Summary
In Inman, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that the trial court was not required to define the terms felony and theft in jury instructions regarding the crime of burglary.
Summary of this case from State v. BelyeuOpinion
A89A0203.
DECIDED APRIL 14, 1989. REHEARING DENIED MAY 9, 1989.
Burglary. Cobb Superior Court. Before Judge Robinson.
Roger L. Curry, for appellant.
Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Nancy I. Jordan, James F. Morris, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of burglary. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the trial court on the jury's guilty verdict.
1. Pursuant to the provisions of OCGA § 42-6-20 et seq., the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, appellant moved to dismiss the charges against him. The trial court denied the motion and this ruling is enumerated as error.
Notwithstanding appellant's attempts to distinguish Thompson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 379 ( 367 S.E.2d 247) (1988) and Greathouse v. State, 156 Ga. App. 491 ( 274 S.E.2d 835) (1980), those decisions are controlling. "[A]ppellant was tried within 180 days of receipt of all the items required by the statute." Thompson v. State, supra at 380. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss.
2. The trial court charged on the definition of "burglary," employing the language of OCGA § 16-7-1: "A person commits the offense of burglary when, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he enters or remains within . . . any building . . . or any room or any part thereof." The trial court's failure to give, without request, a further charge on the definitions of "felony" and "theft" is enumerated as error.
There was no error in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of "felony" because, under the indictment, theft was the only felony that was relevant. See Hibbert v. State, 146 Ga. App. 887 (2) ( 247 S.E.2d 554) (1978). Moreover, even if a charge on the definition of "felony" had been applicable, it would not have been in error to fail to give it absent a written request. See Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458, 462 (5) ( 265 S.E.2d 796) (1980). Likewise, it was not error to fail to instruct on the definition of "theft." "The word `theft' is not . . . a technical word of art with narrowly defined meaning, but a word of general and broad connotation, covering any criminal appropriation of another's property to the taker's use.[Cit.]" Henson v. State, 136 Ga. App. 868, 869 (1) ( 222 S.E.2d 685) (1975). "[A]bsent a request, [a term having a common meaning and subject to common understanding] need not be defined in the court's charge. [Cit.]" West v. State, 252 Ga. 156, 159 (2) ( 313 S.E.2d 67) (1984).
Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J., and Beasley, J., concur.