Summary
finding that plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded a living conditions claim where "the only specific condition she identifie[d]" was "'a large hole' in the shower area that had been covered over with plywood"
Summary of this case from Simmons v. CrippsOpinion
04 Civ. 5918 (DLC).
August 15, 2006
Appearances
For plaintiff: Monique Ingram, pro se
For defendants: Anna Nguyen Assistant Corporation Counsel City of New York New York, NY.
OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff Monique Ingram ("Ingram"), an incarcerated inmate proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages for alleged violations of her constitutional rights in connection with two incidents: a slip-and-fall accident in the jail showers on February 8, 2002, and the subsequent denial of medical care (the "slip and fall"); and an attack on her by other prisoners, with the alleged assistance of certain employees of the New York City Department of Correction ("DOC"), on June 29, 2002 (the "attack"). In addition to DOC, Ingram names the City of New York (the "City"), former warden of the Rose M. Singer Center Carolyn Thomas ("Thomas"), "Officer Steele," "Captain Parham," "Deputy Johnson," and "Captain Benson" as defendants. The City and Thomas bring this motion to dismiss the claims against all defendants. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
In the amended complaint, Ingram names the "City of New York Corporation Counsel" as a defendant. She has made no allegations whatsoever regarding the Corporation Counsel's involvement in the events at issue here. Therefore, the amended complaint will be construed as bringing claims against the City of New York, rather than the Corporation Counsel.
Background
Ingram originally filed a complaint with this Court on August 20, 2003 (the "2003 complaint") containing allegations regarding the attack. The 2003 complaint did not, however, make any claims based on the slip and fall. The only defendants named in the 2003 complaint were the individuals named in the present action; Ingram did not bring any claims against the City or DOC at that time. Chief Judge Michael Mukasey ruled that the 2003 complaint did not state a claim on which relief could be granted, and ordered her to file an amended complaint. Ingram failed to do so, and on January 27, 2004, Judge Mukasey dismissed the 2003 complaint, stating that "any appeal from the Court's order would not be taken in good faith."
Approximately six months later, Ingram filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. On July 29, 2004, it was transferred to this Court. In her complaint, Ingram stated that she had slipped and fallen in the bathroom of "Dorm 9" on February 8, 2002, and that she was taken to "the main clinic," where she was denied appropriate medical attention and refused x-rays. She also claimed that "unsafe conditions" in Dorm 9 caused the slip-and-fall accident. As to the attack, Ingram stated that Officer Steele had facilitated the incident by letting the attackers out of their cells; she also claimed that she was unable to eat for a few days after the attack and slipped into a diabetic coma as a result of another DOC employee's refusal to provide her with medical treatment.
At a conference on November 18, 2005, the Court determined that Ingram's claims regarding the attack were likely infirm because they had already been adjudicated through Judge Mukasey's dismissal of the 2003 complaint. Through an Order of November 21, Ingram was given an opportunity to amend her complaint to include further information regarding the slip and fall incident, including (1) any facts suggesting that it resulted from "a custom or practice on the part of the City or its agencies, as required to support municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)"; and (2) the names of the individual defendants involved in the incident and the basis for their liability. On December 15, Ingram executed an amended complaint, which was subsequently served on the City and sent to Chambers, but never filed with the Court. Ingram alleged that defendants DOC, Johnson, and Thomas "ET. AL." were "responsible for the condemned housing unit" where the slip and fall took place. She also claimed that the floor in the bathroom had caved in and had been covered with a plywood board that "sank in when walked on." Ingram stated that after she complained of these conditions, "inspectors" closed Dorm 9 "until all the violations were fixed."
The claims relating to the attack were not, however, dismissed at that point. Instead, Ingram was given an opportunity to amend her pleadings to remedy the defects identified by the Court. Ingram did not respond in any way to the argument that the claims based on the attack had already been addressed on the merits and therefore could not properly be adjudicated here. Those claims are hereby dismissed.
The City and Thomas argue that, because Ingram failed to file the amended complaint, "the controlling complaint for the purposes of this motion is [the] original complaint." The City was served with the amended complaint and therefore has suffered no prejudice from plaintiff's failure to file. The Court will file the amended complaint, which plaintiff mailed to Chambers.
On February 17, 2006, defendants Thomas and the City moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that (1) defendants DOC, Steele, Parnham, Johnson, and Benson were not served with either complaint within the 120-day window provided by Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or within the three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions; (2) DOC is a non-suable entity; (3) Ingram has not sufficiently alleged the personal involvement of any of the individually named defendants in the claimed deprivations of her rights; and (4) Ingram has not sufficiently alleged a claim for deliberate indifference to her medical needs.
Discussion
Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations" set forth therein.Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (citation omitted). Under the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, complaints must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (2). "[A] plaintiff is required only to give fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586, 590 (2d Cir. 2006).
When considering a motion to dismiss, a trial court must "limit [its] consideration to facts stated in the complaint" or attached or incorporated documents, Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005), and "must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in [the] plaintiff['s] favor." In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 384 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The court's duty "is not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Chosun Int'l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In addition, "[i]t is well-established that when a plaintiff proceeds pro se . . . a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations." Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A pro se complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).
To prevail on a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate "the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The conditions in which a prisoner lives "can give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation." Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). For such conditions to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must prove that they were "sufficiently serious" and that a prison official acted, or failed to act, with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Phelps, 308 F.3d at 185 (citation omitted).
Eighth Amendment analysis only applies to the treatment of inmates after they have been sentenced. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979). Pretrial detainees, on the other hand, are presumed innocent, and the state cannot punish them; therefore, the conditions of their confinement are analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.Id. Here, neither party has stated whether Ingram was awaiting trial or was already serving a sentence at the time of the slip and fall. Because both plaintiff and defendants rely on the Eighth Amendment in their motion papers, however, it can be inferred that Ingram had been tried by the time she sustained her injuries.
A plaintiff satisfies the first requirement if she demonstrates that prison conditions deny inmates "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Id. (citation omitted). Prisoners may not be deprived of their basic need for reasonable safety by conditions that "pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to their future health." Id. (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). "Ultimately, to establish the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must prove that the conditions of his confinement violate contemporary standards of decency." Phelps, 308 F.3d at 185.
To satisfy the second requirement, a plaintiff must establish that "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 185-86 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). This standard of "deliberate indifference" is equivalent to the "recklessness" standard employed in criminal law. Id. at 186; see also Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). A plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to prove a prison official's knowledge, and knowledge may be inferred from the fact that a risk was obvious. Phelps, 308 F.3d at 186.
Here, Ingram has sufficiently pled a violation of her Eighth Amendment rights based on the conditions of Dorm 9. Although the only specific condition she identifies is "a large hole" in the shower area that had been covered over with plywood, she also claims that there were many other violations of prison regulations that rendered the dormitory "unlivable." Given the obviousness of the risk posed by a large hole in a shower area, and the insufficiency of the remedy provided by the plywood sheet, knowledge on the part of prison employees can be inferred.
Indeed, in her opposition to defendants' motion, she claims there were as many as two hundred such violations.
The standard for establishing that inadequate medical treatment constituted a violation of a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights is similar to the standard for demonstrating a violation based on prison conditions: the claimant must show "deliberate indifference to [her] serious medical needs." Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A medical need is "sufficiently serious" when it is "a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain."Johnson, 412 F.3d at 403 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has met that burden here. She claims that in the days immediately following the fall, no x-rays were taken and no treatment was given. She also asserts that she was "still extremely in pain." While other statements in her complaint indicate that Ingram might have a difficult time proving that she was treated with deliberate indifference by the DOC medical staff, her allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The question remains whether any of the defendants named in the amended complaint could be held liable for either the dormitory conditions or the alleged denial of appropriate medical treatment.
For example, Ingram refers to x-rays taken within two weeks of the incident and to heat therapy treatment she eventually received. If discovery indicates that Ingram simply disagrees with the medical staff's assessment of the appropriate treatment for her injuries, the dispute would not implicate her constitutional rights. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 2000).
I. The City
A municipality may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged unconstitutional actions by non-policymaking employees solely on the basis of a respondeat superior theory.See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In order to establish municipal liability, "a plaintiff must show that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy." DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although this rule "does not mean that the plaintiff must show that the municipality had an explicitly stated rule or regulation, a single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, does not suffice to show a municipal policy." Id. (citation omitted).
With respect to the dormitory conditions, Ingram has alleged that there were multiple "violations" in Dorm 9. She further alleges that the problems went unaddressed until she wrote a complaint letter, at which point "inspectors . . . closed [the dorm] down until the violations were fixed." Taken in the light most favorable to Ingram, the failure to repair multiple dangerous conditions could constitute a "custom or policy" sufficient to establish the City's liability. This claim against the City will not be dismissed.
With respect to the alleged denial of medical treatment, Ingram has not alleged anything more than a single incident of inadequate care. This claim against the City will be dismissed.
The plaintiff has not opposed the motion to dismiss this claim against the City by any request for leave to replead or assertion that she could plead that a municipal custom or policy contributed to the failure to give her appropriate medical care.
B. Warden Thomas
An individual defendant "cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 merely because [s]he held a high position of authority, but can be held liable if [s]he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation." Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free School Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Personal involvement can be demonstrated through evidence showing that:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.Id. (citation omitted). Ingram's only allegation of Thomas's personal involvement in the events at issue is that the former warden was "responsible for the condemned housing unit." Read in the light most favorable to Ingram, this statement could be taken to mean that Thomas was negligent in her oversight of the employees who performed maintenance on the facility, and/or that she was the originator of the policy or custom of allowing unsafe conditions to go unrepaired. Given the liberal pleading standard for pro se complaints, this is sufficient to state a claim against Thomas for the conditions in Dorm 9. Ingram has not, however, alleged that Thomas had any involvement — supervisory or otherwise — in the alleged denial of medical care. That claim will therefore be dismissed.
C. DOC
The New York City Charter provides that "[a]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law." New York City Charter § 396. As a result, City departments, including the Department of Correction, cannot be sued. See, e.g., Westin v. New York City Dept. of Corr. Services, No. 05 Civ. 578 (LAK), 2005 WL 1253938, *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2005). The claims against DOC are accordingly dismissed.
D. Officer Steele, Captain Parham, Deputy Johnson, and Captain Benson
The statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983 is three years. Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2004). The limitations period starts running at the time the plaintiff knows of the injury on which she bases her action. Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, therefore, the statute of limitations began running in February 2002 and expired in February 2005.
To date, plaintiff does not appear to have served either complaint on defendants Officer Steele, Captain Parham, Deputy Johnson, or Captain Benson. Because the statute of limitations has run, Ingram could not properly serve defendants now. See, e.g., McGregor v. United States, 933 F.2d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 1991) ("the filing of a complaint does not toll the applicable statute of limitations beyond the 120-day period for service provided by [Rule 4(m)]") (citation omitted). Ingram's claims against Steele, Parham, Johnson, and Benson are therefore dismissed. Conclusion
Each of these defendants was identified in plaintiff's original complaint as having been involved in the attack. Ingram has not identified any of these defendants by name in her description of the events surrounding the slip and fall or the purported denial of medical treatment following that incident. As explained above, this is an alternate and sufficient ground for dismissal of the claims against these defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion is denied with respect to Ingram's claim against the City and Thomas based on the allegedly unsafe conditions in Dorm 9. Defendants' motion is granted with respect to all other claims against all defendants.
SO ORDERED.