Opinion
A22-0406
11-03-2022
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-15-4420
Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Elise L. Larson, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2016, a jury found appellant, Rashad Ramon Ivy, guilty of four counts of aiding and abetting engaging in sex trafficking in the second degree, two counts of aiding and abetting solicitation to practice prostitution in the second degree, one count of domestic assault by strangulation, one count of solicitation to practice prostitution in the second degree, one count of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, and one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking.
2. The trial judge sentenced appellant to a 700-month prison term. Appellant appealed his sentence on three occasions, resulting in a reduction in his sentence to a 433-month prison term. State v. Ivy, 902 N.W.2d 652 (Minn.App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2017); State v. Ivy, No. A18-1338, 2019 WL 2168772 (Minn.App. May 20, 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2019); State v. Ivy, No. A19-1980, 2020 WL 3494345 (Minn.App. June 29, 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2020).
3. On December 22, 2021, appellant filed, among other documents, a petition for postconviction relief, a motion to remove the trial judge for cause, a judicial bias affidavit, and a memorandum of law in support of his motion to remove.
4. Appellant's petition for postconviction relief raised both constitutional and non-constitutional claims.
5. Appellant addressed the motion to remove the trial judge to the Ramsey County District Court chief judge. And appellant's judicial bias affidavit and memorandum of law described specific interactions and circumstances that appellant argues demonstrate the trial judge's bias.
6. On February 1, 2022, the trial judge denied appellant's petition for postconviction relief. There is no indication that the chief judge-or the trial judge- decided appellant's motion to remove before the decision on appellant's petition for postconviction relief.
7. Appellant's petition for postconviction relief was denied on the ground that appellant did not include "an Affidavit of Service showing proof of service to the Minnesota Attorney General as required when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged." The trial judge did not cite any specific authority for the decision to dismiss appellant's constitutional claims and it is unclear on what basis the trial judge dismissed appellant's non-constitutional claims.
8. Appellant timely appealed the order denying his petition for postconviction relief. We review a decision to deny a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020).
9. Appellant contends the trial judge erred by deciding appellant's postconviction petition before the chief judge decided appellant's motion to remove. We agree.
10. A party may "request to disqualify a judge for cause" if the judge's participation in the case would violate the Code of Judicial Conduct. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(3); In re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn. 2011). Judicial bias is a basis for disqualification. See Hooper v. State, 680 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn. 2004); Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A) ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .").
11. A motion to remove a district court judge "for cause must be heard and determined by the chief judge of the district . . . ." Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(3) (emphasis added); State v. Finch, 865 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Minn. 2015) (noting that the rule "clearly and unambiguously[] directs the chief judge to hear and determine a request to disqualify a judge for cause" (quotation omitted)).
12. Here, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to decide appellant's postconviction petition before the chief judge decided the motion to remove. See, e.g., Finch, 865 N.W.2d at 699 (vacating a district court judge's probation-revocation order where the district court declined to refer the motion to remove to the chief judge). We must, therefore, determine whether such an error is harmless. Rossberg v. State, 874 N.W.2d 786, 790 (Minn. 2016).
13. An error is not harmless and warrants reversal where a district court's failure to follow a procedure deprives a defendant "of a 'basic protection' without which the result [is] fundamentally unfair." Finch, 865 N.W.2d at 703 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999)); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 ("Any error that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded."). In a case involving a potentially disqualified judge, the substantial right implicated is the "right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal with a decision maker who does not appear to favor one side." Finch, 865 N.W.2d at 703.
14. Here, the error was not harmless. Appellant filed a motion, memorandum, and affidavit describing specific interactions and circumstances that appellant argues demonstrate the trial judge's bias. And neither the trial judge nor the chief judge decided the motion to remove, distinguishing it from cases where appellate courts reviewed the decision for harmless error. E.g., Rossberg, 874 N.W.2d. at 790 (finding harmless error where the postconviction judge decided the motion to remove, without referring the motion to the chief judge, but the defendant provided no factual support); Finch, 865 N.W.2d at 700, 705 (reversing and remanding where the trial judge orally decided the motion to remove, without referring the motion to the chief judge, despite defendant offering specific interactions to demonstrate the potential for judicial bias). Here, the record lacks any decision for our court to review.
15. Appellant is entitled to have the chief judge decide his motion to remove before the district court decides his petition for postconviction relief. If the chief judge denies appellant's motion to remove, the trial judge must consider the postconviction petition anew. Alternatively, if the chief judge removes the trial judge for cause, appellant is entitled to consideration of his postconviction petition before a different district court judge. See Finch, 865 N.W.2d at 705.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: 11/01/2022