of a defendants liability is a question of law and social policy"].) Thus, when the underlying facts are essentially undisputed, resolution of the public policy issue is appropriate in a motion for summary judgment. (See Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 834 (Evan F.).)
In Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th 828, the court refused to impose liability on a church that was sued by a molestation victim because public policy considerations did not support such liability. In that case, the pastor of a church molested a 13-year-old boy, who in turn molested his younger sister. A psychiatrist testified that the boy had molested his sister as a result of his own molestation by the pastor. (Id. at pp. 831-832.) The children and their parents sued the pastor, the local church, and the California-Nevada Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (the Conference), the larger organization to which the local church belonged. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Conference and the local church as to the parents claims because they were time barred and as to the sisters claims because the court concluded that defendants alleged conduct was not the proximate cause of her damages. (Id. at pp. 833-834.)
The summary judgment apparently did not encompass the boys claims against the Conference. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 833-834.)
The appellate court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the sister could not proceed against the Conference for negligence because the Conferences alleged negligent hiring was not the proximate cause of her damages under the public policy considerations element of the proximate cause analysis. The court explained, "`"Proximate cause" — in itself an unfortunate term — is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actors responsibility for the consequences of the actors conduct."" (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.) Legal responsibility, therefore, is limited "`to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." (Ibid.) In other words, "`[s]ome boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy." (Ibid.) To set this boundary, the court must examine "`the nature and degree of the connection in fact between the defendants acts and the events of which the plaintiff complains." (Ibid.)
The court reversed summary judgment with respect to the boys complaint against the local church for negligent hiring, holding that that cause of action did not implicate the same public policy considerations as his sisters cause of action. The court further held that summary judgment was unavailable because triable issues of fact existed as to whether the church had reason to believe the pastor was unfit and whether the church had failed to use reasonable care in investigating him. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 841-843.)
Applying these guidelines, the court held that the Conference was not the proximate cause of the damage to the sister. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 837.) The court explained that "[t]o conclude otherwise would impose liability on the person who hired the person who molested the person who molested the person in [the sisters] position," and "[t]his convoluted syntax alone argues against imposing liability in this situation." (Ibid.)
In the present case, with respect to Little League Baseball, the syntax is nearly as convoluted: plaintiffs seek to impose liability on the national organization that chartered the local organization for whom the molester volunteered and later worked as an employee when the molester, through the local organization, met and befriended the families of children he later molested at locations apart from Little League activities. We agree with the trial court that the nature and degree of the connection between the defendants acts and the events of which the plaintiffs complain was, as a matter of public policy, too attenuated to support imposing liability on Little League Baseball.
In reaching this conclusion, we rely on, in addition to Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th 828, another case with facts remarkably similar to those of the present case (although not cited by any party), Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718 (Jeffrey E.). In that case, a minor, Jeffrey E., brought an action against a church based on the minors repeated sexual molestation by a Sunday school teacher. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the church, and the appellate court affirmed. Although that case was brought on a vicarious liability theory, the courts analysis focused on the issue of proximate cause.
The court noted that although the Sunday school teacher was a volunteer, "[t]he [respondeat superior] rules applicability is the same for both unpaid volunteers and paid employees." (Jeffrey E., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 722, fn. 6, citing Malloy v. Fong (1951) 37 Cal.2d 356, and Leno v. Young Mens Christian Assn. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 651.) The Sunday school teacher, Ernest Schwobeda, had been a member of the defendant Central Baptist Church (CBC) since 1964 and a Sunday school teacher since 1967, and he participated in an organized visitation program for the church on Thursday evenings. Jeffrey started attending Sunday school at CBC when he was five years old, and he entered Schwobedas class when he was in second grade. Sometime thereafter, Schwobeda began picking Jeffrey up at his home on Thursday evenings. Schwobeda told Jeffreys mother the boy was "`his eyes" at night and helped him find the homes he was to visit. Jeffrey also frequently spent time with Schwobeda on Sunday mornings and evenings, and Schwobeda occasionally picked up Jeffrey on Saturdays to do yard work or other errands unrelated to church activities. (Jeffrey E., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 720.) For two years, Schwobeda molested Jeffrey unbeknownst to his mother, who encouraged the relationship. (Id. at p. 721.)
After Schwobeda was arrested and pleaded guilty to nine felony counts of child molestation involving Jeffrey, Jeffrey brought the underlying action. The church moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Schwobedas conduct was not reasonably foreseeable; Schwobeda had no ostensible authority or agency to commit the molestations; and the molestations were self-serving acts unrelated to Schwobedas duties for the church. The trial court granted the churchs motion for summary judgment. (Jeffrey E., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 721.)
On the churchs appeal, the court stated that its task was to determine whether Schwobedas activities were within the scope of his employment. In this regard, the court stated, "Certainly Schwobeda was not employed to molest young boys. There is no evidence the acts occurred during Sunday school. And the record indicates there was always at least one other adult present during the Sunday school classes. Only one of the acts to which Schwobeda pled guilty occurred on a Thursday, but we do not know whether this was during a visitation period. There is no evidence to suggest Schwobedas conduct was actuated by a purpose to serve CBC. Rather, the acts were independent, self-serving pursuits unrelated to church activities. Finally, Schwobedas acts of sexual molestation were not foreseeable `in light of the duties [he was] hired to perform. [Citation.] `There is no aspect of a [Sunday school teachers or members] duties that would make sexual assault anything other than highly unusual and very startling. [Citation.]" (Jeffrey E., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 722, fns. omitted.) The court therefore concluded that Schwobedas acts were not within the scope of his employment. (Ibid.)
With regard to public policy considerations, the court further explained, "[t]here was not an abuse of authority which had been established by reason of a special relationship created by CBC. Schwobedas `position of trust developed not because he was Jeffreys Sunday school teacher or because he was a member of CBCs congregation. Rather, it flourished through numerous other contacts sanctioned by Jeffreys mother. And it is undisputed that none of the acts occurred on CBC property or during Sunday school. It is also undisputed children were not a part of visitation; that was an adult function. Schwobedas actions in taking Jeffrey along during visitations were outside the scope of his authority as established by CBC. Finally, it was not asserted in the complaint that any of the acts of molestation actually occurred during any of the times Schwobeda took Jeffrey on visitation." (Jeffrey E., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 723.)
As in Jeffrey E., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d 718, the molestations of S.W. occurred through contacts sanctioned by her parent after the molester had formed a relationship with the parent. Moreover, as in Jeffrey E., the molestations occurred only during activities outside the scope of the molesters duties as a volunteer. Plaintiffs argue, however, that summary judgment was improper under Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377 (Juarez), in which the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant in the plaintiffs action against the Boy Scouts of America, the national organization, after the plaintiff was molested by a scoutmaster from his local Boy Scouts troop. The court reasoned that there was "sufficient evidence to raise triable issues of fact that the Scouts failed to take reasonable protective measures to protect him from the risk of sexual abuse by adult volunteers involved in scouting programs, and that the failure to take such steps exposed him to an increased danger of sexual molestation." (Id. at pp. 411-412.)
Juarez did not turn on the public policy considerations element of the proximate cause analysis; rather, the Juarez court found triable issues of fact regarding duty, breach, and causation. The court acknowledged that the evidence might "ultimately establish there was no breach of the Scoutss duty or that any breach was neither a cause in fact nor legal cause of any damages . . . ." (Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 413.) Moreover, in Juarez, the molestations were committed during "officially sanctioned scouting events, such as overnight camping trips, and at [the perpetrators] home." (Id. at p. 385.) Here, in contrast to the facts in Juarez, it was undisputed that none of the molestations occurred during any Little League-sponsored activity.
In the context of discussing whether the Scouts owed a duty of care to the victim, the Juarez court addressed each of the factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113, superseded on other grounds in Mastro v. Petrick (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 83, 87, including "the policy of preventing future harm." (Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 401.) In addressing this factor, the court stated, "Our greatest responsibility as members of a civilized society is our common goal of safeguarding our children, our chief legacy, so they may grow to their full potential and can, in time, take our places in the community at large." (Id. at p. 407.) The court went on to discuss the harm to children from sexual predators and the public policy against victimization of children that is evident in our criminal laws. (Ibid.) Based on this discussion, the plaintiffs argue that public policy supports imposing liability on Little League Baseball as the entity in the best position to implement effective screening measures.
The plaintiffs argument, however, as in Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 377, goes to the duty element of a cause of action for negligence. However, the issue presently before us is the public policy considerations element of proximate cause, and under that element, legal liability is imposed only based on "those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.) Juarez therefore provides no guidance in the present case when the sole issue is the public policy element of proximate cause.
2. Summary Judgment in Favor of East Baseline Little League
Plaintiffs contend that East Baseline Little League had reason to believe Watson was unfit and that East Baseline Little League had failed to use reasonable care in investigating him. East Baseline Little League is one step closer than Little League Baseball in the chain of causation of the molestations — East Baseline Little League entered into a direct relationship with Watson under which Watson first served as a volunteer and later as a paid umpire. Thus, the "syntax" (see Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 837) is less convoluted with respect to East Baseline Little Leagues potential liability for negligence.
In Evan F., supra, the court reversed summary judgment with respect to the boys complaint against the local church for negligent hiring. The court held that cause of action did not implicate the same public policy considerations as his sisters cause of action. The court further held that summary judgment was unavailable because triable issues of fact existed as to whether the church had reason to believe the pastor was unfit and whether the church had failed to use reasonable care in investigating him. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 841-843.)
For similar reasons, we conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of East Baseline Little League. As early as 1990, at least one East Baseline Little League board member formed suspicions against Watson based on Watsons behavior. That board member warned his own son to stay away from Watson and recommended to a friend that that friend take similar steps with regard to the friends own son. Thus, we conclude triable issues of fact exist as to whether East Baseline Little League had reason to believe Watson was unfit and failed to use reasonable care to investigate him.
C. Claims Against Little League Baseball Based on Agency Relationship
Plaintiffs further argue that triable issues of fact exist as to whether Little League Baseball had sufficient control over East Baseline Little League to establish the existence of a principal-agent relationship. A principal may be liable to a third person for negligently hiring or selecting an unfit agent. However, the plaintiff must establish the existence of an agency relationship. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 836.) In determining whether an agency relationship exists, courts look to the principals "`right to control the means and manner in which the result is achieved" by the agent. (See, e.g., Cislaw v. Southland Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1288 (Cislaw).) When the principal has no right to control the means and manner by which the agent acts, an agency relationship does not exist.
In Cislaw, the court held that a franchisor could not be liable to the plaintiff for the illegal sale of clove cigarettes to the plaintiffs minor son because no agency relationship existed between the franchisor and franchisee. The court noted that the franchise agreement gave full and complete control of hiring, firing, disciplining and scheduling of employees to the franchisee. (Cislaw, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1292-1293.) Even though the franchisor retained the right to control some aspects of the franchise relationship, the court held that this did not create vicarious liability for the franchisees exercise of its day-to-day operations. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs argue that there was evidence that Little League Baseball had the right to control and supervise East Baseline Little Leagues activities. Among other things, plaintiffs argue that Little League Baseball requires local leagues to comply with Little League Baseballs Operating Manual and its detailed Regulations, under the threat of having their charters revoked.
Here, however, Little League Baseball neither selected nor supervised Watson and was not even aware of his association with East Baseline Little League until his arrest in 1997. (See M.L. v. Civil Air Patrol (E.D.Mo. 1992) 806 F.Supp. 845, 849 [holding that the Boy Scouts of America was not liable for the negligent hiring of a local scout leader who had molested the plaintiff because the Boy Scouts of America was not in charge of selecting or supervising the volunteer leaders and therefore lacked the necessary control over employee selection to subject it to vicarious liability for negligent hiring].) See also Jeffrey E., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 724 [granting summary judgment to the defendant after concluding there was no vicarious liability under facts similar to those of the present case].)
In Evan F., the court permitted the boy to proceed with his suit against the church because it had hired the pastor without an investigation or inquiry, despite being aware of some difficulty with the pastors prior employment history. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.) In addition, the Conference was actively involved in the selection process: "Under the relevant hiring procedure, Conference selects the pastor for a local congregation after the district superintendent investigates candidates and consults with the local churchs committee on pastor/parish relations. Once the Conference makes its selection, the pastor/parish relations committee . . . may approve or disapprove the appointment." (Id. at p. 832.)
Here, in contrast, it was undisputed that Little League Baseball took no part in selecting or supervising Watson or approving his selection. Rather, Little League Baseball had no knowledge that East Baseline Little League had selected Watson as a volunteer or that Watson was a registered sex offender until after the molestations had occurred.
We conclude that plaintiffs have failed to show the existence of triable issues of fact that would support a cause of action against Little League Baseball based on agency.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed with respect to Little League Baseball. The judgment is reversed with respect to East Baseline Little League.
We concur:
RICHLI, J.
KING, J.