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concluding that "the Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction in accordance with Section 2349" because the appellant had "improperly filed her notice of appeal with this Court instead of with the Superior Court of Sussex County"
Summary of this case from Hudson v. Beebe Med. Ctr.Opinion
C.A. No. 03A-04-010 PLA
Submitted: May 9, 2003
Decided: June 16, 2003
UPON EMPLOYER BELOW-APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED.
Gary S. Nitsche, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Claimant Below-Appellant.
Danielle K. Yearick, Esquire, Tybout, Redfearn Pell, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Employer-Below-Appellee.
ORDER
The State of Delaware ("Appellee") has filed this Motion to Dismiss the notice of appeal filed by Frances Irvin-Wright ("Appellant"), appealing an order of the decision of the Industrial Accident Board of the State of Delaware ("IAB" or "Board") resulting in the denial of Appellant's Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due, and request for attorney's fees, medical fees and medical witness fees. For the reasons stated below, Appellee's Motion is GRANTED.
Statement of Facts
On August 21, 2002, Appellant filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due with the Board requesting ongoing total disability benefits from the period commencing March 13, 2001. Appellant sustained an injury on January 4, 2000 while working for Appellee at the Indian River School District. Appellant also sought 10% permanent impairment to the right upper extremity as a result of her work accident.
The Board conducted a hearing on February 27, 2003. On March 7, 2003, the Board entered its decision denying Appellant's Petition, holding that Appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she had sustained a 10% impairment to the right upper extremity as a result of her work accident. The Board mailed its Statement of Determination denying Appellant's Petition on March 10, 2003.
On April 17, 2003, Appellant filed a notice of appeal with this Court appealing the Board's decision. Pursuant to Section 2349 of Title 19 of the Delaware Code, Appellant had within 30 days (April 9, 2003) of the day that the Statement of Determination was mailed by the Board to file her appeal. Appellant's notice of appeal was filed eight days late.
Section 2349 provides, in part, "[a]n award of the Board, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive between the parties, except as provided in ¶ 2347 of this title, unless within 30 days of the day the notice of the award was mailed to the parties either party appeals to the Superior Court for the county in which the injury occurred or, if the injury occurred out of the State, to the Superior Court in and for the county in which the hearing was had." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, ¶ 2349 (1995 Supp. 2002).
Parties' Contentions
Appellee filed its Motion to Dismiss on April 30, 2003. In support of its motion to dismiss, Appellee states that pursuant to Section 2349, the Appellant filed its notice of appeal with the Court beyond the statutory appeal period permitted under Section 2349. Further, Superior Court Civil Rule 72(i) mandates that the untimely filing of an appeal is a ground for dismissal since this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain untimely appeals. Moreover, Appellee argues that Appellant has also failed to comply with the mandates of Section 2349, as the notice of appeal should have been filed with the Superior Court for the county in which the injury occurred, i.e., Sussex County. Therefore, Appellee asserts, Appellant's notice of appeal should be dismissed as untimely and non-compliant within the statutory guidelines imposed by both Rule 72 and Section 2349.
In response, Appellant contends that her counsel did not receive the Board's Statement of Determination until March 24, 2003 and, therefore, Appellant had only sixteen days in which to appeal. Appellant argues that, notwithstanding the text of Rule 72 and Section 2349, a strict interpretation of their language in the case at bar would result in unfair prejudice to the Appellant. According to Appellant, Section 2349 requires that both parties have equal time to appeal, and that using April 9, 2003 as the final appeal date would allow Appellant only sixteen days in which to evaluate the potential merits of taking an appeal and to file an appeal accordingly. It is Appellant's contention that fundamental fairness requires both sides to a controversy to have the same amount of time to decide whether an appeal is meritorious.
Discussion
Under Rule 72 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal may be taken from the final decision of the Board by filing a notice of appeal with the Prothonotary of the appropriate county within the time prescribed by the controlling statute. Section 2349 of Title 11 prescribes that the award decreed by the Board shall be final, unless within 30 days of the day the notice of award was mailed to the parties, either party appeals to the Superior Court of the appropriate county.
Rule 72. Appeals from Certain Commissioners, Boards and Courts
(a) Application of Rule. This Rule shall apply to appeals to the Superior Court from all commissions, boards, hearing officers under the Personal Rules for Non-Judicial Employees, or courts from which an appeal may at any time lie to the Superior Court to be tried or heard on the record made below.
(b) How Taken. When an appeal is permitted by law, a party may appeal by filing a notice of appeal with the Prothonotary of the appropriate county within the time prescribed by statute. If no time is prescribed by statute, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 15 days from entry of judgment, order, or disposition from which an appeal is permitted by law. DEL. SUPER. CT. C.P.R. 72(a), (b).
It is well established that in construing the language of a statute, Delaware courts attempt to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, i.e., the objective of statutory construction is to `ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.' In the construction of a statute, the Delaware Supreme Court has established as its standard the search for legislative intent. Further, `[w]here the intent of the legislature is clearly reflected by unambiguous language in the statute, the language itself controls.' That is to say, if a statute contains unmistakable language, no interpretation is required and the plain meaning of the words control. The Delaware Supreme Court has found this analysis equally applicable to an interpretation of a court rule as well.
Ingram v. Thorpe, 747 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2000); State v. Cephas, 637 A.2d 20, 23 (Del. 1994).
Director of Revenue v. CNA Holdings, Inc., f/k/a Hoechst Celanese Corp., 818 A.2d 953, 957 (Del. 2003) (quoting Ingram, 747 A.2d at 547)).
Cephas, 637 A.2d at 23; Sandt v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 640 A.2d 1030, 1032 (Del. 1994).
Streett v. State, 669 A.2d 9, 12 (Del. 1995); Cephas, 637 A.2d at 23; Sandt, 640 A.2d at 1032 (quoting Spielberg v. State, 558 A.2d 291, 293 (Del. 1989)).
Ingram, 747 A.2d at 547; accord Eliason v. Englehart, 773 A.2d 944, 946 (Del. 1999); Cephas, 637 A.2d at 23; Spielberg, 558 A.2d at 293.
State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002).
Interpretation of legislative intent and statutory construction requires that a court first examine the text of the statute in its context to determine if it is ambiguous. By and large, a statute is ambiguous if it `is reasonably susceptible of different conclusions or interpretations.' A statute may also contain ambiguity, "[i]f a literal interpretation of the words of the statute would lead to a result so unreasonable or absurd that it could not have been intended by the legislature." Therefore, in those instances when a statute's language lends itself to ambiguity, "[a] court must seek to resolve the ambiguity by ascertaining the legislative intent." Concomitantly, in those instances when the language of a statute harbors no ambiguity and application of the literal meaning of its words would not be unreasonable, there is no basis for an interpretation of those words by the court.
Snyder v. Andrews, 708 A.2d 237, 241 (Del. 1998); State Dept. of Labor v. Reynolds, 669 A.2d 90, 93 (Del. 1995).
CNA Holdings, Inc., 818 A.2d at 957; accord Newtowne Vill. Serv. Corp. v. Newtowne Rd. Dev. Co., Inc., 772 A.2d 172, 175 (Del. 2001); Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985).
CNA Holdings, Inc., 818 A.2d at 957; accord Newtowne Vill. Serv. Corp., 772 A.2d at 175; Snyder, 708 A.2d at 241; DiStefano v. Watson, 566 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 1989).
Snyder, 708 A.2d at 241; Acierno v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline Corp., 656 A.2d 1085, 1088 (Del. 1995).
Snyder, 708 A.2d at 241; DiStefano, 566 A.2d at 4.
Upon examination of the pertinent language of Section 2349, the Court finds that no ambiguity exists. In particular, the statute clearly instructs that a party has 30 days from the date that the Board's notice was mailed to file an appeal to the Court. There is not an indicia of any accommodating language within the text of the statute that, upon interpretation, would permit an extension or tolling of the 30- day filing deadline due to exigent conditions or mitigating circumstances hindering or prohibiting compliance. If it had been the intent of the General Assembly to make provisions for such factors, it would have incorporated such ameliorating language within the statute. Additionally, there is no indication of any error in the processing, filing, etc., of the appeal attributable to the Court's personnel that could have hindered a timely filing.
Counsel for Appellant claims that his office received the Board's Statement of Determination on March 24, 2003 despite the fact that the Board's decision bears a mailing date of March 10, 2003. In reality, a copy of the United States Postal Service Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested Green Card indicates that counsel received the Board's decision on March 21 and that the office of workers' compensation received confirmation that the mail was received by counsel's office on March 24. Therefore, in actuality, counsel for Appellant had nineteen days, not sixteen days, in which to file an appeal. Whether nineteen days is sufficient time for Appellant's counsel to evaluate the merits of, and to timely file, an Industrial Accident Board appeal is not an issue this Court need consider. Assuming arguendo that Appellant had nineteen days in which to perfect her direct appeal, there is no remedy. The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider a direct appeal that is untimely.
Braxton v. State, 479 A.2d 831, 833-34 (Del. 1984).
Hence, Appellant's counsel failed to file a notice of appeal within the statutory prescribed period. Pursuant to Rule 72(i), an untimely-filed appeal is a ground for dismissal as the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear any untimely appeals. As such, jurisdictional defects cannot be waived. Moreover, there is no remedy for an untimely appeal since the Court lacks jurisdiction.
Rule 72(i) provides, in part, "[t]he Court may order an appeal dismissed, sua sponte, or upon a motion to dismiss by any party. Dismissal may be ordered for untimely filling of an appeal, for appealing an unappealable interlocutory order, for failure of a party diligently to prosecute the appeal, for failure to comply with any rule, statute, or order of the Court or for any other reason deemed by the Court to be appropriate. DEL. SUPER. CT. C.P.R. 72(i).
Eller v. State, 531 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. 1987).
Id. at 951.
In addition to the Court lacking jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's untimely appeal, the Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction in accordance with Section 2349. Appellant's original injury claim arose from a work related mishap while employed with the Indian River School District, located in Sussex County, Delaware. The statute clearly denotes that the appeal is to be filed with the Superior Court for the county in which the injury occurred. Appellant improperly filed her notice of appeal with this Court instead of with the Superior Court of Sussex County. Thus, Appellant's motion to dismiss fails due to this noncompliance with statutory requirements as well.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellee's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.