Opinion
NO. 00-2003-CIV-KING
March 14, 2001
Counsel for Defendant National Labor Relations Board: Margery E. Lieber, Esq., Assistant General Counsel for Special Litigation, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
Counsel for Defendant Seaboard Marine Limited: Michael W. Casey, III, Muller, Mintz, Kornreich, Caldwell, Casey, Crosland Bramnick, P.A. First Union Financial Center, Miami, Florida.
Counsel for Plaintiff: Jack R. Reiter, Esq., Adorno Zeder, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant National Labor Relations Board's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment filed November 27, 2000 and Defendant Seaboard Marine Limited's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment filed December 8, 2000. Plaintiff International Longshoreman's Association, Local 1922 ("Local 1922"), filed a Response on January 8, 2001. Defendant Seaboard Marine Limited ("Seaboard") filed a Reply on January 19, 2001. Defendant National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board") filed a Reply on March 2, 2001.
Seaboard is a business that transports cargo between the United States and various destinations in the Americas. Seaboard conducts part of its shipping business at the Port of Miami and stores cargo in the 36th Street Yard. (SEE Amend. Compl. 3). Local 1922 is a labor union affiliated with the International Longshoreman's Association, AFL-CIO. On November 25, 1997, Local 1922 filed a petition with the NLRB to designate certain classes of Seaboard's employees as a unit for collective bargaining purposes. (See Amend. Compl. 18). Local 1922 petition covered 17 employees from three job classifications. Seaboard filed objections to Local 1922's petition on the grounds that the only appropriate bargaining unit was a wall-to-wall, including about 198 employees from fifteen job classifications. The NLRB Acting Regional Director conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 12, 1997 to determined the appropriate bargaining units. The Acting Regional Director concluded that the 17 employees of the three job classification shared a sufficient community of interest and certified them as a unit. (See Amend. Compl., Ex. A, NLRB Decision Dated January 9, 1998). Seaboard filed a timely request for the NLRB to review its Acting Regional Director's decision. On February 4, 1998, the NLRB granted Seaboard's request stating that the Acting Director's decision "raises substantial issues warranting review.") (Amend. Compl. Ex. B, February 4, 1998 NLRB Order). On February 5, 1999, the NLRB reversed the Acting Regional Director's decision and vacated the election held on February 5, 1998. The NLRB remanded the case to the Regional Director to determine the appropriate unit for collective bargaining, the adequacy of the Local 1922's showing of interest in such a unit and the scheduling of a new election. (See Amend. Compl., Seaboard Marine. Ltd., 327 NLRB 108 (1999)). The NLRB found that the Acting Regional Director's decision was contrary to "well established [NLRB law] that the Board does not approve fractured units, i.e., combinations of employees that are too narrow in scope or that have no rational basis." (Id.). On March 26, 1999, the Regional Director issued a Supplemental Decision and Direction of Election in which she concluded that the only appropriate unit was an overall unit of employees. (See Amend. Compl., Ex D., Supplemental Decision) Local 1922 requested for the NLRB to review the Acting Director's Supplemental Decision. However, the NLRB denied Local 1922 request for failure to raise any issues warranting review. (See Amend. Compl., Ex. E).
Local 1922 filed suit on June 6, 2000 and amended its Complaint on October 16, 2000 against NLRB and Seaboard. In Local 1922's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, it seeks declaratory judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that the NLRB violated its own rules and regulations and statutory directives by reviewing and/or reversing a decision by the Acting Regional Director in a representation case and that the NLRB violated Local 1922 and Seaboard employees' constitutional due process rights by denying Seaboard's employees the right to select a bargaining representative as authorized under the Nation Labor Relations Act. Specifically, Local 1922 requests that this Court reinstate the NLRB's Acting Regional Director original decision that the trailer interchange clerks, vehicle and equipment receiving clerks, and equipment control clerks are an appropriate unit for bargaining purposes and recognize the ballots from the election held on February 15, 1998 as the true expression of the unit members' will. The NLRB moves for dismissal of the Amended Complaint on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Local 1922 claims, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failing to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Seaboard seeks dismissal of the Amended Complaint on the same grounds as NLRB moves.
II. Legal Standard
Dismissal is justified only when "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief'" See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 810(1993) (quoting McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980)). The complaint at issue should be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all facts alleged by the plaintiff are accepted as true. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. Regardless of the alleged facts, however, a court may dismiss a complaint on a dispositive issue of law. See Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
III. Discussion
Under 29 U.S.C. § 159(b), the NLRB has the authorization and responsibility to determine what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. The NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over questions regarding representation. See Minn-Dak Farmers Coop. Employees Org. v. Minn-Dak Farmers Coop., 3 F.3d 1199, 1201 (8th Cir. 1993). It is settled law that NLRB decisions regarding representations are generally directly non-reviewable by district courts except in certain limited circumstances. Federal courts have recognized three circumstances where federal jurisdiction exists over representation matters. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 1963, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963) (finding federal jurisdiction where "public questions particularly high in the scale of our national interest because of their international complexion.")(Id. at 17); Milk Ice Cream Drivers' Union Local 98 v. McCulloch, 306 F.2d 763 (U.S. App. D.C. 1962) (federal jurisdiction exists where the NLRB has violated a constitutional right of the complaining party); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184(1958) (finding federal jurisdiction where the NLRB had clearly acted "in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act.") Id. at 188. InBoire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1964), the Court held that "[t]he [Leedom v.] Kyne exception is a narrow one, not to be extended to permit plenary district court review of Board orders in certification proceedings whenever it can be said that an erroneous assessment of the particular facts before the Board has led it to a conclusion which does not comport with the law." Id. at 481. Local 1922 only relies on the constitutional deprivation and Leedom v. Kyne exception as ground for this Court's jurisdiction.
Section 159(b) of the National Labor Relations Act states that: The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation or (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.
NLRB argues that Local 1922 claims do not meet any of the exceptions for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. On the other hand, Local 1922 argues that its constitutional right as codified in 29 U.S.C. § 157 for "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing" has been violated by Seaboard employees' ability to determine their own representatives. In response, NLRB contends that Local 1922 failed to make a clear and strong showing that the NLRB violated Local 1922 constitutional rights. This Court agrees.
Next, Local 1922 argues that the Leedom v. Kyne exceptions applies here because the NLRB acted in excess of "clear and mandatory" statutory provisions by not articulating a reason for reviewing the Acting Regional Director's decision as required by 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c) and exceeded its authority by reviewing the Acting Regional Director's decision. Local 1922's Amended Complaint does not allege that the NLRB violated a clear and mandatory statutory provision as required for theLeedom v. Kyne exception. This Court finds that Local 1922 failed to meet to Leedom v. Kyne exception because under 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) the NLRB has discretion to determine appropriate bargaining units. See Computer Sciences Corp. v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 1982). The instant case involves representation matters, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The NLRB is not mandated by statute to state specific reasons when it decides to grant review of a NLRB representation decision. See NLRB v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 709 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, the NLRB found that the Acting Regional Director's decision "raises substantial issues warranting review" in its February 4, 1998 NLRB Order and concluded that the Acting Regional Director's decision was contrary to establish law. Hence, the NLRB complied with it's rules and regulations.
(c) The Board will grant a request for review only where compelling reasons exist therefor. Accordingly, a request for review may be granted only upon one or more of the following grounds: (1) That a substantial question of law or policy is raised because of (i) the absence of, or (ii) a departure from, officially reported Board precedent. (2) That the regional director's decision on a substantial factual issue is clearly erroneous on the record and such error prejudicially affects the rights of a party. (3) That the conduct of the hearing or any ruling made in connection with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error. (4) That there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important Board rule or policy.
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, this Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Local 1922 claims.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, and the Court being otherwise fully advised, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant National Labor Relations Board's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Defendant Seaboard Marine Limited's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint be, and the same are hereby, GRANTED. All other pending Motions are hereby DENIED as MOOT. It is further
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the above-styled be, and the same is hereby, DISMISSED with prejudice.