Opinion
3D23-1418
05-01-2024
Fernando A. Irizarry, Appellant, v. The State of Florida, Appellee.
Fernando A. Irizarry, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lower Tribunal Nos. F18-12351 & 20-2292 Javier Enriquez, Judge.
Fernando A. Irizarry, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES, and GORDO, JJ.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
SCALES, J.
In this Jimmy Ryce Act proceeding, appellant Fernando A. Irizarry challenges the trial court's denial of both his demand for an adversarial probable cause hearing and his motion for a more definite statement. Appellee State of Florida has moved to dismiss Irizarry's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that because Jimmy Ryce Act proceedings - which govern the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators - are civil in nature, any appeals from such proceedings are limited either to orders that are final or to orders that are specifically enumerated in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. We agree with the State and, therefore, dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2020, Irizarry pleaded guilty to violating his sexual offender registration requirements, and for unlawfully residing within 2,500 feet of a school. After receiving a positive recommendation from the multidisciplinary team, the State filed a petition pursuant to sections 394.910-931 of the Florida Statutes, commonly referred to as the Jimmy Ryce Act, for the involuntary civil commitment of Irizarry and to declare Irizarry a sexually violent predator.
Specifically, section 394.914 authorizes the State to file a petition for the involuntary civil commitment of a sexually violent predator. The petition must be based upon a positive or negative recommendation from the multidisciplinary team, the procedure for which is outlined in section 394.913. Here, prior to the expiration of Irizarry's criminal sentence, the Department of Children and Families' multidisciplinary team assessed whether Irizarry qualified for involuntary civil commitment, and it concluded that he did.
In opposition to the State's petition, Irizarry argued below that the State failed to establish probable cause in its petition, and that it was improper for the court to conduct an ex parte hearing to determine probable cause. Irizarry demanded that the trial court conduct an adversarial probable cause hearing and sought to compel the State to file a more definite statement. The State filed a response in opposition to Irizarry's motion, and ultimately, the trial court entered a June 23, 2023 order denying Irizarry's motion.
Borrowing from language contained in standard orders that summarily deny post-conviction motions, the June 23rd order states that Irizarry may appeal the order within thirty days, and that, if Irizarry does appeal the order, the lower court clerk shall transmit Irizarry's motion, the State's response, and the order to this Court. Thereafter, acting pro se, Irizarry filed the instant appeal seeking review of the June 23rd order. The State then filed the instant motion to dismiss, asserting that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the challenged June 23rd order.
Irizarry filed his initial brief contemporaneously with the filing of his notice of appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
At the outset, we note that our appellate jurisdiction is determined by the Florida Constitution, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Caufield_v. Cantele, 837 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla. 2002) ("[D]istrict courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Florida Constitution."). Hence, notwithstanding any statements regarding appellate jurisdiction that may be contained in a trial court order, we have an independent duty to exercise appellate jurisdiction only where such jurisdiction is authorized.
Irizarry contends that because the order on appeal contains language stating that Irizarry "has the right to appeal this order to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District" the order is a final, appealable order. This argument is unavailing because "[o]ne cannot transform a nonfinal order into a final order by calling it final." Coral Gables Imps., Inc. v. Suarez, 306 So.3d 348, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting Jackson v. Alverez, 831 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ill.App.Ct. 2005)).
Proceedings initiated under the Jimmy Ryce Act are civil in nature rather than criminal. § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2023) ("It is therefore the intent of the Legislature to create a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators."); see Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93, 100 (Fla. 2002). Thus, because these proceedings are civil in nature, appeals are limited to final orders that end judicial labor in the case, as well as those listed in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A)-(B) (limiting appellate jurisdiction of Florida's district courts to final orders and non-final orders prescribed by rule 9.130); Fla. R. App. 9.130(a)(3)(A)-(H) (outlining the appealable non-final orders); see Adweiss LLLP v. Daum, 367 So.3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) ("It is axiomatic that our appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing final orders and those non-final orders specifically contained in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130's schedule of appealable, non-final orders.").
Here, the trial court's June 23rd order denying Irizarry's demand for an adversarial probable cause hearing and Irizarry's motion for a more definite statement is not appealable as either a final order or as a non-final order. First, the order is not appealable as a final order because it does not end judicial labor in the case. S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So.2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974) ("Generally, the test employed by the appellate court to determine finality of an order . . . is whether the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause[.]"). Indeed, the June 23rd order is purely interlocutory in nature. The trial court merely denied Irizarry's motion seeking a more definite statement, and Irizarry's demand that the trial court conduct an adversarial probable cause hearing, which is a decision that is purely at the trial court's discretion. Further judicial labor, in the form of a determination as to whether Irizarry is a sexually violent predator under section 394.917, remains. Hence, the challenged order is plainly non-final.
Section 394.915 provides that "the court may conduct an adversarial probable cause hearing if it determines such hearing is necessary." § 394.915(2), Fla. Stat. (2023) (emphasis added).
Of note, section 394.917(1) expressly provides the right to appeal the determination that a person is a sexually violent predator.
Further, the order is not an appealable, non-final order because it is not within the schedule of appealable, non-final orders contained in rule 9.130. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(A)-(H); Local Door Coupons Franchise, Inc. v. Mayers, 261 So.3d 726, 728 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ("This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review only those non-final trial court orders scheduled in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3).").Because the challenged order does not end judicial labor in the case and is not appealable as one of the listed non-final orders, we lack appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the trial court's June 23rd interlocutory order.Accordingly, we are compelled to dismiss the appeal.
We also note that the challenged June 23rd order is not the type contained in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(A)-(G)'s schedule of orders appealable by a defendant in criminal cases.
While this Court may review, via certiorari, certain non-final orders where (i) the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law, (ii) resulting in irreparable injury, see Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Assn, 104 So.3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012), we decline to treat Irizarry's appeal as a certiorari petition to review the June 23rd order, because neither requirement for certiorari has been satisfied. On the merits, there is likely no departure from the essential requirements of the law, because section 394.915(2) provides courts with the discretion to conduct an adversarial probable cause hearing. See Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983) (recognizing that a departure from the essential requirements of the law exists "only when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice"); Barker v. Barker, 909 So.2d 333, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("A decision made according to the form of the law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as applied to the facts, does not rise to the necessary level [to warrant certiorari relief]."). Nonetheless, we do not have certiorari jurisdiction, and do not reach the merits, because Irizarry cannot establish the requisite irreparable harm - i.e., harm that cannot be remedied on plenary appeal - from the challenged June 23rd order, as section 394.917(1) expressly authorizes plenary appellate review of a sexually violent predator designation. See San Perdido Ass'n, 104 So.3d at 351 ("[B]efore certiorari can be used to review non-final orders, the appellate court must focus on the threshold jurisdictional question: whether there is a material injury that cannot be corrected on appeal, otherwise termed as irreparable harm.").
Appeal dismissed.