Opinion
No. COA14–1303.
05-05-2015
INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Macie Louise MOORING, James Mooring, Jerry Alan Carraway, Robert Linwood Jones, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Erica Lynn Ealey Jones, Robert Linwood Jones as Guardian ad Litem for Makenna Linn Jones and Kailey Grace Jones, Christopher Cooper, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Kaleigh Louise Cooper, Defendants.
Bennett & Guthrie, P.L.L.C., by Rodney A. Guthrie and Kimberly S. Shipley, for plaintiff-appellant. Everett, Womble & Lawrence, L.L.P., by Ronald T. Lawrence, II, for defendant-appellees Christopher Cooper and the Estate of Kaleigh Louise Cooper. Gerrans, Foster & Sargeant, P.A., by Jonathan L. Sargeant, for defendant-appellee Robert Linwood Jones, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Erica Lynn Ealey Jones. White & Allen, by Matthew S. Sullivan, for defendant-appellee Robert Linwood Jones, Individually and as guardian ad litem for Makenna Linn Jones and Kailey Grace Jones. Dees, Smith, Powell, Jarrett, Dees & Jones, by Tommy W. Jarrett, for defendant-appellees James Mooring and Macie Mooring.
Bennett & Guthrie, P.L.L.C., by Rodney A. Guthrie and Kimberly S. Shipley, for plaintiff-appellant.
Everett, Womble & Lawrence, L.L.P., by Ronald T. Lawrence, II, for defendant-appellees Christopher Cooper and the Estate of Kaleigh Louise Cooper.
Gerrans, Foster & Sargeant, P.A., by Jonathan L. Sargeant, for defendant-appellee Robert Linwood Jones, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Erica Lynn Ealey Jones.
White & Allen, by Matthew S. Sullivan, for defendant-appellee Robert Linwood Jones, Individually and as guardian ad litem for Makenna Linn Jones and Kailey Grace Jones.
Dees, Smith, Powell, Jarrett, Dees & Jones, by Tommy W. Jarrett, for defendant-appellees James Mooring and Macie Mooring.
TYSON, Judge.
Plaintiff, Integon National Insurance Company (“Integon”), appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. We affirm.
I. Background
On 27 August 2012, defendant, Macie Mooring (“Macie”), was driving a 2005 Chevrolet owned by defendant Robert Linwood Jones on U.S. Highway 13 in Snow Hill. Mooring is alleged to have crossed the centerline of the highway and collided with a truck driven by defendant Jerry Carraway. Erica Jones, Makenna Jones, Kaleigh Cooper, and Kailey Jones were passengers in the vehicle. The accident caused bodily injury to all of the vehicles' occupants. Kaleigh Cooper, Macie's daughter, and Erica Jones died as a result of injuries sustained from the accident.
Macie's father, defendant James Mooring (“Mooring”), carried an automobile liability insurance policy with Integon. The policy was in effect on the date of the accident. The policy lists Macie as a driver, but does not list any vehicle owned by Macie, or the vehicle she was operating at the time of the accident.
Integon filed a declaratory judgment action on 27 March 2013, seeking a determination of whether Integon is liable under Mooring's automobile insurance policy to provide coverage to Macie. Integon filed a motion for summary judgment on 7 May 2014 and alleged Macie was not insured under the policy, because she was not a resident of her father's household at the time of the accident, or when Mooring renewed the policy in May of 2012.
The record contains depositions of James Mooring, Cindy Whitley, Macie's mother, and Christopher Cooper (“Cooper”), Macie's boyfriend. Macie was nineteen years old at the time of the accident. Her parents divorced when she was a child and she resided primarily with her mother. When Macie was fifteen or sixteen years old, she left her mother's residence to reside with Cooper.
Mooring owns a mobile home park in Goldsboro. Sometime in 2010, he allowed Macie and Cooper to live in one of his mobile homes at 101 Woodside Circle. Macie and Cooper conceived a child, Kaleigh, in 2010. When Macie became pregnant, Mooring allowed them to move into a doublewide mobile home he owned and located at 115 Woodside Circle.
Mooring lived in a separate residence, where he had resided since 1994. Mooring did not collect any rent from Macie or Cooper. The utilities were in Mooring's name and were paid by him. The other tenants in Mooring's mobile home park paid rent to Mooring and were responsible for paying their own utilities. Cooper occasionally contributed to the electricity bill, if he was employed. Mooring provided Macie with furniture, a television, and a washer and dryer for the mobile home. Mooring performed all of the maintenance on the mobile home where Macie and Cooper lived.
Both Mooring and Cooper considered 115 Woodside Circle to be Macie's primary residence. Macie slept at Mooring's home after she and Cooper argued. Cooper testified Macie spent the night at Mooring's home about once per week. Mooring testified that Macie slept at his house between two and four nights per month. Macie slept in a guest bedroom in Mooring's home and kept her clothes there. She also had a crib there for her daughter, Kaleigh. Mooring did not allow Cooper to stay at the mobile home if Macie was not there. On those occasions he would sleep at his mother's residence. Mooring testified that Macie was free to come and go from his residence as she pleased.
Macie never owned her own vehicle. Mooring also owns a car dealership and furnished Macie vehicles to drive. He also purchases all of the gas for the vehicles Macie drives. Macie was included on her father's automobile insurance policy since she had obtained her driver's license at age sixteen. Mooring pays all of the premiums on the policy. Macie does not own her own, separate insurance policy. Mooring renewed the policy after the accident, and continued to list Macie as a driver on the policy.
Mooring testified Macie was dependent upon him for financial support in 2012. He provided her with rent-free housing, paid all of her expenses, and provided her with spending money.
The trial court found no genuine issue of material fact exists to whether Macie was a member of Mooring's household, and deemed her an insured party under the policy. Integon appeals from the order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
II. Issue
Integon argues the trial court erred by determining Macie was covered under Mooring's automobile insurance policy and by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
III. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 56(c) (2013). “An issue is ‘genuine’ if it can be proven by substantial evidence and a fact is ‘material’ if it would constitute or irrevocably establish any material element of a claim or a defense.” Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982) (citation omitted).
A party moving for summary judgment may prevail if it meets the burden (1) of proving an essential element of the opposing party's claim is nonexistent, or (2) of showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim. Generally this means that on undisputed aspects of the opposing evidential forecast, where there is no genuine issue of fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party must in turn either show that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial or must provide an excuse for not doing so.
Id.(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In a motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented to the trial court must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 378, 218 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975).
“Once the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima faciecase at trial.” Pacheco v. Rogers & Breece, Inc., 157 N.C.App. 445, 448, 579 S.E.2d 505, 507 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008).
IV. “Resident of Household”
Integon asserts Macie was not a “resident” of Mooring's household under Mooring's automobile insurance policy with Integon, and argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. We disagree.
Mooring's automobile policy with Integon provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Part A—Liability Coverage
INSURING AGREEMENT
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any insured becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. Damages include prejudgment interest awarded against the insured.... We have no duty to defend any suit or settle any claim for bodily injury or property damage not covered under this policy.
....
“Insured” as used in this Part means:
1. You or any family member for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or trailer.
The policy defines “family member” as “a person related to [the policyholder] by blood, marriage, or adoption who is a resident of [the policyholder's] household.This includes a ward or foster child.” (Emphasis supplied). The policy does not define the terms “resident” or “household.”
In the recent case of N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paschal,this Court considered whether the injured party was a “resident” of the insured's “household.” ––– N.C.App. ––––, 752 S.E.2d 775, disc. review improvidently allowed, 367 N.C. 642, 766 S.E.2d 282 (2014). The Court recognized that the word “resident” is “ ‘flexible, elastic, slippery and somewhat ambiguous [,]’ meaning anything from ‘a place of abode for more than a temporary period of time’ to ‘a permanent and established home[.]’ “ Id.at ––––, 775 S.E.2d at 779 (quoting Great American Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 78 N.C.App. 653, 656, 338 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1986) ). “Determinations of whether a particular person is a resident of the household of a named insured are individualized and fact-specific[.]” Id.at ––––, 775 S.E.2d at 780.
When a term included in an insurance policy is not defined and capable of more than one definition
[it] is to be construed in favor of coverage.... When an insurance company, in drafting its policy of insurance, uses a ‘slippery’ word to mark out and designate those who are insured by the policy, it is not the function of the court to sprinkle sand upon the ice by strict construction of the term. All who may, by any reasonable construction of the word, be included within the coverage afforded by the policy should be given its protection.If, in the application of this principle of construction, the limits of coverage slide across the slippery area and the company falls into a coverage somewhat more extensive than it contemplated, the fault lies in its own selection of the words by which it chose to be bound.
Id.at ––––, 775 S.E.2d at 779–80 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Where coverage under the policy extends to members of the insured's household, the term “household” has been broadly interpreted. Id.at ––––, 775 S.E.2d at 780. (citation omitted) “ ‘[M]embers of a family need not actually reside under a common roof to be deemed part of the same household.’ “ Id.(quoting Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 N.C.App. 102, 105, 331 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1985) ).
The insurance policy in Paschalcontains an identical definition of “family member” as the policy presently before the Court. Id.at ––––, 752 S.E.2d at 779. The injured party, sixteen-year-old Harley, was riding as a passenger in her cousin's vehicle when her cousin drove the vehicle off the road into a ditch. Harley brought an underinsured motorist claim against her grandfather's automobile insurance policy, issued by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. Id.at ––––, 752 S.E.2d at 776. The trial court determined Harley was not a resident of her grandfather's household on the date of the accident, was not entitled to coverage, and granted summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. Id.at ––––, 752 S.E.2d at 776–77.
The grandfather owned multiple houses and several hundred acres of farmland. Harley lived with her father in one the houses located on her grandfather's property. Id.at ––––, 752 S.E.2d at 777. Harley's father did not pay any rent to the grandfather. Id.Harley's grandfather also provided her food, clothing, utilities, transportation, and other necessary expenses. Id.The grandfather had a key to the house Harley shared with her father, considered the house part of the family farm, and felt free to enter it at any time. Id.We determined that Harley was a member of her grandfather's household under the policy, and reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. Id.at ––––, 752 S.E.2d at 782.
In Paschal,it is unclear whether Harley was listed as an insured party on her grandfather's insurance policy. Here, Macie is specifically listed as an insured party in the policy. This listing demonstrates Mooring's intent for Macie to be included as an insured driver under his policy. See Id.at ––––, 752 S.E.2d at 780 (“[I]n determining whether a person in a particular case is a resident of a particular household, the intent of that person is material to the question.”) (citation omitted).
Integon asserts this case should be distinguished from Paschalbecause in that case Harley was a minor child. Here, Macie had reached the age of majority at the time of the accident. Harley was determined to be a resident of her grandfather's household under his policy because of her dependence upon him for her basic needs, not solely because of her age. If the insurer intended to restrict coverage to only minor residents of the policyholder's household, it could have done so.
We disagree with Integon's assertion that the facts of this case are similar to those before this Court in Bruton v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 127 N.C.App. 496, 490 S.E.2d 600 (1997), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 573, 498 S.E.2d 379 (1998). In Bruton,the plaintiff lived in his own mobile home with his girlfriend and claimed he was a member of his father's household. We concluded the plaintiff was not a member of his father's household and affirmed the trial court. The undisputed evidence showed:
[the] plaintiff spent the majority of his time with his girlfriend in hismobile home in Faison; prior to the accident he purchased a health insurance policy for which he listed his Faison address; he listed his Faison address for a bank account; his utility bills were incurred at and mailed to his Faison address; his Faison address was given for all tax matters; and his Faison address was also listed as his ‘residence’ with the United States Post Office. In addition, following the accident plaintiff gave his Faison address to the medical authorities for all of his medical and accident reports. Although plaintiff spent two to three weekends per month at his father's house and stored some toiletries there, the overwhelming evidence shows that he consistently and publicly represented his Faison address as his residence. At most, plaintiff's occasional weekend visits could be characterized as family visits.
Id.at 498, 490 S.E.2d at 602 (emphasis in original).
The evidence in Brutonshowed the plaintiff had established his own residence and household, independent of his father. The facts of this case are more analogous to those of Paschal,than Bruton.Like Paschal,Macie was dependent on Mooring, the policyholder, for all her basic needs. Mooring provided Macie with furnished, rent-free housing, provided her with a vehicle and automobile insurance, paid for her gas, paid all of her utilities and expenses, and gave her spending money.
The record shows that Mooring intended for Macie to be covered as an insured under his automobile policy. Even though Macie lived under a separate roof owned by Mooring, she was wholly dependent on Mooring for her housing and basic needs. The trial court properly determined no genuine issue of material fact existed that Macie was a resident of Mooring's household at the time of the accident.
V. Conclusion
The record shows Macie was listed as an insured party under Mooring's automobile insurance policy, and she was dependent upon Mooring for her housing and basic needs at the time of the accident. The trial court properly determined Macie was a resident of Mooring's household and covered as an insured under the terms of the policy. The trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Opinion
Appeal by defendants from order entered 30 June 2014 by Judge Charles H. Henry in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 April 2014.