Opinion
CIVIL NO. 19-2146 (GAG)
02-26-2020
IRR GAS STATION CORP., Plaintiff, v. PUMA ENERGY CARIBE, LLC, Defendant.
Manuel Martinez-Umpierre, Arecibo, PR, for Plaintiff. Alberto G. Estrella, Francisco A. Ojeda-Diez, Kenneth C. Suria-Rivera, Estrella, LLC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
Manuel Martinez-Umpierre, Arecibo, PR, for Plaintiff.
Alberto G. Estrella, Francisco A. Ojeda-Diez, Kenneth C. Suria-Rivera, Estrella, LLC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
GUSTAVO A. GELPI, United States District Judge
On November 8, 2019, IRR Gas Station Corp ("IRR Gas" or "Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against Puma Energy Caribe, LLC ("Puma" or "Defendant") in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Court of First Instance, alleging breach of contract and requesting compensatory damages. (Docket No. 1). On December 20, 2019, Defendant removed the action to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Id.
On February 5, 2020, IRR Gas filed a Demand for Jury Trial. (Docket No. 11). In opposition, PUMA filed a Motion to Strike said request, arguing that Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the jury demand was not timely filed. (Docket No. 13). Defendant further argues that the Court should exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b) and deny its request for a jury trial. Id.
After reviewing the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Strike at Docket No. 13.
I. Legal Analysis and Discussion
Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a jury demand be timely made, no later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the last pleading on such issue. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b). If no jury demand is made, Rule 38(d) dictates that the party's right to a trial by jury is waived. Id. In removal cases, Rule 81(c) provides that a party entitled to a jury trial under Rule 38 must be given one if it makes a demand within fourteen (14) days after filing the notice of removal or being served with a notice by another party. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c). The failure of a party to make the demand as ordered is a waiver to its right. Id. It is worth noting that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico does not provide jury trials in civil cases. See Stewart v. Tupperware Corp., 356 F.3d 335, 339 (1st Cir. 2004).
Rule 39(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows district courts to grant a jury trial, even if the party has waived it for failure to file a timely demand. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(b). This rule states that, when a jury trial is not properly requested, "the court may, on motion, order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury might have been demanded." Id. Granting a jury trial under this Rule relies solely within the court's discretion. See Rivera Rosa v. Citibank, N.A., 549 F. Supp. 2d 155, 157 (D.P.R. 2007) ; see also Algarin-Torres v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 126 F.R.D. 8 (D.P.R. 1989). Rule 39(b) itself contains no reference to limitations on a district court's discretion. See Rivera Rosa, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 157.
Explaining how to exercise this discretion, the First Circuit has held that "the discretion under Rule 39(b) is very broad and that the case would be very rare indeed where a district court abused its discretion in denying or granting a Rule 39(b) motion." Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 200 (1st Cir. 1987) (abrogated on other grounds); Rivera Rosa, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 157.
Although Rule 39(b) does not provide any guidelines or limitations on the district court's discretion, several factors should be considered to determine whether to grant an untimely motion for a jury trial. See Rivera Rosa, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 157. These factors are:
(1) Whether defendants are prejudiced by the granting of the motion; (2) to what extent will special instructions be necessary so that the jury may understand the issues; (3) will factual matters be easily understood by the jury, and (4) possible delays caused by the granting of the jury request.
See Rivera Rosa, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 157 (citing Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 200 ).
In this case, Defendant offers no reason, other than Plaintiff's untimely filing, to deny the request for a jury trial. (Docket No. 13 at 3). Puma posits that IRR Gas's request for jury trial was filed forty (40) days after the notice of removal. Id. at 6. It avers that Plaintiff's delay is inexcusable because its counsel has had experience litigating before this Court. Id.
Plaintiff, in its demand for jury trial, explained that failure to file a timely request constituted a good faith inadvertence and honest mistake. (Docket No. 11 ¶ 4). Furthermore, in its opposition to Defendant's motion to strike, IRR Gas emphasized that the Court has exercised its discretion before, under Rule 39(b), and ordered a trial jury even when the motion is untimely. (Docket No. 14 ¶ 5). See Rivera Rosa, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 157. Plaintiff also claims that Puma did not allege prejudice or any other circumstance that could weigh in favor of a bench trial. (Docket No. 14 ¶ 9).
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Although Rule 38(b) establishes that a party may demand a trial by jury no later than fourteen (14) days after the notice of removal, Plaintiff's failure to file the demand within the established term did not cause any actual or potential prejudice to Defendant. See Rivera Rosa, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 157. Additionally, besides the absence of any prejudice, the Court deems that the facts of this case can be understood by a jury and there would be no need for an extended list of instructions. Id. Thus, granting a trial by jury would not cause any delays. The discretion afforded by Rule 39(b) will be exercised to order trial by jury.
The Court stresses the importance of complying with the terms set by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Parties must always strictly abide with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable law and the court orders. The Court's ruling responds to the fact that no prejudice has been caused and because there is a "strong federal policy favoring trial by jury of issues of fact." Algarin-Torres, 126 F.R.D. at 10.
II. Conclusion
For the reasons expressed above, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Strike at Docket No. 13.