Opinion
Civ. No. 03-2531(RHK/AJB)
September 12, 2003
Roger L. Kramer, Gislason Hunter L.L.P., Minnetonka, Minnesota, for Plaintiff
Frank E. Villaume III, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota, for Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff David Eugene Ingram, a/k/a Abrams ("Ingram") sued David B. Pavlak ("Pavlak"), Michael A. Wortman ("Wortman"), and the City of St. Paul (collectively "Defendants") claiming (1) unreasonable use offeree under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, battery, and assault. (Compl. at 5-7.) Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground that Ingram's suit is barred by collateral estoppel because he has pleaded guilty to obstructing legal process with force. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Defendants' motion.
Ingram also asserts a vicarious liability claim against the City of St. Paul.
Background
Both parties agree that the "Description of the Case" in their Rule 26(f) Report sets forth the basic facts of this case. (Pl's Mem. in Opp'n at 2; Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 2.)
On March 27, 2001, Ramsey County Sheriffs deputies attempted to serve a warrant on Ingram at his home. (Rule 26(f) Report ¶ 2(a).) Upon discovering that the deputies were trying to serve him, Ingram hid in his basement. (Id.) St. Paul Police Department officers Pavlak and Wortman, accompanied by their police dog, arrived on the scene to back up the deputies. (Id.) The police dog found Ingram in the basement behind a locked door. (Id.) Ingram agreed to surrender, as long as Pavlak and Wortman pulled the dog back. (Id.) Rather than consenting, Pavlak and Wortman removed the door and released the dog, which attacked Ingram. (Id.) Ingram wrestled with the dog and was hit by the officers. (Id.) Ingram's head, hand, and jaw were injured. (Id.)
Ingram was charged with, and pled guilty to, obstruction of legal process with force. (Villaume Aff. Exs. B, C.) Under Minnesota law, to be guilty of obstruction, one must intentionally "obstruct, resist, or interfere with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties." Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2002). In his guilty plea, Ingram admitted that (1) he knew police officers were at his house to execute an arrest warrant on him, (2) he stabbed the police dog with a screwdriver when the police came to arrest him, (3) he struggled with the officers and the dog, (4) he knew he was interfering with the police in carrying out their duties, and (5) he was not acting in self defense. (See Villaume Aff. Exs. C, D.) The court accepted his plea. (Villaume Aff. Ex. C.)
Standard of Decision
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the evidence demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In viewing the evidence, the Court makes its inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The burden is on the moving party,Enterprise Bank, 92 F.3d at 747; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), and summary judgment should be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In essence, the court performs a threshold inquiry to determine whether there is a need for trial. Id.
Analysis
The sole issue before the Court is whether Ingram is collaterally estopped from asserting his claims after having pled guilty to obstruction. "[T]he Supreme Court [has] held collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, may apply when § 1983 plaintiffs attempt to re-litigate in federal court issues decided against them in state criminal proceedings." Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980)). Once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case. Id. (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 94). This Court "gives a state court judgment the same preclusive effect it would be given under the law of the state in which it was rendered." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738).In order for collateral estoppel to apply under Minnesota law, the following must be true:
(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.Id. at 1006 (citing Willems v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 333 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Minn. 1983)). Thus, for Ingram to be collaterally estopped from asserting the present claims, the issues must be identical to those in the obstruction case. The Court will examine Ingram's causes of action in turn.
I. Unreasonable Force
Ingram is not estopped from asserting his unreasonable force claim. Unreasonable force is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" test. Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 328 F.3d 427, 433 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); Crumley, 324 F.3d at 1007. This test asks whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, and it pays "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Kuha, 328 F.3d at 433-34 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Thus, the issue in this Court will be whether Pavlak and Wortman's use offeree was objectively reasonable.
The issue in the state court, however, was obstruction of legal process with force, which is intentionally "obstruct[ing], resist[ing], or interfer[ing] with a peace officer." As the state court record reveals, the reasonableness of Pavlak's and Wortman's use offeree was not at issue, nor was it litigated or decided. (See Villaume Aff. Ex. C.) Although Ingram admitted that he was interfering with the police, his resistence was the sole issue before the state court, while it is only a factor to be considered in determining unreasonable force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Thus, because the obstruction and unreasonable force claims are not identical, Ingram's unreasonable force claim is not precluded by collateral estoppel.
Furthermore, other courts have squarely held that a guilty plea or verdict in state court for resisting arrest does not necessarily preclude a subsequent claim of excessive force in federal court. See. e.g., Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (collecting cases) ("The mere fact that Sullivan was conclusively shown by his prior convictions to have resisted arrest and harassed Officer Gagnier could not foreclose the possibility that the force used by Gagnier in response to Sullivan's misconduct was excessive"); Donovan v. Thames, 105 F.3d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that an excessive force claim was not precluded "[b]ecause the issue of the officers' use of excessive force was not essential to the conviction for resisting arrest and because [the court had] no evidence that the issue of excessive force was actually litigated in the state-court criminal proceeding").
While Defendants assert two counter-arguments, neither has merit. First, Defendants argue that Heck v. Humphrey compels the Court to dismiss Ingram's unreasonable force claim because its successful prosecution would render his state court conviction invalid. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Ingram, however, does not challenge the lawfulness of the arrest, but rather the excessiveness of the force used. Because "[a] lawful arrest may be accompanied by excessive force,"Sullivan, 225 F.3d at 166, the success of Ingram's action would not demonstrate the invalidity of his obstruction conviction. Second, Defendants argue that Ingram has conceded that the force was reasonable because he admitted he was not acting in self defense. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. at 9). While Ingram resisted arrest, however, it does not follow that the responding force was reasonable. As the Second Circuit explains,
Heck held that "in order to recover damages fory . . . harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been" reversed, expunged, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). "A claim for damages . . . that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983." Id. at 487 (emphasis in original).
The fact that a person whom a police officer attempts to arrest resists, threatens, or assaults the officer no doubt justifies the officer's use of some degree of force, but it does not give the officer license to use force without limit. The force used by the officer must be reasonably related to the nature of the resistance and the force used, threatened, or reasonably perceived to be threatened, against the officer.Sullivan, 225 F.3d 165-66 (emphasis in original).
Because the issues are not identical — "obstruct[ion], resist[ance], or interfere[nce] with a peace officer" versus "objective reasonableness" of the force — and the state court never addressed the reasonableness of the force used, collateral estoppel does not apply. Thus, the Court will deny Defendants' motion with regard to the unreasonable force claim. II. Assault and Battery
Needless to say, the particular facts pertaining to Ingram's resistance and admission that he was not acting in self defense cannot be relitigated because the state court decided them as "an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment" in the obstruction case. Crumley, 324 F.3d at 1006.
Nor is Ingram estopped from asserting his assault and battery claims. "An assault is a threat to do bodily harm to another with the present ability to carry out the threat," and "[a] battery is an intentional, unpermitted, offensive contact with another." Adewale v. Whalen, 21 F. Supp.2d 1006, 1016 (D. Minn. 1998) (Tunheim, J.) (citing Dahlin v. Fraser, 288 N.W. 851 (Minn. 1939); Paradise v. City of Minneapolis, 297 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 1980)). Minnesota, however, "does not recognize `excessive force' as a cause of action apart from assault and battery." Id. at 1015 n. 6. "[O]nly the use of excessive force by a police officer will constitute a battery." Johnson v. Peterson, 358 N.W.2d 484, 485 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984) (citing Paradise, 297 N.W.2d at 152) (emphasis in original). Consequently, the issues in the obstruction proceeding are not identical to the issues facing this Court because the state court only decided whether Ingram obstructed, resisted, or interfered with the police, not whether Ingram was battered or assaulted. Moreover, because the assault and battery claims are not independent of the unreasonable force claim, they are not precluded for reasons stated above. Thus, the Court concludes that the assault and battery claims are not precluded.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 8) is DENIED.Dated: September 12, 2003