Opinion
C. A. N20C-12-243 JRJ
08-19-2021
ANNE INGINO-CACCHIOLI, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE ADMINISTATOR AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES JOSEPH CACCHIOLI, Plaintiff, v. INFINITY CONSULTING SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant.
Date Submitted: July 28, 2021
ORDER STAYING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT PENDING INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD'S DETERMINATION
Jan R. Jurden, President Judge
Upon consideration of Defendant Infinity Consulting Solutions, Inc. ("Defendant")'s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff Anne Ingino-Cacchioli, individually and as administrator of the Estate of Charles Joseph Cacchioli ("Plaintiff)'s Response thereto, Defendant's Reply to Support its Motion to Dismiss, and the record in this case, IT APPEARS THAT:
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Def. Mot. to Dismiss") (Trans. ID. 66417983).
Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant Infinity Consulting Solutions, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss ("Pl. Opp. to Def. Motion to Dismiss") (Trans. ID. 66517634).
Defendant's Reply to Support its Motion to Dismiss ("Def. Rep. for Mot. to Dismiss") (Trans. ID 66576387).
1. Plaintiff Anne Ingino-Cacchioli, widow of Decedent Charles Joseph Cacchioli ("Decedent"), in her individual capacity and on behalf of Decedent's Estate, filed suit against Decedent's employer, Defendant Infinity Consulting Solutions, Inc., alleging that Defendant's negligence, gross negligence, and/or recklessness caused Decedent to contract his fatal case of COVID-19 at work.
Complaint ("Compl.") ¶¶ 96-102 (Trans. ID 66218224). Plaintiff also alleges derivative claims for loss of consortium and survival and wrongful death. Id. ¶¶ 115-123.
2. In response, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of the Delaware Worker's Compensation Act ("Act").
Def. Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 5; see 19 Del. C. § 2304. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs derivative claims for consortium and survival and wrongful death on the same basis, as barred by the exclusivity provision of the Delaware Worker's Compensation Act. Id. ¶ 7.
3. The Act provides compensation benefits to employees who suffer personal injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment and it is the "exclusive remedy available to an employee to secure compensation from an employer for work-related injuries." Injuries covered by the Act include only those that create "violence to the physical structure of the body, such disease or infection as naturally results directly therefrom when reasonably treated and compensable occupational diseases and compensable ionizing radiation injuries arising out of and in the course of employment."
Grabowski v. Mangier, 2007 WL 121845, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2007); see also 19 Del. C. § 2304.
4. The Industrial Accident Board ("IAB") is the governing body vested with jurisdiction to hear all cases arising under the Act and any dispute over work-related injuries must be heard in the first instance by the IAB.
Jeanbaptiste v. Clarios, LLC, 2020 WL 2375047, at *3 (Del. Super. May 11, 2020); see also 29 Del. C. §8511.
5. As noted, Defendant disputes the Superior Court's jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims, arguing that Plaintiff must first bring her claim to the IAB for a determination on the merits because Plaintiff claims the Decedent contracted COVID-19 at his workplace.
Def. Rep. for Mot. to Dismiss at 3.
6. Plaintiff rebuts the Defendant's argument, asserting that because COVID-19 does not qualify as an occupational disease or any other "injury" covered by the Act, her claims in this Court are not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act. Plaintiff relies on two decisions from Delaware Courts for the proposition that an "occupational disease" as defined under the Act is one that results from the peculiar nature of the employment or one that is commonly regarded as natural or inherent in the particular type of employment. Plaintiff argues that because COVID-19 is not the type of disease inherent in a professional staffing job, like Decedent's, it cannot be considered an occupational disease under the Act.
PI. Opp. to Def. Motion to Dismiss at 4.
See Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 1965); Burns v. Wilson, 2015 WL 413452 (Del. Super. Jan. 30, 2015).
PI. Opp. to Def. Motion to Dismiss at 5.
7. Assuming arguendo, that COVID-19 is not defined as an occupational disease in accordance with the case law upon which Plaintiff relies, her argument fails to address the jurisdictional argument Defendant raises-that the IAB is the appropriate decision-making body to make such a determination in the first instance.
The two cases Plaintiff relies on, Air Mod Corp. v. Newton and Burns v. Wilson, began with petitions in the IAB, which were then appealed up to the Delaware Supreme Court and the Superior Court, respectively. Air Mod Corp., 215 A.2d at 437; Burns, 2015 L 413452 at *1.
8. At oral argument on July 28, 2021, Plaintiffs counsel disclosed to the Court that Plaintiff filed a petition in this case with the IAB on May 19, 2021 in order to preserve her claims within the one-year statute of limitations. According to Plaintiff, Plaintiffs IAB petition was stayed by stipulation and order of the Board pending a decision in this Court.
9. In light of the fact that Plaintiff has preserved her rights with the IAB and the well-established Delaware statutory and case law vesting the IAB with jurisdiction to hear all cases arising under the Act, it is evident to the Court that this case should first be heard by the IAB.
Defendant cites to an IAB decision where the Board exercised jurisdiction over a claimant's work-related COVID-19 case. In that case, the IAB denied compensation because the claimant failed to prove he contracted COVID-19 at his workplace. Carl Fowler v. Perdue, Inc., IAB Hearing No. 1501167 (Dec. 31, 2020); see Def. Rep. for Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5. Defendant argues that although the IAB did not need to resolve the question of whether COVID-19 was covered by the Act, neither party disputed the Board's authority to do so if necessary. Id.
NOW THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, this matter is STAYED pending, and subject to, the IAB's determination of the matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.