Opinion
A23-0237
07-31-2023
Rochelle Lynn Inselman, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed Date: 8/7/2023
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-12-11083
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Jennifer L. Frisch, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2012, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Rochelle Lynn Inselman with second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2010). A grand jury later indicted Inselman on a charge of first-degree premeditated murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2010).
2. The parties informed the district court that they were considering a plea agreement and mutually requested that the district court order a competency examination of Inselman pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 and 20.02. The district court ordered a Rule 20 examination. The Rule 20 examiner opined that Inselman was competent to proceed, and the district court found that Inselman was competent to proceed.
3. Inselman pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder. In the plea petition, Inselman acknowledged that she had been a patient in a mental hospital, had talked with or been treated by a psychiatrist, and had recently taken medication for depression. Inselman also acknowledged that she had not been coerced or threatened into pleading guilty. At the plea hearing, Inselman denied that her medications or conditions affected her ability to understand what she was doing, agreed that she was "clear in [her] mind," and agreed that no promises or threats had been made to induce her to plead guilty. Inselman waived her right to a jury determination of aggravating factors. The district court again acknowledged the Rule 20 examiner's opinion that Inselman was competent to proceed and then confirmed that Inselman understood her decision to plead guilty. The district court sentenced Inselman to 40 years' imprisonment, an upward durational departure from the presumptive sentence set forth in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
4. In 2013, Inselman filed a direct appeal to this court challenging the district court's imposition of an upward durational departure from the presumptive sentence. State v. Inselman, No. A13-0443, 2014 WL 621434, at *1 (Minn.App. Feb. 18, 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 2014). We affirmed. Id. at *3.
5. In 2018, Inselman moved the district court to withdraw her guilty plea on the basis that her plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Inselman asserted that she was "in the extremity of poor health and was incapacitated by her illnesses, therefore was unable to make knowing and intelligent decisions nor able to assert her wishes" and that her condition rendered her not competent. Inselman asserted that she "only learned of those conditions in the past year when she requested her medical files." The district court construed Inselman's motion as a petition for postconviction relief and denied the motion. It reasoned that Inselman's motion was untimely because she did not file it within two years of the disposition of her direct appeal and no exception to the two-year time limit applied.
6. In August 2022, Inselman retained new counsel and again petitioned for postconviction relief. Inselman argued that she should be allowed to withdraw her plea because it was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent, and that her petition was not time-barred or procedurally barred. The postconviction court denied the petition on the basis that it was untimely, procedurally barred, and her plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Inselman appeals.
7. A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years of the entry of a judgment or, if a direct appeal was filed, an appellate court's disposition of the direct appeal. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2022). But a petition filed after this deadline may be treated as timely if a statutory exception applies. Id., subd. 4(b) (2022). One exception applies when "the petitioner establishes that a physical disability or mental disease precluded a timely assertion of the claim." Id., subd. 4(b)(1). "Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (b) must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises." Id., subd. 4(c) (2022). A claim "arises" under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), when the petitioner knew or should have known of the claim. Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 558-60 (Minn. 2012). This is an objective standard. Id. at 558. "We review the denial of a postconviction petition for [an] abuse of discretion." Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272, 277 (Minn. 2019). The determination of when a claim arises is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 560.
8. Inselman argues that her mental-health conditions prevented her from bringing her postconviction claim before August 2022. The postconviction court found that Inselman's "mental illness is not a sufficient exception to the timeliness requirement," reasoning that Inselman had not explained why her mental-health conditions prevented her from timely asserting her claim and that she had filed a direct appeal in 2014 and a postconviction petition in 2018. The record supports this determination. As noted by the postconviction court, Inselman's mental-health conditions did not preclude her from seeking relief in 2018, when she asserted that she must be allowed to withdraw her plea because her mental-health conditions rendered her plea unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. She took this action approximately four years before her 2022 petition requesting plea withdrawal for the same reason. See Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Minn. 2015) (noting that the defendant's "alleged mental illness" did not prevent him from filing four previous requests for postconviction relief). And in an affidavit signed December 12, 2017, and filed in support of her 2018 request, Inselman asserted that she discovered conditions that she claims rendered her incompetent at the time of the plea "in the past year when she requested her medical files." Even if the mental-illness exception applied to Inselman's current petition, the record supports the postconviction court's determination that more than two years had passed since Inselman knew or should have known of her claim. Thus, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Inselman's August 2022 postconviction petition was time-barred.
9. The postconviction court also properly determined that Inselman's August 2022 postconviction petition was procedurally barred. "A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2022); see also State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). Inselman concedes that her petition is procedurally barred but argues for the application of the interests-of-justice exception. The interests-of-justice exception "authorizes review of an otherwise barred claim if the claim has merit and was asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay." Onyelobi, 932 N.W.2d at 279 (quotation omitted).
10. We have reviewed the record and Inselman's claims. We are not persuaded that Inselman's claims have any merit or were asserted without inexcusable delay. Neither the petition nor anything in the record supports a conclusion that Inselman's then-existing mental-health conditions rendered her plea unintelligent or involuntary. To the contrary, the record supports the conclusion that Inselman was competent to proceed and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered her plea. And we specifically note that Inselman sought relief in 2018 raising the identical issues set forth in her August 2022 postconviction petition. See id. (reasoning that a delay in bringing a claim was inexcusable because the defendant filed a pro se supplemental brief on direct appeal which contradicted their assertion that they lacked the ability to raise the issue sooner because their counsel never met with them). Thus, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Inselman's August 2022 postconviction petition was procedurally barred.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The postconviction court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.